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I. INTRODUCTION
For fifteen years, the United States has experienced high
levels of immigration.1 Although analysts debate the effects
and merits of this development,2 all acknowledge one
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1. From 1981 through 1995, over twelve million legal immigrants were admitted to
the United States. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, STATISTICAL ABSfRACf OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1997, at 10 (117th ed. 1997).
2. See generally NATIONAL REsEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC,
DEMOGRAPHIC AND FISCAL EFFEcrs OF IMMIGRATION (1997). See also, e.g., PETER
BRIMELOW, AUEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION DISASTER
(1995) (severely criticizing recent immigration); PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS,
STRANGERS, AND IN-BE1WEENS: EssAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, ch. 14 (1998)
(reviewing Brimelow and defending recent immigration); MiCHAEL FIX & JEFFREY S.
PASSEL, IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANTS: SETI1NG THE RECORD STRAIGHT (1994)
(highlighting some economic benefits and costs of immigration).
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undesirable consequence: an increasing number of aliens
commit crimes in the United States but are not removed.S
Decrying the costs of arresting, prosecuting, and incarcerating
these criminal aliens, politicians in jurisdictions where
immigrants cluster have implored the federal government for
more than a decade to remove the illegal aliens as quickly as
possible.4
This chorus of complaints began as early as July, 1985, when
Senator Alfonse D'Amato of New York asked the Government
Accounting Office (GAO) to investigate the performance of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in removing
criminal aliens in the New York City area.s In the first of many
such reports during the next decade, the GAO announced what
would come to be a familiar litany of alarming findings. A
significant share of arrested felons were aliens. The vast
majority of them were quickly released by local law
enforcement agencies without any INS screening. Most of the
arrested aliens convicted of crimes for which they ought to
have been removed were released pending completion of
deportation proceedings and either absconded or were arrested
only after they committed new crimes. Few who were released
were actually removed. The INS often failed to prevent the re-
entry of the small percentage of criminal aliens whom it did
manage to remove, and its information systems for screening
3. Although the absolute number of criminal aliens in the United States has increased,
the findings of two recent studies improve our information about the nature of this
population by comparing criminal aliens incarcerated in California prisons to native-
born inmates over a ten-year period ending in 1996. The studies find that aliens are
much more likely to be imprisoned for drug offenses, serve longer sentences, have a
lower crime rate despite a lower education level, and are less likely to be incarcerated
than demographically similar native-born Americans. The studies also find that this
cohort of criminal aliens has a lower crime rate than the cohort that preceded it. See
Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, The Role ofDeportation in the Incarceration of
Immigrants, unpublished manuscript, Boston College Dept. of Economics, Feb. 1999;
Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, Recent Immigrants: Unexpected Implicationsfor
Crime and Incarceration, 51:4lNous. & LAB. REL REv. 654-57 Ouly 1998). For a review of
four recent books on criminal aliens in the United States from specific ethnic groups,
see Wayne Fulton, Four Books about Criminal Aliens, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, Winter
1997-98, at 149.
4. See, e.g., Daniel M. Weintraub, County to Dun U.S. for Illegal-Alien Expenses, L. A.
TIMES, June 25, 1986, at B3; Illegal Alien Felons: A Federal Responsibility: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Federal Spending, Budget, and Accounting ofthe Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 100th Congo 2 (1987) [hereinafter Federal Responsibility] (statement of Sen.
Lawton Chiles).
5. See Judith Bender, INS Computer System Failing to Keep Out Aliens, NEWSOAY, Mar.
13,1987, at 41.
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aliens' entry into the country did not even list most of the
previously removed criminal aliens. Senator D'Amato
demanded an INS response detailing a plan to remedy the
criminal-alien problem, and, in September 1986, the INS
presented its Alien Criminal Apprehension Program, a
coherent strategy for action.
Today, almost fifteen years later, the INS has made only a
small dent in the criminal-alien problem. In 1986, the INS
removed fewer than ten percent of the criminal aliens who had
been arrested.6 Although it has multiplied the number of
deportations seven-fold since then, it still removes7 fewer than
twenty percent of the nearly 300,000 criminal aliens estimated
to be already under law enforcement supervision.s
In the vast majority of cases, these aliens are removable as a
matter of law.9 Congress has repeatedly insisted-ever more
emphatically- that criminal aliens be easily removed on the
assumption that, because Congress has systematically deprived
aliens of avenues of relief, removal can be swiftly effectuated.
The latest and most drastic measure, the Illegal Immigration
6. See Federal Responsibility, supra note 4, at 1.
7. Although the terms "removal" and "deportation" are not equivalent, they are used
interchangeably in this Article to refer to the expulsion o~aliens already in the country.
Prior to April 1, 1997, the INS could remove aliens from' the United States through
either exclusion or deportation. Aliens who had not yet entered the country could be
excluded; those who had entered had to be deported. The IIIegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRlRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Division C
(part of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997), 110 Stat. 3009-546,
merged the procedures for deportation and exclusion into one "removal proceeding."
IIRIRA § 304 (codified at 8 U.S.c. §§ 1229, 1229a, 1229b, 1229c). Because this study is
concerned with the identification and removal of criminal aliens already in the United
States, it focuses on issues relating to deportation, not exclusion. Thus, although the
term "removal" now technically applies to what were previously considered exclusions
as well as deportations, this Article uses the term to mean only those actions formerly
known as deportations.
8. See infra Section II.C. Throughout this Article, the phrase "under law enforcement
supervision" is used to-refer to all those individuals in state or federal prisons, in local
jails, on state or federal parole, or on probation.
9. An alien is removable (or deportable) by law if he has engaged in conduct that
constitutes a ground for removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
Before IIRlRA, this included aliens convicted of one or more "crimes of moral
turpitude" or of an "aggravated felony," and those convicted of certain drug and
firearm offenses; those excludable at the time of entry or of adjustment of status; status
violators; non-registrants; document violators; and security offenders. IIRlRA added
other crimes to this list and expanded the category of aggravated felony. A removable
alien, however, may have available to him certain defenses or waivers enabling him to
defeat removal, although IIRlRA severely restricted these defenses and waivers,
essentially eliminating them for convicted criminals.
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Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),lO
expands the category of criminal aliens who are subject to
expedited removal,l1 bars. judicial review of most removal
orders,12 mandates detention pending removal,13 and
eliminates legal defenses for all criminal aliens except a few
long-term permanent residents.14 Coming on the heels of
similar legislation passed with notable regularity in 1986, 1988,
1990, 1991, 1994, and earlier in 1996, IIRIRA was heralded as a
"landmark" law, the toughest "in a generation."l5
In truth, IIRIRA may be the harshest,. most procrustean
immigration control measure in this century-so much so that
Congress should amend the new law in a number of important
respects. One of us has discussed these objections elsewhere.16
In this Article, however, we do not develop those objections
but instead take the statute as given.
Despite the rigor of IIRIRA and its predecessors, they will
not rid the country of criminal aliens. The recent history of the
criminal-alien problem suggests that .only an· enormous
increase in resources or a significant realignment of inter-
governmental responsibilities will enable the federal
government to deport most removable criminal aliensP This
10. IIRIRA, supra note 7. IlRIRA made many other changes, but here we discuss only
those relating to removal of criminal aliens.
11. See nRIRA § 321,(codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1101(a)(43» (expanding definition of
"aggravated felony," a term discussed in more detail infra beginning at text
accompanying note 90).
12. See IlRIRA § 306 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252).
13. See nRIRA § 303(a).
14. See IlRIRA § 348 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h».
15. William Branigin, Congress Finishes Major Legislation; Immigration: Focus is
Borders, Not Benefits, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1996, at AI.
16. The objections concern the statute's broad retroactivity provisions, its possibly
unconstitutional restrictions on judicial review, its elimination of INS discretion in cases
of extreme hardship, its indiscriminate expansion of the aggravated felony category,
and other features. See SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 143-45. Many earlier immigration
control measures were also exceedingly harsh-some examples are the Chinese
exclusion laws, the "gentleman's agreement" with Japan, Operation.Wetback, and the
infamous Palmer raids of the 1920s-but those were discrete enforcement initiatives
rather than structural legislative reform of the immigration enforcement system as a
whole, as represented by IlRIRA and the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of1996 (AEDPA).
17. In the remainder of this Article, all references to criminal aliens will refer to
removable criminal aliens unless the context suggests otherwise. This distinction is
extremely important because aliens are not removable by reason of a crime as a matter
of law until they either have been convicted of the crime in a court, have entered a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere, or have admitted sufficient facts to' warrant a finding of
guilt and the judge ordered some punishment, penalty, or restraint on liberty. See
IlRIRA § 322(a)(I) (codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1101 (a)(48)(A) (Supp. II 1996». At that point,
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Article explains the basis for this baleful prediction.
Policy failure is remarkably common. Its causes are
numerous. Any vague or contradictory policy may unravel
during implementation, especially if it was based on a fragile
political consensus or commands a low priority in Congress or
the relevant department or agency,18 Congress may hobble a
policy by granting insufficient authority to the agency charged
with implementing it19 or by diffusing that authority across
several agencies, leading to time-consuming turf disputes.
Well-organized special interests may co-opt administrators and
twist a policy to suit their own purposes. Judicial interference
may hobble implementation.2o And, when these problems arise,
Congress may no longer be paying attention.
What is most striking about the INS's failure to establish an
effective criminal-alien removal system, however, is that none
of these familiar explanations-even in combination-can
account for it. It is hard to think of any public policy that is less
controversial than the removal of criminal aliens. Although
consensus on overall immigration policy has often been
elusive, no policymakers or significant interest groups have
argued that aliens who commit serious crimes after IIRIRA's
effective date should not be removed. Even immigration
lawyers, who have fought to maintain due process for aliens in
removal hearings, have focused their attention on the issues of
the law's retroactive effect and its elimination of relief in
hardship cases.
The criminal-alien problem also has been a perennially high
policy priority for lawmakers. Congress began investigating
the problem in 1985,21 and politicians and reporters have
they may be placed in removal proceedings. The Board of Immigration Appeals
("BIA") recently held that this provision is not affected by state expungement or other
rehabilitative statutes. See Matter of Roldan-Santoyo, Int., Dec. 3377 (BIA 1999). As
detailed in this Article, Congress has steadily-most dramatically in IIRIRA-eased the
INS's procedural and substantive burdens in obtaining and executing a final order of
removal.
18. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILUAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL, DIRTY AIR
(1981).
19. See, e.g., BERYL A. RADIN, IMPLEMENTATION, CHANGE, AND THE FEDERAL
BUREAUCRACY (1977).
20. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY
(1990).
21. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRIMINAL AUENS: INS INVESIlGATIVE
EFFORTS IN THE NEW YORK CITY AREA 1 (1986) [hereinafter INVESIlGATIVE].
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emphasized it ever since.22 It has been a focus of media
attention since 1991, when California Governor Pete Wilson
began to complain about the fiscal burdens of illegal
immigration.23 Indeed, Congress passed legislation on the topic
in every Congress since 1986.24
The INS also enjoys immense administrative advantages that
ought to make its task of removing criminal aliens relatively
easy. First, the federal government possesses exclusive legal
authority over immigration and has delegated all of that
authority to one agency, the INS. Hence, the INS need not
share legal authority with state governments or with any other
federal agency, although this Article argues that it should do so
in the future. Second, whatever conflicts inhere in other aspects
of immigration law, criminal-alien policy is clear: Congress has
repeatedly demanded that criminal aliens be removed
immediately and ahead of other removable aliens. Third,
compared to problems such as global warming and poverty,
the causes and nature of the criminal-alien removal problem
are straightforward and clearly understood by all of the
relevant actors. Fourth, few criminal aliens have legal avenues
of defense or even delay available to them anymore, as
Congress has scaled back or eliminated nearly all of them.
Fifth, because all criminal aliens are, at some point, in physical
custody or otherwise under the supervision of law
enforcement, it should be possible for the INS to find and
control them without undue difficulty. Finally, at a time of
fiscal stringency, Congress has rapidly expanded the agency's
22. See, e.g., Peter Kerr, Moves to Deport Aliens for Drugs are not Pressed, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 1986, at A1; George Ramos, New Effort to Deport Alien Criminals in US. Jails Told,
L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1986, at Bl.
23. See infra Section 1V.C.1.
24. Including IIRIRA, ten laws since 1986 have included significant measures
affecting criminal aliens. See Criminal Aliens Identification (CAI), Pub. L. No. 105-141,
111 Stat. 2647 (1997); AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); Immigration
and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 (INCfA), Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108
Stat. 4305 (1994); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (VCCLEA),
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration
and Naturalization Amendments Act (MTINA), Pub. L. No. 102-232, 105 Stat. 1733
(1991); Immigration Act of 1990 (lMMACf90), Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978
(1990); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADA of 1988), Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181
(1988); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (!RCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (1986); and Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADA of 1986), Pub. L. No. 99-570,
100 Stat. 3207 (1986). This does not include appropriations legislation targeting
criminal-alien removal or amnesty legislation adopted in 1997 and 1998 making
aggravated felons ineligible for this relief.
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resources, staffing, and authority; indeed, the INS budget has
increased more than five-fold since 1985 and has more than
doubled since 1994. As a result, the INS is now the largest law
enforcement agency in the country.
Despite these remarkable policy implementation advantages,
the INS removed relatively few criminal aliens until recently.
From a population conservatively estimated at 300,000
removable criminal aliens under law enforcement supervision
(and many more at large),25 the INS has managed to remove
only a small fraction, fewer than twenty percent.26 The best
estimates suggest that the number of removable criminal aliens
under law enforcement supervision has increased nearly ten-
fold since 1980.17 This number of criminal aliens jrnposes heavy
costs on the public and on law enforcement, especially in those
states such as California and Florida with large immigrant
populations. What possibly could have gone wrong?
Searching for an explanation for this surprising policy
failure, this Article first describes the contours of the criminal-
alien problem, (part 11), although data deficiencies of the
criminal-alien removal system make this difficult. It next
explores the legal and institutional framework of the removal
system (part III) and concludes that, although the provisions of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) applicable to
criminal aliens arm the INS with ample legal authority to
perform the task, it must rely as a practical' matter on other
public agencies that do not always share its congressionally
mandated priorities. Local law enforcement agencies
apprehend and identify criminal aliens; state and local
correction officials detain them; and immigration judges in the
Justice Department's Executive Office of Immigration Review
(BOIR) preside over their removal proceedings. This web of
federal, state, and local institutions is complex, fragmented,
and subject to the sort of coordination problems that
25. See Telephone Interview with Russell A. Bergeron, Director of Public Mfairs, INS
(Feb. 11, 1999) [hereinafter Feb. 11, 1999, Bergeron Interview]. Our own estimates are
detailed at Section ITA, infra.
26. In fi!lcal year 1997 (FY 97), the INS removed 114,386, 51,272 of whom were
convicted of crimes in the United States. In FY 98, the INS removed 171,154 foreigners,
which constituted a fifty percent increase over the previous year; deportees convicted
of crimes increased less than ten percent, to 56,011. See MIGRATION NEWS, Feb. 1999, ,
Vol. 6, No.2 <http:ffmigration.ucdavis.edu> [hereinafter Migration News].
27. See Feb. 11, 1999, Bergeron Interview, supra note 25. See also Section II.A., infra.
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predictably confound implementation.28
The Article next reviews the political and policy responses to
the criminal-alien problem (part IV). One might ask: if the
INS's difficulties were so substantial, why did Congress fail to
allocate new resources or craft a legislative solution? The
answer is that Congress did act; it conducted numerous
hearings and steadily and severely limited the· ·rights and
defenses of criminal aliens, while also rapidly increasing the
INS's budget. The result is that the INS has become one of the
fastest growing federal agencies. Today, even relatively minor
offenses can trigger the rapid removal of a long-term lawful
permat:\ent resident (LPR).
These efforts, however, did not solve the agency's problems.
Although the INS developed a promising criminal-alien
strategy as early as 1986, both Congress and the agency tried to
devise cheap solutions to the criminal-alien problem by
focusing on procedural reforms designed to reduce aliens'
defenses to removal and to accelerate the hearing process.
These reforms marginally improved the removal system, but
did not increase removals substantially. Although both
Congress and the INS knew that this course was too timid to be
effective, they persisted in it until state governments, unwilling
to pay the price for this federal policy failure any longer,
devised strategies intended to raise the political costs to federal
officials of further temporizing. The INS responded by
proposing a comprehensive removal strategy that Congress
fully funded - and then some. Yet the INS still removes only a
small proportion of the criminal aliens under law enforcement
supervision.
The Article concludes with a diagnosis and a
recommendation for a partial remedy for '; the INS's
ineffectiveness in removing criminal aliens. The removal
system is plagued by a chronic and fundamental misalignment
of governmental incentives. The INS cannot remove criminal
aliens without the cooperation of federal, state, and local
government agencies, yet those agencies do not share its
priorities. Although these agencies support the federal policy of
criminal-alien removal, their own orgariizational incentives
28. See, e.g., JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION 102-10
(1973) (ascribing delay in the Economic Development Administration's Oakland project
to similar coordination problems). '
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cause them to emphasize other goals, which delay or defeat
implementation of INS strategies. Although authority to
enforce the immigration laws lies almost exclusively with the
federal government, states and localities bear most of the costs
of policy failure. This mismatch between legal authority and
fiscal burden leaves states and localities vulnerable to federal
neglect. Federalism, then, appears to be the source of the
implementation problem.
This Article proposes a bold solution that seeks to build upon
the crucial role of the states in sparking recent progress in
criminal-alien removals29-the devolution of some immigration
enforcement authority. States with large populations of
immigrants are highly sensitive to the costs that criminal aliens
impose, probably even more sensitive than Congress. In
addition, state and local governments are almost always the
first to apprehend criminal aliens and thus are in the best
position to initiate the removal process. Under the current
system, however, they lack the information, incentive, and
legal authority to exploit this advantage. Rather than forcing
states to seek relief in Washington from burdens relating to
criminal aliens, federal policymakers should encourage states
to contribute to local solutions. Here, as elsewhere, Congress
can use federalism as a resource for, rather than an obstacle to,
effective policy implementation.3D
II. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Growing Population ofCriminal Aliens
Any attempt to determine the size of the criminal-alien
population must confront the lack of reliable information about
the removal system. Aware of these pitfalls, the INS has not
even attempted a comprehensive estimate.31 Nevertheless, the
population has certainly exploded since 1980, multiplying
perhaps ten-fold.32
29. For another analysis advocating a greater role for states in immigration policy, see
Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era ofDemi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L.
121 (1994).
30. See generally Symposium, Constructing a New Federalism: Jurisdictional Competence
and Competition, 14 YALE L. & pOL'Y REv. 2 (1996).
31. See Telephone Interview with John Morton, Special Assistant to the INS General
Counsel (Mar. 4, 1997) [hereinafter Morton Interview].
32 For an explanation of these estimates, see Table I and Table II later in this section.
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For purposes of this analysis, the Article defines "criminal
aliens" as those aliens who have been convicted of a crime in
the United States33 and who are removable under current law.34
The target group, therefore, includes both illegal aliens who are
convicted of any crime committed in the United States and
legal aliens (including lawful non-resident aliens and lawful
permanent residents (LPRs)) whose criminal convictions make
them removable. Although this population is the precise target
of the criminal-alien removal system, it is exceedingly difficult
to count. Without precise data, officials and policy analysts
make estimates based on any of three different measures:
(1) All foreign-born persons, including citizens, convicted of
crimes;
(2) All non-citizens convicted of crimes, whether removable
or not;
(3) All non-citizens convicted -of crimes who are removable
under current law.
It is highly noteworthy- because it reflects the nature and
causes of the underlying criminal-alien removal problem-that
neither the federal government nor the states has developed
reliable figures for any of these categories. The easiest number
to count, and the only figure routinely gathered by state and
local governments, is the number of prison and jail inmates
who are foreign-bom.35 Congress has required states to report
The INS also estimates that 93 percent of the aliens it detains have criminal records,
compared to only 40 percent in the late 1980s. See Migration News, supra note 26, at No.
3, Mar. 1999 <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/archive/mar_1999-0l.html>.
33. Although any policy designed to limit the number of criminal aliens in the United
States should also seek to prevent the entry of those who have committed crimes in
other countries, this Article is not concerned with that problem. Furthermore, although
the public is rightfully concerned about all aliens who commit crimes, and not simply
those who are convicted, it is the principal task of the INS, and therefore the focus of .
this Article, to remove those who have been convicted, rather than to seek out,
apprehend, and convict all aliens who commit crimes.
34. After all, the INS cannot be held accountable for failing to remove aliens who are
not deportable. As is discussed later in this Article, legislative changes over the period
1986 to 1996 have continued to expand the legal basis for deporting criminal aliens. By
definition, these legal changes increased the population of deportable criminal aliens.
This fact does not, however, affect this Article's estimates of the growth in the criminal-
alien population.
35. The number of foreign-born offenders on parole and probation is more difficult to
ascertain because these data, though generally gathered, are not systematically
reported. The analysis in this Article, described in more detail below, extrapolates from
the percentage of foreign-born inmates to arrive at the number of foreign-born
offenders on probation and parole.
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these numbers to the INS only since 1990,36 and many began to
do so only in 1992. Even this measure, the best available for
estimating the size of the removable criminal-alien population,
may be unreliable because local criminal-justice officials do not
verify inmates' often bogus claims that they were born in the
United States.37 Instead, the states simply report the number of
inmates who say they are foreign-bom.38
The next step- determining how many of the foreign-born
are, in fact, removable - is left to INS investigators to determine
on a case-by-case basis. Because the INS does not actually
determine whether most foreign-born offenders are removable,
analysts have developed rough rules of thumb to determine the
percentage of foreign-born inmates who are removable. The
INS estimates that seventy-nine percent of foreign-born state
prison inmates are removable, while seventy-five percent of
foreign-born federal inmates are.39 Two studies indicate that
about sixty percent of foreign-born inmates in the Los Angeles
County jail system are removable.40
No fully integrated models exist that can estimate the total
number of removable criminal aliens under law enforcement
supervision, let alone the number currently at large. Instead,
this Article contains necessarily imprecise extrapolations and
educated guesses:
Federal Pr.isons: The federal prison system contains by far the
highest proportion of foreign-born inmates of any
component of the criminal-justice system.41 In 1980, fewer
36. See lMMACT90 § 507 (current version at 42 U.S.c. § 3753(a)(11) (1994».
37. See, e.g., Criminal Aliens in the United States: Hearings Before the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 103rd
Congo 18 (1993) [hereinafter Criminal Aliens in the United States] (discussing
preponderance of inmates in one sample who claimed to have been born in Puerto Rico
or U.S. Virgin Islands).
38. Even these numbers may not be reported accurately. A recent report by the Urban
Institute found that some states even included inmates born in the United States among
their count of foreign-born inmates. See REBECCA L. CLARK ET AL., FISCAL IMPACfS OF
UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS: SELECTED EsTIMATES FOR SEVEN STATES57 (1995).
39. See THE INTERSTATE CRIMINAL ALIEN WORKING GROUP, REPORT ON ADDRESSING
THE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROBLEM 10 (1996) [hereinafter ADDRESSING THE CRIMINAL ALIEN
PROBLEM].
40. See Criminal Aliens: Hearing on H. Can. Res. 47 Before the Subcomm. on International
Law, Immigration, and Refugees of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Congo 171
(1994) [hereinafter 1994 Hearings on Criminal Aliens] (statement of Rep. Anthony C,
Beilenson).
41. Experts attribute this to the increase in drug arrests, especialIy those targeting
interdiction. Although seventy-five percent of the non-U.S.-eitizen federal prison
population is incarcerated for drug charges, only fifty-six percent of the U.S.-citizen
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than 1,000 non-US citizen inmates were in Bureau of Prison
(BOP) facilities, about 3.6 percent of the total BOP
population at that time.42 By 1988, the number had risen to
10,647 (21%);43 in May of 1995, the number was 25,444
(25.4%);44 and, by 1996, it had risen to 27,601 (26.2%).45 By
September, 1998, the number of sentenced, foreign-born
inmates was 28,05046 (29%).47
State Prisons: In 1980, approximately 8,000 foreign-born
inmates were in state prisons, 2.6 percent of the total state
prison population.48 By January of 1995, that number had
grown to 69,926 (7.6%)49 and in May of 1996, the number
was 77,257 (7.6%).50 By July of 1998, the number of foreign-
born inmates was 85,59351 (7.6%).52 Alien inmates are
concentrated in a handful of states; just seven (California,
New York, Texas, Florida, Arizona, New Jersey, and illinois)
federal prisoners are. See id. at 165 (statement of Kathleen M. Hawk, Director of the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP».
42. See id. at 166.
43. See Criminal Aliens in the United States, supra note 37, at 13.
44. See BUREAU OF JUSfiCE STATISTICS, U.S. DE?'T OF JUSflCE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSfiCE STATISTICS 1996, at 531 (1997) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK 1996]. The
total population of federal inmates in 1995 was 100,250. See BUREAU OF JUSfiCE
STATISTICS, U.S. DE?'T OF JUSflCE, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES, BULLETIN, 1995, at 1
(August 1996).
45. See ADDRESSING THE CRIMINAL AUEN PROBLEM, supra note 39, at 11. The total
population of federal inmates at the end of 1996 was 105,544. See BUREAU OF JUSfiCE
STATISTICS, U.S. DE?'TOFJUSflCE, PRISONERS IN 1996, BULl.ETIN 1 (1997).
46. See Statement of Amy Dale, Administrator, Detention Services, BOP, submitted to
the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, House Judiciary Committee (Sept. 17,
1998) [hereinafter Dale Statement] at 1.
47. The total BOP population in federal prisons at the end of 1997 was 112,973. See
Nation's Prison Population Increased By More Than 5 Percent During 1997 [hereinafter
Nation's Prison Population] <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/p97.pr>
(visited Feb. 10, 1999).
48. There were 9,071 foreign-born prisoners in state and federal prisons in 1980. See
Criminal Aliens in the United States, supra note 37, at 13 (staff statement of the permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations). Subtracting the 1,000 foreign-born prisoners in
federal prison in 1980 yields a foreign-born state prison population of approximately
8,000. The total state prison population in 1980 was 259,363. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSIRACf OF THE UNITED STATES1995, at194 (114th ed.1994).
49. See Removal of Criminal and Illegal Aliens: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, l04th Congo 8 (1995)
[hereinafter Hearings on Removal) (statement of T. Alexander Aleinikoff, General
Counsel, INS). The total state prison population in 1994 was 936,896. See U.S. BUREAU
OF lliE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACf OF THE UNITED STATES: 1997, at 220 (117th ed.
1997).
50 See ADDRESSING THE CRIMINAL AUEN PROBLEM, supra note 39, at 10. The total state
prison population at year-end 1996 was 1,076,625. See Christopher J. Mumola & Allen J.
Beck, BUREAU OF JUSfiCE STATISTICS, U.S. DE?'T OF JUSflCE, BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 1996
(1997) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs>.
51 See Dale Statement, supra note 46.
52. The total population of state prisons at the end of 1997 was 1,131,581. See Nation's
Prison Population, supra note 47.
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hold more than eighty percent of them.53 Foreign-born
inmates account for twenty-one percent of California's
prison population, thirteen percent of New York's, nine
percent of Florida's and eight percent of Texas's.54
Local Jails: Data on foreign-born inmates in local jails is not
systematically collected. Two studies of the Los Angeles
County jails, conducted in 1990 and 1992, found that
nineteen percent of the inmates were foreign-born and
eleven percent were deportable.55 Because criminal aliens
are concentrated in certain localities, these figures cannot be
extrapolated to jails across the country. Our best guess,
admittedly a rough one, is that foreign-born inmates
constitute roughly the same proportion of local inmates as
they do of state inmates. This would mean that 7.6 percent of
the 1996 local jail population of 518,492 was foreign-bom.56
If so, there were approximately 39,400 foreign-born inmates
in local jails at any given time in 1996. For mid-year 1997,
the numbers changed slightly: the local jail population grew
to 581,733,57 with an estimated 44,088 (7.6 %) foreign-born.
Probation and Parole: No hard data is available on the
numbers of foreign-born offenders on probation and parole.
If, as one would expect, the proportion is similar to that in
the inmate population, there were at least 247,912 foreign-
born probationers and 52,060 foreign-born offenders on
federal or state parole as of December, 1997.58
All told, then, the number of criminal aliens in custody or
53. See ADDRESSING THE CRIMINAL AllEN PROBLEM, supra note 39, at 10.
54. See Deborah Sontag, Porous Deportation System Gives Criminal Little 10 Fear, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1994, at AI. State-reported figures such as these, however, may not be
entirely reliable. A 1992 study by the National Institute of Corrections, for example,
found that alien inmates made up only 10.4 percent of California's total inmate
population, and only 4.3 percent of Texas's. See Criminal Aliens in the United Slates, supra
note 37, at 13 (staff statement of the permanent Subcomm. on Investigations). In another
study, conducted by the Urban Institute, nearly twenty percent of those reported by
Texas as foreign-born inmates were actually born in the United States. See CLARK, supra
note 38, at 57. A recent study finds that twenty-seven percent of those admitted to
California prisons in 1996 were foreign-born. See Butcher & Piehl, supra note 3. On the
other hand, many aliens falsely claim to be United States citizens or nationals. See supra
note 37 and accompanying text.
55. See 1994 Hearings on Criminal Aliens, supra note 40, at 171 (statement of Rep.
Anthony C. Beilenson).
56. See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES
AT MiDYEAR, 1996,at 2 (1997).
57. JAILS STATISTICS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (visited on Feb. 10, 1999)
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/jails.htm> [hereinafter JAILSSTATISTlCSj.
58. There were 3,262 million probationers and 685,000 parolees at the end of 1997. See
PROBATION AND PAROLE STATISTICS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (visited on Feb. 10,
1999) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pandp.htm>.
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otherwise under law enforcement supervision is approximately
300,000, a nearly ten-fold increase since 1980. The following
Tables summarize the location and status of criminal aliens in
1980 and 1997 (as noted above).
Table I:
Removable Criminal Aliens in 1997
75% of 28,050 foreign-born federal prisoners: 21,036
79% of 85,593 foreign-born state prisoners: 67,618
79% of 52,060 foreign-born parolees: 41,127
60% of 44,088 foreign-born local prisoners: 26,453
60% of 246,912 foreign-born probationers: 148,147
TOTAL: 304,381
Table 2:
Removable Criminal Aliens in 198()59
75% of 1,000 foreign-born federal prisoners: 750
79% of 8,000 foreign-born state prisoners: 6,320
79% of 5,51160 foreign-born parolees: 4,354
60% of 4,55761 foreign-born local prisoners: 2,734
60% of 27,95262 foreign-born probationers: 16,771
TOTAL: 30,929
Others have estimated the total number of removable
criminal aliens under law enforcement supervision at 450,000
or higher.63 Although the calculations in this Article are more
conservative, the actual number of removable criminal aliens
59. Although the removable proportion of the foreign-born correctional population
was probably lower in 1980 than in 1997 due to the legislative changes of the 1980s and
1990s, this Article uses the same proportions for the sake of comparison.
60. The total population on parole in 1980 was 220,438. See SOURCEBOOK 1996, supra
note 44, at 502. Because 2.5 percent of the state prison population was foreign-born, this
Article assumes the same percentage for parole, probation, and local jail populations.
61. The total population in local jails in 1980 was 182,288. See id.
62. The total population on probation in 1980 was 1,118,097. See id.
63. See Criminal Aliens in the United States, supra note 37, at 12.
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present in the country is considerably higher than 300,000
because most criminal aliens move out of criminal-justice
supervision before the INS screens them.
Most criminal aliens are not present in the country legally,
although the percentage who fall within a particular
immigration status varies from state to state. Though no one
knows with certainty how many removable criminal aliens are
LPRs, non-immigrant aliens, and illegal aliens, rough data from
the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) indicate
that LPRs make up considerably less than a third of the
population of removable criminal aliens in state prisons.64
Officials estimate that over seventy-five percent of removable
criminal aliens in border states such as California and Texas are
not in the country legally,65 whereas a majority in other major
receiving states such as New York may be LPRs.66
B. The Costs ofFailure: High andRising
As the number of criminal aliens increases, so do the costs of
apprehending, identifying, prosecuting, and incarcerating
them. No precise cost estimates are available, although upper
and lower limits can be established. The Bureau of Justice
Statistics (BJS) reported that a total of $97.5 billion was spent
nationwide in 1993 on federal, state, and local law
enforcement.67 Because these costs increased by just over three
percent a year since 1993,68 the United States can anticipate
64. The State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) allows states to seek
reimbursement from the federal government for the costs of incarcerating removable
criminal aliens. States submit lists of their foreign-born prisoners to the Bureau of
Justice Assistance (BJA), and the INS attempts to match those names to INS databases
of known aliens. For FY 98, participating states submitted a foreign-born population of
roughly 106,000 names, about 72,000 of which were matched to INS data which showed
that just under 25,000 were LPRs and another 5,000 were otherwise in the country
legally. The INS estimates that only five percent of the 34,000 unmatched names were
legally in the country. If so, LPRs constituted less than thirty percent of the total
foreign-born population in state prisons. See Telephone Interview with Alison Morris,
Policy Analyst, INS Office of Program Planning (Mar. 8, 1999) [hereinafter Morris
Interview].
65. See Telephone Interview with Lydia St. John-Mellado, Special Assistant to the
Associate Comm'r for Enforcement, INS Oune 7, 1995) [hereinafter St. John-MelIado
Interview 1].
66. See Telephone Interview with Anthony Annucci, New York State Corrections
Dep't Oune 6, 1995) [hereinafter Annucci Interview].
67. See SOURCEBOOK1996, supra note 44, at 2.
68. The average inflation rate over the period was approximately three percent. See
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATI5flCAL ABSfRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES: 1997, at 487
(117th ed. 1997).
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spending approximately $118 billion on law enforcement in
1999. Because removable criminal aliens constitute roughly 5.5
percent of the total United States population under criminal
supervision,69 state, local, and federal law enforcement
expenditures on criminal aliens may be as high as $6.5 billion.
To judge solely from prosecution, detention, and
incarceration costs, law enforcement agencies spend a
minimum of nearly $3 billion annually on criminal aliens. The
roughly 100,000 removable criminal-alien prisoners currently
housed in federal, state, and local facilities cost governments
about $2.2 billion in incarceration expenses each year.70 One
must add to these incarceration costs the costs of apprehension
and prosecution. The Los Angeles County jail, which houses
about one-twelfth of the nation's removable jail inmates, was
processing 22,000 removable aliens annually by the early 1990s,
according to a number of studies.7! This implies that there were
more than 264,000 arrests of removable criminal aliens
nationwide that year. At that rate, the annual cost of arrest and
prosecution could have been $300 million.72 Tciken together,
these estimates suggest that government annually spends
between $2.5 and $6.5 billion in criminal justice costs
attributable to removable criminal aliens.
69. In1995, there were 3.1 million individuals on probation and 700,000 on parole, for
a total of roughly 3.8 million on supervised release. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISl1CS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECflONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1995 (1996).
At the same time, there were roughly 1.5 million persons in prison or jail (1,026,037
state prisoners; 507,044 jail inmates; and 100,250 federal prisoners). See BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISl1CS, U.S. DEP'T OF JuSTICE, JAIlS & JAIL INMATES: 1994 (1995). As noted
earlier, approximately 290,000 of the 5.3 million persons under criminal justice
supervision in 1994 (5.5%) were removable criminal aliens.
70. Current per-bed annual cost is $22,494. See -Telephone Interview with Steve
Mertins, Office of Management and the Budget (Feb. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Mertins
Interview I}. Because aliens serve longer sentences than their American counterparts,
Butcher & Piehl, supra note 3, these estimates, which are based on averages, tend to
understate the costs of incarcerating aliens.
71. See Criminal Aliens in the United States supra note 37, at 14. This Article assumes that
the Los Angeles county jail has about one-twelfth the national population of jailed
removable aliens because evidence from the hearings puts the population of removable
criminal aliens in that jail at just over 2,000 at any given time in 1993. See id. at 18. This
Article's earlier calculations suggest the population of removable aliens in local jails
nationally was roughly 23,600 (60% of 39,400 in 1996). See supra text accompanying
notes 40 and 56.
72. A 1990 study of the New York City criminal justice system conducted by the
Enforth Corporation found that criminal justice costs totaled nearly $1,000 per person
from arrest to arraignment. This estimate did not include the legal and court costs
beyond the arraignment. See Telephone Interview with Michelle Sviridoff, Center for
Court Innovation O"une 6, 1997). Assuming some additional court costs and inflation,
$300 million is a reasonable estimate.
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These costs are not spread evenly across local and state
governments. Although California has roughly one-eighth of
the national population, its prisons house roughly twenty-five
percent of the criminal aliens held in state or federal prison.73 A
California congressman stated that projected incarceration
costs for criminal aliens in FY 95 and FY 96 alone would be
$375 million.74 Certain localities are hit even harder. Los
Angeles County, for example, estima~ed that it spent $75
million in 1993 on incarceration and prosecution costs related
to removable criminal aliens.75 When costs are so concentrated,
the criminal-alien problem affects government services in
certain localities more than the $2.5-$6.5 billion national cost
figure would suggest.
C. Little Removal
As the number of criminal aliens has grown, the INS has
accelerated the pace of removals. Then-Deputy Attorney
General Jamie Gorelick called 1995 "a banner year"76 for
removals and declared that the government was on its way to
"creat[ing] a seamless web of enforcement."77 In FY 96, the INS
removed more than five times as many criminal aliens as it had
in FY 89, and by FY 98, removals were more than seven times
the FY 89 total.
Table 3:
Fiscal YearCriminal Removals78
73. See Sontag, supra note 54, at AI.
74. See 1994 Hearings on Criminal Aliens. supra note 40, at 133 (statement of Rep.
Richard H. Lehman). .
75. See Dianne Klein, A Hit or Miss Approach to Curbing Deportable Felons, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 1993, at Bl.
76. David. G. Savage, More Illegal Immigrants Deported, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1995, at
A19.
77. U.S. Deports RecordNumber olIllegallmmigrants in '95, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 29, 1995, § 1,
at 9.
78. See Criminal Aliens in the United States. supra note 37, at 77 (1993); see also
IMMIGRATION AND NATURAUZATION SERVICE, DEP'T OF JU5I1CE, REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL
AUENS 4 (1995) (budget briefing document on file with authors) (figures for FY 94);
IMMIGRATION AND NATURAUZATION SERVICE, DEr'T OF JU5I1CE, REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL
AND OTIiER ILLEGAL AUENS 3 Guly 1996) [hereinafter REMOVAL OF ILLEGAL AUENS)
(FY 95 figures); IMMIGRATION AND NATURAUZATION SERVICE, DEP'T OF JuSTICE, PRESS
RELEASE: 67,094 ILLEGAL AUENS REMOVED IN FY 96, at 1 (Oct. 26, 1996) (FY 96 figures);
IMMIGRATION AND NATURAUZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEr'T OF JU5I1CE, MONTHLY
REMOVALS REPORT: APRIL 1998, at 2 (1998) [hereinafter REMOVALS REPORT: APRIL 1998)
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Despite its substantial progress, however; the INS cannot
credibly claim to have succeeded. It still removes fewer than
twenty percent of the criminal aliens who are currently under
law enforcement supervision. Its performance is even worse when
one takes into account several other considerations. First, the
vast majority of removable criminal aliens are at large in the
community, either on probation or parole or free from criminal-
justice supervision altogether. Second, the problem is not
simply one of removing the stock of criminal aliens already in
the country. New immigration flows constantly replenish and
augment the stock of such aliens, while those not removed
before the end of their sentences are simply released into the
population at large.
As the next section of our analysis details, the causes of this
slow progress lie in the complicated structure of the criminal-
alien removal system.
III. THE CRIMINAL-ALIEN REMOVAL SYSTEM
Like many legal institutions, the "criminal-alien removal
system" consists of a legal framework and a thicket of
organizational structures. Some of these organizations, such as
the immigration courts that oversee the removal process, are
(FY 97 figures).
79. See REMOVALS REPORT: APRIL 1998, supra note 78 at 2; MIGRATION NEWS, supra
note 26.
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creatures of the immigration statute. Others, such as state and
local law enforcement, help to shape the system but are
fundamentally independent of it. Although each institution in
the system (local police departments, state and federal prison
agencies, the INS, the immigration court, and local U. S.
Attorneys) may see itself as separate from the others, both the
average citizen and the alien accused of a crime probably view
them as parts of an integrated whole. To understand this
system, then, this Article examines both the basic structure of
immigration law and the concrete practices of the institutional
actors that affect the apprehension, identification, detention,
adjudication, supervision, and removal of criminal aliens.
A. The INA from IRCA to IIRIRA
Because the immigration statute is the best evidence of the
policy that Congress expects the INS to implement, this Section
begins by examining the legal framework. To organize the
analysis, the provisions of the INA relating to criminal aliens
are divided into four categories: (1) grounds for removal; (2)
removal procedures; (3) opportunities for relief; and (4) rules
regarding re-entry. In each category, this Article describes the
INA prior to the passage of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA) in 1986 and then higWights the important
changes since then, especially IIRIRA, which was enacted in
October, 1996. This overview reveals two important features of
the law pertaining to criminal aliens. First, the last dozen years
of legislative change reveal Congress's growing demand and
heightened priority for the swift removal of criminal aliens.
Second, although the INA is complex and has become even
more so during this period of frequent changes, it continues to
provide the INS with sufficient legal authority to accomplish its
task.
1. Groundsfor Removal
Broadly speaking, the INS prior to IRCA was authorized to
remove aliens either because they were present in the country
illegally or because they had been convicted of a removable
offense.so Aliens in the country illegally included (1) aliens who
80. This Article focuses only on these two categories because they describe the bulk of
criminal aliens. Before Nov. 29, 1990, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (redesignated 8 U.S.C. § 1227 in
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had entered the country without inspection at a border-
crossing station;81 (2) any alien who violated the conditions of
his entry, for example, by overstaying his visa,82 or by violating
the conditional status of an alien who entered on the basis of a
marriage to a United States citizen or LPR;83 and (3) any alien
who was excludable at the time of entry.84 Criminal offenses
that could trigger removal included: (1) conviction (within five
years after the date of entry) for a crime of "moral turpitude"
for which the alien was sentenced to at least one year in
prison;85 (2) conviction (at any time after entry) for two crimes
of "moral turpitude," regardless of the sentence;86 (3)
conviction (at any time after entry) for any violation of any law
relating to controlled substances;87 or (4) conviction (at any
time after entry) for unlawful possession of an automatic
weapon.88
Since 1986, Congress has substantially increased the range
and number of crimes for which an alien may be removed.
Furthermore, because criminal aliens have always had fewer
opportunities than other aliens for relief from removal by
showing "good moral character," the expansion of criminal
grounds for removal also limits the procedural rights of aliens
who previously would have been removable only on other
grounds. The first of these changes came in the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act (ADA) of 1988, in which Congress stipulated that
any alien convicted of an "aggravated felony" at any time after
1996) also contained several other grounds for removal, such as becoming a public
charge, affiliation with anarchist or communist organizations, failure to register under
the Alien Registration Act of 1940, posing a threat to national security, and smuggling
other aliens into the country. IMMACf90 revised and reorganized some of these
categories and removed others (most notably those having to do with affiliation with
political groups). See IMMACf § 602(a) (current version at 8 U.S.c. § 1227, as amended
by IIRIRA § 305(a)(2».
81. See 8 U.S.c. § 1251(a)(2) (1986) (current version at 8 U.S.c. § 1227 (1994».
82. See 8 U.S.c. § 1251(a)(9) (1986) (current version at 8 U.S.c. § 1227 (1994»).
83. The Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-639, 100 Stat.
3537 (1986), were adopted just days before the IRCA was enacted. It is now codified at 8
U.S.c. §§ 1227(a)(1)(G), 1186a, 1255(d),(e), 1325(c). Under the latter provision, marriage
fraud is a felony, although it may not constitute an "aggravated felony" under 8 U.S.c.
§ 1101(a)(43)(0).
84. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (1994).
85. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) (1994). The term "crime of moral turpitude" has never
been clearly defined. Crimes such as murder, rape, larceny, and fraud all generally fall
in the category, whereas aggravated assault usually does not.
86.Seeid.
87. See 8 U.S.c. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (1994).
88. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (1994).
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entry would be removable.89 The new category of "aggravated
felony" included most of the drug and firearms crimes
previously covered by the statute, "crimes of moral turpitude,"
and some other crimes.90 Having created the category of
aggravated felony, Congress continued to expand it, adding
money laundering and trafficking in any controlled
substances,91 certain burglary, tax evasion and fraud
convictions,92 some gambling, prostitution, and document
fraud crimes,93 and rape and sexual abuse.94 Congress also
broadened the grounds for removal based on a crime of moral
turpitude to include all such crimes for which a sentence of a
year or more might have been imposed, rather than only those'
for which a sentence of a year or more had actually been
imposed.96 This category includes some relatively minor
offenses, including, in New York City, subway turnstile
jurnping.97 Congress also made the crimes of domestic violence,
stalking, child abuse, child neglect, child abandonment, and
violation of certain protective orders grounds for removal.98
2. Removal Procedures
Under the INA prior to the IRCA, an alien could be removed
only after a hearing before an Immigration Judge (II). The alien
was entitled to notice of the charges of removability against
him, had the right to counsel at his own expense, and had the
right to examine witnesses and other evidence. During the
course of the proceedings, the alien could be detained, released
on bond, or released on other conditions, subject to the
89. ADA of 1988 § 7344(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.c. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii».
90. When first added to the statute, the new category included murder and any drug
or firearms trafficking crimes. See DAN KEssELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES § 7.4 (1984).
91. See IMMACf90 § 501(a) (codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1101(a)(43), as amended by IIRIRA
§ 321(a». Furthermore, the new definition included crimes under federal, state or
foreign law. See id. at § 501(a)(5),(6) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)
(1994».
92 See INCfA § 222 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.c. § 1101(a)(43) (1994».
93. See AEDPA § 440(e) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.c. § 1101(a)(43) (1994».
94. See IIRIRA § 321 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.c. § 1101(a)(43) (1994 & Supp. II
1996».
96. See IMMACf90 § 501(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.c. § 1101(a)(43) (1994».
97. See discussion in Yesil v. Reno, 973 F. Supp. 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd sub nom.
Henderson v. INS, 157 F. 3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998), cer/. denied Reno v. Navas 119 S.Ct. 1141,
(Mar. 8, 1999).
98. See IIRIRA § 350(a) (codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1227(a)(2)(E».
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discretion of the II.99 Once a final order of removal had been
entered by the IJ, the alien could appeal to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA), an administrative court
independent of the INS but within the Department of Justice.100
Once the BIA reached its decision, the alien could seek judicial
review in the United States Court of Appeals. His appeal had to
be filed within six months of the final BIA order.101 Any appeal
from a removal order triggered an automatic stay of removal.102
Since 1986, Congress has focused special attention on
streamlining this removal process. The revisions have been
especially severe. for criminal aliens. In each round of
legislative change, and especially in 1996, Congress invented
new, swifter removal procedures that progressively narrowed
aliens' procedural rights. Congress's first move, in 1988, was to
direct the INS to obtain final orders of removal for.aggravated
felons prior to their release from incarceration in state or
federal prison.103 Aggravated felons whose removal hearings
were not complete by the date of their release from state or
federal criminal custody were to be taken into INS custody
until the INS could obtain a final order.104 To further expedite
these removals, Congress shortened the available time to
appeal a final order of removal from six months to sixty days
for all aggravated felons.105
In 1990, Congress attempted to prevent perceived abuses by
aliens, their lawyers, and the INS by overhauling the entire
99. See 8 U.S.c. § 1252(a) (1994).
100. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (1997) (removed and reserved by 62 Fed. Reg. 10,382).
101. See 8 U.S.c. § 1105a(a)(1) (1994) (amended to ninety days by ADA of1988).
102. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.6 (1997).
103. See ADA of 1988 § 7347(d) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.c. § 1228 (Supp. II
1996». This measure was inspired by an experimental program-the Institutional
Hearing Program (IHP) - that began as a collaboration between the INS and New York
state prison officials in 1986. See Robert Pear, US. Plans to Speed Deportation of Drug
Offenders, N.Y. TIMFS, July 31, 1986, at B3.
104. See ADA of 1988 § 7343 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A». This
requirement was later relaxed for aggravated felons who were LPRs. Such aliens could
be released pending removal if they could show they were likely to appear at
immigration hearings and were not a danger to the community. See IMMACI90 §
504(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2), as amended by IIRlRA § 308(g)(10)(H); MTINA
§ 306(a)(4) (amending 8 U.S.c. § 1252(a)(2», repealed by IIRlRA § 306(a)(2). Release was
still not allowed for aggravated felons who were not LPRs, and the INS declared that
detaining these aliens was its "first priority." UNDERSfANDING THE IMMIGRATION Acr
OF 1990, at 10-5 (Stephen Yale-Loehr ed., 1991) [hereinafter UNDERSfANDING
IMMACI90).
105. See ADA of1988 § 7347(b) (repealed 1996).
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removal hearing process. The time for appeals was reduced for
all aliens,106 including aggravated felons, to thirty days,107
Congress also formalized deportation hearing procedures and
established severe consequences for non-complying aliens.
Stricter notice requirements were established to insure that
aliens would know of the time, place, and importance of
removal hearings,108 Aliens were required to keep the INS
informed of changes of address or phone number. Aliens not
appearing for their removal hearings could be ordered
removed in absentia; such orders were subject to judicial
review only in very limited circumstances, and only if the
appeal was filed within sixty days,109
In 1994, Congress created two new procedures to further
expedite criminal-alien removals. The first was a streamlined
administrative removal procedure that allows the INS to issue
a final order of removal without conducting a hearing before
an IJ.ll0 The procedure applies to aliens who are: (1) aggravated
felons; (2) not LPRs; and (3) not eligible for other forms of
relief. Appeals to the courts from an administrative removal
order (which must be filed within thirty days) are only
available on the most basic issues, such as whether the alien
was actually convicted of an aggravated felony. Second,
Congress added a "judicial removal" procedure giving United
States district court judges the authority to order, at the request
of the prosecuting attorney, the removal of a criminal alien as
part of the sentence in a criminal trial if the criminal conviction
would render the alien removable.111 In 1996, Congress
expanded judicial removal to all removable criminal aliens and
formally authorized the use of stipulated orders of removal as
part of a plea bargain in a criminal case.ll2
106. Administrative appeals had to be filed within ninety days, see IMMACf90 §
545(b)(1),(d), repealed by IIRIRA § 306(b), as did appeals for judicial review, sec
IMMACT90 § 545(b)(1). Rather than receiving an automatic stay of removal upon the
filing of an appeal, aliens had to ask for it separately. See IMMACf90 § 513 (a),(b).
107. See IMMACf90 § 502(a) (codified at 8 U.S.c. § 11518(a)(1».
108. See IMMACf90 § 545(a), repealed by IIR1RA § 308(b)(6).
109. See id. Certain exceptions were provided.
110. See VCCLEA § 130004 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.c. § 1228(b) (1998)
(formerly 8 U.S.c. § 12518(b),(d) (1994))). In an administrative removal, the alien retains
his other hearing rights, such as the right to counsel and to inspect the evidence against
him. See 8 U.S.c. § 1228(b)(4)(B),(C).
111. See INCfA § 222 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.c. § 1228(b) (1998) (formerly 8
U.S.c. § 12518(d) (1994))).
112. See lOORA § 374 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.c. § 1228(c)(5». Stipulated
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The most significant revisions in removal procedures were
made in the two most recent laws affecting criminal aliens, the
Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). By changing the definition
of "entry" to include only entry with inspection, Congress
subjected all of the numerous aliens who had entered without
inspection (EWIs) to more rapid and less procedurally
demanding removal processes.ll3 It also drastically altered
these procedures, potentially subjecting EWIs who cannot
establish two years continuous presence in the United States to
a purely administrative removal process,114 with no express
right to appeal unless the alien claims asylum.ll5 Judicial
review of such a removal is available only to LPRs and to aliens
previously granted refugee status.l16
These revisions, taken together, create a summary removal
process that operates against most criminal aliens.l17 The new
law forecloses judicial review of removal orders for almost all
criminal aliens. AEDPA apparently subjected all EWIs present
in the United States for less than two years to the expedited
removal process, but before that provision took effect, IIRIRA
was enacted, applying expedited removal to EWIs only if the
Attorney General makes a specific determination to this effect.
As of late March, 1999, no such determination had been issued.
The law strips the courts of jurisdiction to review any
discretionary judgments of the INS, including the denial of any
forms of discretionary relief.118 The new law also expands
removal is analogous to a plea bargain in which the alien agrees to be removed in
exchange for a lighter sentence on the criminal charge. Stipulated removal orders had
already been used by the INS and U.S. Attorneys in some parts of the country prior to
their recognition in the immigration law. See Morton Interview, supra note 31.
113. See AEDPA § 414 (amending 8 U.S.c. § 1251) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.c. §
1227(a)(I)(B». Previously, EWIs present in the United States were subject to
deportation, and only aliens caught trying to enter the United States were subject to
exclusion.
114. See IIRIRA § 302 (codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1225).
115. Even a claim for asylum, however, only entitles the alien to an interview with an
asylum officer. If the officer determines the alien has a credible fear of persecution, the
alien receives a hearing before an Immigration Judge (m within seven days. If the
asylum officer remains unconvinced, the alien has no further right of appeal. See 8
U.S.c. § 1225(b)(I)(B)(ii).
116. See IIRIRA § 306 (codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1252).
117. Aspects of this new expedited removal procedure were upheld in American
Immigration Lawyers Association v. Reno, 18 F. Supp.2d 38 (D.D.C. 1998).
118. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). The Supreme Court has held that this provision in
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detention. Since transitional rules expired in October of 1998,
the INS has been required to detain virtually all criminal aliens
upon the completion of their criminal sentences.ll9
3. Opportunitiesfor Relief
Under the INA as it stood in 1986, several means to delay or
preclude an attempted removal order were available to
criminal aliens threatened with deportation:
Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation (JRAD): Under
§ 241(b) of the INA, a judge who convicted an alien of a
crime of moral turpitude could issue a binding
recommendation that the conviction not trigger
deportation.l2o
Asylum: Any alien could file for asylum by claiming that he
had a well-founded fear of persecution"on account of [the
alien's] race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion" if forced to
return to his country of origin. Criminal aliens were not
barred outright from seeking asylum, but their criminal
records were weighed in the ultimate discretionary decision
of an IJ on whether to grant asylurn.l21
Withholding ofDeportation: The INS could not deport an alien
whose life or freedom would be threatened in the country of
return because of one of the first five grounds for asylum.
However, relief was unavailable to aliens convicted of a
"particularly serious crime."l22
Suspension of Deportation under § 244 of the INA: An alien
could apply for a discretionary suspension of deportation by
demonstrating that his deportation would result in "extreme
har~ship." Certain minimum residency periods were
effect bars review of selective enforcement claims, even by LPRs. See Reno v. American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 1999 U.S. Lexis 1514, Feb. 24, 1999.
119. See IIRIRA § 303 (codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1226).
120. See 8 U.S.c. § 1251(b) (1986), repealed by IMMACf90 § 505(a)(1) (1990).
121. See 8 U.S.c. § 1158.
122.8 U.S.c. § 1253(h). The term "particularly serious crime" had not been defined,
except on a case-by-case basis. As a result, it was not necessarily equivalent to either a
"crime of moral turpitude" or an "aggravated felony." In IMMACf90, however,
Congress clarified the definition, saying that any "aggravated felony" was a
"particularly serious crime." William R. Robie & Ira Sandron, Criminal Aliens in the
Immigration System: Examining the Significant Role ofthe Criminal Alien Hearing Program, 38
FED. B. NEWS & J. 449, 452 (1991). When IIRIRA expanded the list of crimes that qualify
as aggravated felonies, it made the bar for "particularly serious crime" applicable only
if the crime leads to a sentence of five years or more. 8 U.S.c. § 1231(b)(3).
HeinOnline -- 22 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 393 1998-1999
No.2] Removing Criminal Aliens 393
required.l23
Waiver ofDeportation under § 212(h) ofthe INA: Any alien who
was a spouse, parent, or child of a U.S. citizen or LPR and
-was eligible to adjust status could seek to have an IJ waive
deportation based on a conviction for a crime of moral
turpitude or possession of thirty grams or less of
marijuana.l24 As in suspension of deportation cases, the
alien had to show that his deportation would result in
IIextreme hardship."l25
Waiver of Deportation under § 212(c) of the INA: A lawful
permanent resident who had lived in the United States
lawfully for seven years and could demonstrate substantial
social and humane considerations in his favor could petition
the II for a discretionary waiver of deportation.126 Except for
long-term residents eligible for suspension of deportation
under sec. 244, this waiver provision was the only means of
avoiding deportation on the grounds of a narcotics
conviction (other than those for possession of less than thirty
grams of marijuana).127
The last decade of legislative changes has deprived most
criminal aliens of nearly all of these opp<?rtunities for relief. In
1990, Congress eliminated JRADsl28 and rendered aggravated
felons ineligible for asylum or withholding of deportation.129
Furthermore, aliens convicted of aggravated felonies for which
123. An alien who entered the country without inspection or overstayed a visa had to
have been present in the United States for seven years prior to the date of application.
An alien who became deportable due to a criminal conviction had to have been present
in the United States for ten years since the date of the crime that triggered his
deportability. In both cases, the alien had to show that he had been a person of "good
moral character" during that time. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1), (2) (repealed 1996).
124. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (repealed 1996).
125. KEssELBRENNER & ROSENBERG, supra note 90, at § 11.3(d)(2).
126. See 8 U.S.c. § 1182(c), repealed by IIRIRA § 304. Considerations weighing in the
alien's favor have included such factors as family ties within the United States,
residence in the United States for a long period (particularly when the inception of
United States residence occurred at a young age), hardship to the alien's family if
deportation occurred, service in the U.S. armed forces, a history of stable employment,
and other evidence attesting to the respondent's good character. Adverse factors
include the seriousness of the crime, the presence of additional immigration violations,
the existence of a criminal record, and other evidence indicative of bad character.
Although this section of the INA refers to exclusion cases, case law has extended it to
deportation cases where the basis for deportation tracks that for exclusion. See Matter of
Marin 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 (BIA 1978).
127. See generally, KEssELBRENNER & ROSENBERG, supra note 90, at § 11.4(a).
128. See IMMACf90 § 505(a)(1).
129. This was achieved by defining an aggravated felony as a "particularly serious
crime." IMMACf90 § 515(a)(1), (2) (codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1158 as amended by llRIRA §
604(a»; 8 U.S.c. § 1253(h)(2), as amended by llRIRA § 307(a».
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they had served five years or more in prison were no longer
eligible for relief under § 212(c) of the INA130 and were
prevented from establishing "good moral character," a
prerequisite to obtaining suspension of deportation.131
Effectively, then, aliens who had served five years in prison for
an aggravated felony at any time in the past had no relief
available under the immigration law.132
Bpt the ,most significap.t restrictions on relief occurred in
1996. The new analogue of § 212(c) relief, cancellation of
removal under § 240A(a), makes far fewer criminal aliens
eligible to seek relief than the earlier version did,133
"Aggravated felons" are barred from eligibility, at a time when
Congress has greatly expanded that category. Section 240A(b)
provides an analogue, cancellation of removal, but also on very
restricted terms; it is available only to aliens who have been
present in the United States for ten years. 134 Furthermore, an
alien seeking relief under the new provision must now meet a
higher standard; rather than showing that removal would
result in "extreme hardship" to himself or to a United States
citizen or LPR family member, he must show that the removal
will cause"exceptional and extremely unusual" hardship to the
relative. Hardship caused to the alien himself is no longer
relevant,135 Congress also limited the scope of § 212(h) of the
INA by making waivers unavailable to LPRs who, since
admission, have been convicted of an aggravated felony or
who have not lawfully and continuously resided in the United
States for at least seven years.136
130. See IMMACf90 § 511(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c», repealed by IIRlRA §
304(b).
131. See IMMACf90 § 509(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(£)(8».
132. The only tactic available to such an alien was to attack the validity of his
previous criminaI conviction, perhaps on the grounds that he had received inadequate
assistance of counsel at the time of his plea or conviction. See generally KESSELBRENNER
& ROSENBERG, supra note 90, at § 4. This five-year sentence requirement was later
broadened to include any combination of aggravated felony sentences totaling five
years. See MTINA § 306(a)(10) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182).
133. They can still apply to the district director for"deferred action" status or seek
private legislation from Congress.
134. See IIRlRA § 304 (codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1250(a».
135.Seeid.
136. See IIRlRA § 348.
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4. Rules Regarding Re-Entry
Prior to IRCA, a deported alien was not permitted to re-enter
the country for five years. Premature re-entry was a felony
carrying a sentence of up to two years in prison,137 or ten years
for criminal aliens.l38 Those aliens not ultimately removed on
criminal grounds were eligible to depart voluntarily, without
the burden of a formal deportation order.139 Because aliens who
are not formally removed are eligible to apply for re~entry
immediately, voluntary departure was and remains perhaps
the most sought-after form of relief. The INS routinely uses it to
encourage aliens not to contest removal.140
Stricter re-entry rules and more severe penalties for their
violation have been imposed during the last decade. In 1988,
Congress increased the maximum penalty for illegal re-entry
by a non-aggravated felon to five years in prison from the
previous limit of twO.141 Aggravated felons were made
excludable for ten years,l42 and the maximum penalty for
illegal re-entry in their case was extended to fifteen years in
prison.143 In addition, aggravated felons were barred from
receiving voluntary departure.l44 In 1994, Congress increased
the penalties for illegal re-entry to ten years in prison, twenty
years for aggravated felons.145 In 1996, with some exceptions,
Congress extended the re-entry bar for deported aliens from
five years to ten, and aggravated felons were barred from re-
entry for twenty years.l46 Aliens "unlawfully present" (due to
overstaying a visa or entering without inspection) in the United
States for more than 180 days but less than a year, and who
depart from the United States, are now barred for three years,
and aliens unlawfully present for one year or more who depart
are inadmissible for ten years. Aliens removed twice are barred
137. See 8 U.S.c. 1326(a)(2).
138. See 8 U.S.c. 1326 (amending 8 U.S.c. § 1252(e)).
139. See 8 U.S.c. 1229(c) (amending 8 U.S.c. § 1252(b)).
140. From 1981 through 1989, an average of over 900,000 aliens chose this option each
year. See UNDERSfANDING IMMACf90, supra note 104, at 10-8.
141. See ADA of 1988 § 7345(b)(1) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)) (later increased to
ten years by VCCLEA).
142. See ADA of 1988 § 7349(a) (amending 8 U.S.c. § 1182(a)(17)).
143. See ADA of1988 § 7345(b)(2) (amending 8 U.S.c. § 1326).
144. See ADA of1988 § 7343(b)(2) (amending 8 U.S.c. § 1254(e)).,·
145. See VCCLEA § 130001(b)(2) (amending 8 U.S.c. § 1326(b)).
146. See IIRlRA § 301(b)(1) (codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1182(a)(9)).
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for twenty years, and aggravated felons are barred for life.147
Aliens who re-enter illegally after having previously been
removed or granted voluntary departure may be removed
immediately under the prior removal order,148
5. A Strong Legal Foundation
On its face, then, the INA grants the INS ample legal
authority to remove most criminal aliens expeditiously. First,
the legal impediments to removing criminal aliens who are
illegally present in the country have never been great under the
INA, and recent legislative changes have made removal even
easier by reducing the available procedural defenses,
streamlining removal procedures, and foreclosing relief for an
ever-broader range of aliens. Under current law, the definition
of an "aggravated felony" is now"so broad that conduct which
might not appear 'aggravated' to a criminal defense
practitioner will nevertheless incur harsh consequences under
the immigration laws."149 Aggravated felons now have no relief
available under the statute and must be detained by the INS
upon the completion of their criminal sentences in most
circumstances. Once removed, aggravated felons are
permanently barred from re-entering the country and face a
prison sentence of twenty years if they attempt to do so. These
sanctions now apply categorically to all aggravated felons, and
no official in any branch of government is authorized to
mitigate them.
But these recent changes have not been limited to aggravated
felons. With the creation of summary administrative removal,
the expansion of judicial removal, and the change in the
definition of "entry," most criminal aliens who are
apprehended now face nearly immediate removal. Criminal
aliens who entered without inspection (as most did) may
remain in the country only if asylum is granted,150 The only
147. See IIRIRA § 301. These bars to re-entry may significantly affect the country to
which the criminal alien is returned. For a fuller discussion of this difficult but often
ignored issue, see Margaret H. Taylor & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Deportation o/Criminal
Aliens: A Geopolitical Perspective (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
148. See 8 U.S.c. § 1231(a)(5) (1998).
149. KEssELBRENNER & ROSENBERG, supra note 90, at § 7.4(a).
150. Even before IIRIRA, only about ten percent of criminal aliens in deportation
hearings succeed in their asylum claims. See DEPARTMENT OF]UsrICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OF lMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEOSIONS ON APPUCATIONS BEFORE IJSIN THE STATED TIME
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aliens retaining any real possibility of avoiding removal after a
criminal conviction are misdemeanant aliens and non-
aggravated felon LPRs who have resided legally in the country
for at least ten years and can show that an immediate relative
citizen or LPR would sustain "exceptional and extremely
unusual" hardship if the alien were removed. This group is
small indeed.
At the same time, the INA's peculiar categorization of crimes
continues to confuse law enforcement. The concepts of "moral
turpitude" and "aggravated felony" appear only in
immigration law, and the former has never been clearly
defined. Courts have held that not all felonies are crimes of
moral turpitude, and not all crimes of moral turpitude are
felonies.l5l Murder, rape, larceny, and fraud are considered
crimes of moral turpitude, whereas aggravated assault often is
not.152 Severity of the punishment is also not controlling.
Predicting the immigration consequences of a criminal
conviction has therefore been difficult for aliens and law
enforcement officials alike. Indeed, the very definition of
"conviction" has been expanded,153
The recent amendments to the INA have increased this
complexity. The definition of an aggravated felony has
changed every few years over the last decade, triggering
consequences that even immigration lawyers find confusing.
Moreover, because many of the new definitions are retroactive,
crimes committed long ago may subject even long-term LPRs
to exclusion or removal. State and local law enforcement
officials who do not specialize in immigration law will be even
more perplexed. Even within the INS, administrative resources
have been directed toward writing new regulations, adjusting
procedures, and retaining personnel to accommodate these
legal changes. Such a complex and unstable body of law makes
coordination of the criminal-alien removal system an even
more difficult task than it otherwise would be.
Still, the law's complexity is an inadequate explanation for
policy failure when, as here, it provides the INS with such
PERIODS (1995) (on file with authors).
151. See, e.g.• United States ex rel. Griffo v. McCandless, 28 F.(2d) 287 (E.D. Pa. 1928).
152. For a more thorough discussion of the meaning of "moral turpitude," see
KESSELBRENNER & ROSENBERG, supra note 90, at § 6.2.
153. See Ira J. Kurzban, Kurzban's Immigration Law Sourcebook, at 125-26 (6th ed.
1998).
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powerful implementation tools. A better answer lies instead
with the institutional framework on which the criminal~alien
removal system is built.
B. The Institutional Framework
To enforce immigration law, government must: (1)
apprehend and identify; (2) prosecute and adjudicate (on
immigration charges); (3) detain or supervise; (4) remove; and
(5) prevent the re-entry of hundreds of thousands of criminal
aliens spread throughout the fifty states. No single agency can
hope to accomplish all of these tasks. Indeed, the INS is only
the first among equals in a multitude of federal, state, and local
agencies powerless to administer the criminal-alien removal
system on their own. In its current form, the INS has primary
responsibility only for determinations of removability, actual
removal, and prevention of re-entry. Even the removability
determination ordinarily must be coordinated with
immigration judges from EOIR, a separate agency within the
Justice Department, and then with the federal courts. To
identify, apprehend, and detain criminal aliens, the INS must
rely on federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. Two
important constraints necessitate this reliance. First, the INS
does not determine in the first instance which aliens are
criminals; that is the job of local police and of prosecutors and
judges at all levels of government. Second, the INS controls
only a tiny fraction of the resources dedicated nationally to
criminal law enforcement,154 Although the INS can and does
use its own resources to locate and arrest criminal aliens, it
often looks to local law enforcement agencies to do so; in any
event, it must rely primarily on such agencies to apprehend,
identify, and detain them. Recent legislative changes have done
little to mitigate the need for case-by-case coordination; indeed,
they have increased it.
The resulting removal system is complex and fragmented.
Especially at the early stages of the process-apprehension,
identification, detention, prosecution and adjudication-the
INS must accommodate its efforts to the organizational
154. In 1993, all levels of government in the United States spent $97.5 billion on law
enforcement. See SOURCEBOOK 1996, supra note 44, at 2. The INS, by contrast, spent less
than one percent of that figure ($934 million) on enforcement in 1993. See IMMIGRATION
AND NATURAliZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSI1CE, INS FACf BOOK 36 (1995). '
HeinOnline -- 22 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 399 1998-1999
No.2] Removing Criminal Aliens , ~ , 399
demands of its external collaborators. Although direct policy
disputes are rare, the incentives of local police officers, state
corrections officials, immigration judges, and other parties
essential to the criminal-alien removal process are often poorly
aligned with those of the INS. The difficulties of coordinating
such a fragmented group of decisionmakers have prevented
the INS from removing more than a small fraction of the
criminal aliens who move into and out of law enforcement
custody each year.
1. Problems ofApprehension and Identification
Coordination problems begin with identification. If an
effective national system of identification were in place" the INS
could rely on state and local law enforcement agents, already in
the business of arresting criminals, to apprehend those who
turn out to be criminal aliens as well. Nevertheless, despite
some progress, twelve years of sustained managerial and
congressional attention have failed to develop a coherent
system for identifying which criminals are aliens. To
understand why, it is helpful to review the criminal justice
process, assessing the coordination problems that impede this
identification at each stage.
a. Arrest
To coordinate the removal system at the initial stage, the INS
must provide arresting officers with an easy way to determine
the immigration status of arrestees155' while also giving police
an incentive to align their post-arrest detention decision with
INS priorities. On its face, this appears difficult. Given the
actual structure of INS information and management systems,
it is nearly impossible. .
The lack of an effective system for determining the alienage
and immigration status of an arrestee is particularly harmful to
coordination. For all but the most petty offenses, most police
departments supplement the identification of an arrestee by
checking his fingerprints against a central database.
Maintained by state governments, these automated fingerprint
155. This involves: first, a determination of whether the arrestee is an alien; and
second, whether he may be removable. The arrestee may be removable: (1) if convicted
of the instant offense; (2) due to previous criminal convictions; or (3) because he is
illegally present in the United States. .
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records allow arresting officers to find the arrestee's prior
arrests, convictions, and outstanding warrants, as well as any
aliases or prior addresses.156 Though not perfect, this system
gives law enforcement officers the information they need to
process an arrest quickly.
No comparable system exists to support the identification of
criminal aliens. Without a detailed knowledge of immigration
law and access to reliable information regarding the arrestee's
immigration status, arresting officers cannot assess whether the
arrestee might be removable. Only in rare circumstances can
local law enforcement officers find out whether a final order of
removal is outstanding against the arrestee. State-run criminal
databases contain no information regarding aliens'
immigration status and, until recently, did not even have
records of previous removals.157 Although arresting officers
sometimes record immigration information offered by the
arrestee or found on his person, no national system is in place
to allow local law enforcement officers to verify an alien's
immigration status.15S
There are several ways the INS could insure accurate
identification of removable criminal aliens at arrest. First, local
law enforcement officials could be trained to assess the
156. If the arrestee has been previously arrested and fingerprinted in the state, the
system takes only a short time to find previous arrests in the same state or in any other,
including arrests by federal law enforcement. If the current arrest is the first time the
arrestee has been fingerprinted in the state, the system will usually be unable to match
the arrestee to arrests in other states until the FBI has processed the fingerprints and
searched its own databases. State databases do cany warrants from other states and
from federal law enforcement. These records usually include name, address, date of
birth and other descriptive information, but are not as reliable as fingerprint records for
matching purposes. See Telephone Interview with Karen Stark, New York State
Division of Criminal Justice Services aan. 31, 1997).
157. In August, 1994, the INS began adding fingerprint records of deported criminal
aliens to the California criminal justice database. In 1996, this project was expanded to a
few other states and the FBI. See REMOVAL OF ILLEGAL AUENS, supra note 78, at 5.
Nevertheless, these improvements affect only a minority of those arrestees previously
ordered deported.
158. In the 1980s, the INS received over 100,000 calls a year from law enforcement,
but its response was generally ad-hoc. See Criminal Aliens: Hearings before the Subcomm.
on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Congo 20 (1989) (testimony of Jack Shaw, Assistant Comm'r for Investigations)
[hereinafter 1989 Judiciary Comm. Hearings on Criminal Aliens]. Since July, 1994, the INS
has operated a pilot program known as the Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC),
designed to respond to inquiries from local law enforcement. See U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LAW ENPORCEMENT SUPPORT CENTER: NAME-BASED SYSTEMS LIMIT
ABIUTY TO IDENTIFY ARRESTED AUENS 4 (1995). For more on the progress and
effectiveness of this project, see Section IV.C.3., infra.
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immigration consequences of an arrest. Such an approach
would require that hundreds of thousands of law enforcement
officers be trained in immigration law. The complexity and
rapid pace of change of immigration law would make such
training even more daunting. More importantly, law
enforcement officers would need access to immigration records
to determine the status of aliens who claim they entered
legally. Designing an automated system to serve such a far-
flung and diverse array of users would be difficult for any
agency, let alone one with a record-keeping system as woefully
antiquated and ineffective as that of the INS.159
Alternatively, local law enforcement officers could contact
the INS whenever they arrest someone who, they believe, is not
a citizen. The INS would have to search its files, review the
current arrest charges, and determine whether the alien is
likely to be removable. To make such a system work, the INS
would need up-to-date central files on all aliens known to it, as
well as enough trained operators to respond quickly to calls
from arresting officers.l60 Unfortunately, the INS has neither. Its
record-keeping system is decentralized and only partially
automated.161 Even with the right data system in place, staffing
such a service would require several hundred operators.l62
159. A 1990 study by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) found that "INS
managers and field officials do not have adequate, reliable, and timely information" to
help them carry out their responsibilities effectively because INS data systems "contain
incomplete and inaccurate data which cannot be efficiently accessed or shared." U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION MANAGEMENT: lMMIGRATION AND
NATURAUZATION SERVICE LACKS READY ACCESS TO EssENTIAL DATA 1 (1990)
[hereinafter INS INFORMATION MANAGEMENT]. According to INS officials surveyed for
the GAO study, "sharing and exchange of data from six INS information systems and
seven extemallaw enforcement systems ... is needed to effectively investigate criminal
aliens." ld. at 4. Although the INS has launched several efforts to improve its
information systems, most are not complete. See Telephone Interview with William
Griffin, Director of the Law Enforcement Support Center (LESe) (Feb. 14, 1997)
[hereinafter Griffin Interview].
160. In New York, for example, criminal justice officials expect a full criminal history
to be available within eight hours of arrest, meaning that state officials must match the
defendant's fingerprints to their databases and send the arresting agency the results
within four to five hours after receiving the request.
161. INS staff must still consult a variety of separate databases to determine whether
an individual has a record with the INS, and some case information is only available in
paper files which may be located at any of dozens of INS offices around the country.
The specialized knowledge needed to understand the data in these systems is an
important reason the INS has been reluctant to link its data systems with those of law
enforcement. See Griffin Interview, supra note 159.
162. This estimate is based on the following assumptions. INS operators at the LESe,
which functions on the model described in the text, spend an average of twenty
minutes on each case. See Griffin Interview, supra note 159. Thus, each operator handles
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Furthermore, many alien arrestees, having entered without
inspection, would be unknown even to the INS. These
identification problems have led the INS to require a face-to-
face interview by an INS investigator before initiating removal
proceedings against any alien,163 To conduct these interviews at
arrest, the INS would need enough investigators to visit police
holding facilities all over the country. Even if face-to-face
interviews were not required, the INS would need some way to
pick up removable aliens whom law enforcement chose to
release,164 The INS has never had enough resources to staff
such a system, even under its current budget.l65.
Detention problems also hamper coordination at arrest. If the
INS were to identify removable criminal aliens at arrest, police
officers would have to arrange for INS detention before
releasing an alien who would not otherwise be detained. In
such cases, two issues would arise. First, the arresting officer
would have to be sure the decision to detain was warranted on
immigration grounds. In close cases, an INS interview would
about twenty calls a day. In 1994, there were over 14,000,000 arrests in the United
States. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISI1CS. SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SfATISI1CS 1995, at 394 (1996) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK 1995]. If
1,000,000 of these (seven percent) result in calls to the INS each year, and the INS staff
members handle an average of twenty calls each per day, this approach would require
forty-six operators per shift. Covering a shift twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year
generally requires five staff members per position, including sick time and vacation, for
a total of 230.
163. INS budget models indicate that this process takes an average of eight hours per
case for aliens incarcerated in state facilities. See St. John-Mellado Interview I, supra
note 65.
164. In Arizona, where the INS began in 1994 to use the centralized information
resources of the LESe, investigators do not interview aliens at arrest. Instead, a
determination of deportability is made via computer, based on INS records. If the alien
is an aggravated felon or has previously been deported and Arizona police choose not
to detain the alien, an INS detention and deportation officer takes the alien into INS
custody. Although this program saves INS investigator time, its expansion has been
contained by the lack of sufficient INS resources in other areas, such as detention and
deportation officers and detention space. See Griffin Interview, supra note 159.
165. See Morton Interview, supra note 31. The Investigations Division of the INS had
only 1,100 staff in FY 86, evenly divided between employer sanctions, document fraud,
and criminal-alien cases. By FY 96, the total had reached only 2,800. See IMMIGRATION
AND NATURAUZATION SERVICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURAUZATION SERVICE SALARIES
AND ExPENSES-CROSSWALK OF BUDGET CHANGES, 1986-1996, at 2-4, 25 (1996)
[hereinafter CROSSWALK] (on file with authors). Only about two-thirds of these staff
members were investigative officers; the rest are support staff. See Telephone Interview
with Tom Klausing, INS Budget Office (Oct. 28, 1996). Even if more resources were
av.ailable, an accurate projection of what it would take to run such a system would
elude the INS because it has no systematic workload statistics or budget models for
investigative staff. See Telephone Interview with Kathleen Hibbard, INS Budget Office
(Feb. 18, 1997).
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probably be required. Second, if the INS asked the arresting
agency to hold the arrestee on immigration grounds alone, it
would need to take the alien into custody or make
arrangements for detention by the local correction agency.
Local authorities would resist such an arrangement, especially
if it delayed the normal justice process or became an unfunded
mandate. Even if the INS were to pay for these services, the
resulting reimbursement scheme would take time to negotiate
and might create perverse incentives for law enforcement to
exaggerate its claims for immigration-related detention.
Concerns such as these have led the INS not to screen for
criminal aliens at the arrest stage. Avoiding the arrest stage
allows the INS to ignore cases in which criminal charges are
dropped, and it allows arresting officers to make detention
decisions based solely on local criminal justice policy. It also
prevents the INS from delaying the criminal justice process,
which local law enforcement would vigorously resist. On the
other hand, the INS remains ignorant of any removable aliens
released just after arrest and misses an opportunity to start the
removal process sooner for those who are detained on criminal
justice grounds.
b. Arraignment
Like an arrest, the arraignment (or its equivalent)166 provides
an opportunity for the INS to coordinate its objectives with
those of local law enforcement agencies. Coordination at this
stage must include prosecuting attorneys and representatives
of the judiciary. Both prosecutors and judges use the
arraignment to sort serious cases from minor ones and strong
cases from weak ones. Weaker cases and those involving less
serious crimes will tend to be disposed of quickly. H the INS
were a party to the arraignment proceeding, however, it might
weigh the cases differently, focusing on previously removed
aliens, regardless of the crime charged in the instant case, or on
aliens who can be removed quickly on grounds unrelated to
the strength of the instant criminal case. Even on the surface,
166. Although the details of criminal procedure differ substantially from one
jurisdiction to another, all jurisdictions require some early determination of probable
cause by a judge or grand jury.- See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103-(1975):' Those
differences are glossed over here, however, because-any variations are likely to-produce
the same difficulties of coordination. ,< - ."
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then, coordination at arraignment is likely to be difficult. In
practice, the INS avoids it altogether.
In most jurisdictions, arraignment is designed to bring
together all of the relevant parties and as much information as
possible, so that case-processing decisions can be made quickly.
Most arraignment judges handle dozens of cases in a day,
spending only a few minutes on each. All parties are reluctant
to delay the process to wait for input from outsiders. Injecting
immigration concerns into this process would require
significant changes and might trigger costly and unwelcome
delays. Although the parties in the courtroom know the
defendant's criminal history, they do not know his immigration
status and have no easy way to learn it. Furthermore, because
local defense attorneys, prosecutors, and criminal court judges
do not specialize in immigration law, they are unlikely to know
the immigration consequences of a particular criminal
disposition. Even if they had this information and were willing
to use it as a case disposal tool, they would have little authority
to do so,167 Under the current institutional framework, then,
both the INS and local law enforcement officials find it
impractical to use arraignment to coordinate criminal and
immigration case processing.
Policymakers hoping to change this situation confront
several obstacles. First, training local attorneys and judges in
immigration law would be nearly as difficult as training law
enforcement officers. Furthermore, like police officers, court
personnel across the country would need access to INS files-
an impossibility under current conditions. Responding to
phone calls from local courts would be just as costly as
responding to calls from arresting officers, and it would be
prohibitively costly for the INS to staff arraignment courts
167. State officials could attempt to get an alien defendant to agree to removal as part
of a plea bargain in a criminal case, but, until recently, such stipulations were often
subject to attack in immigration proceedings. Under the law passed in September, 1996,
such stipulations will now be considered conclusive proof of removability. See IIRlRA §
304(a)(3) (codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1229a (Supp. II 1996». In the past, most prosecutors
have found aliens unwilling to agree to removal as part of a plea bargain. See, e.g., U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRIMINAL AliENS: INS' ENFORCEMENT AcnvmES 31 (1987)
[hereinafter INS' ENFORCEMENT ACTIVmES]. Although this may change now that aliens
have so few defenses to removal, unless local prosecutors themselves can credibly
threaten to press the removal claims, stipulated removal is unlikely to be a real factor in
the removal system.
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across the country.l68 Even making case processing advisory
services available on a voluntary basis to local jurisdictions is
unlikely to be effective. Without a constant INS presence or a
full set of immigration information, local criminal-justice
professionals will continue to process cases according to their
own priorities.
These coordination problems mean that in nearly all cases,
criminal aliens are processed at local courts before the INS and
local law enforcement have exchanged any information
regarding the immigration status of the defendant. By not
screening cases at this stage, the INS misses a chance to deal
with any aliens whose cases are disposed of at arraignment,
except for those sentenced to jail immediately.
c. Pre-trial
Coordination between law enforcement agencies and the INS
is also possible during the pre-trial.period when the defendant
may be in custody in a local jail or released on bailor on his
own recognizance. The important parties at this stage include
the parties present at arraignment- the judge, prosecutor and
defense attorney - as well as the agency responsible for the
local jail. These parties are likely to have strong detention
priorities driven by local criminal justice policies and case-
specific factors that are related to the underlying criminal
charges but unrelated to immigration policy. Nevertheless,
there are more opportunities for coordination because case
processing moves more slowly during the pre-trial phase than
at arrest or arraignment.
Immigration agents, for example, could work with local
criminal justice officials to use pre-trial appearances to screen
for removable criminal aliens. Using some simple profiles, local
officials could identify defendants likely to be aliens and group
their court appearances together on a single day each week or
month when INS screening staff would visit. Although such a
system would be more cost-effective than the blanket coverage
required at arrest or arraignment, it would still be expensive.
Furthermore, coordination problems would arise whenever the
168. One San Diego County judge did manage to arrange this, however,.with
apparently positive results. See 1989 Judiciary Comm. Hearings on Criminal Aliens. supra
note 158, at 84.
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schedules of judges or attorneys failed to mesh with that of the
INS.
Screening defendants at local jails is more promising. There
are far fewer jails than criminal court rooms, and the larger jail
systems hold numerous criminal aliens. Accordingly, the INS
has established screening projects at local jails in several
jurisdictions whose jails house a high proportion of criminal
aliens. In New York City; Los Angeles County; Orange County,
California; Dade County, Florida; and other such jurisdictions,
INS investigators stationed at the local jails screen for foreign-
born inmates. If the INS determines that an inmate is
removable prior to the disposition of his current criminal case,
the county may drop the current charges and release the alien
into INS custody. If the alien is not released, the INS can lodge
a detainer with the local correctional agency requiring that the
alien be turned over to the INS upon release.169 Although more
efficient than screening efforts at earlier stages, jail house
screening is labor intensive. INS investigators spend an average
of eight hours on each case, including preliminary
identification, paperwork review, interview of the alien, and
collection of the necessary paperwork to support the removal
processPo The resource demands of this jail house screening
process have left its promise largely unfulfilled. Although the
INS has recently expanded its jail screening projects, the vast
majority of jail inmates continue to go unscreened. Moreover,
even the existing jail house screening programs miss many
removable criminal aliens because more than half of felony
defendants are not detained prior to the disposition of their
cases.l71
d. Post-conviction
Finally, the INS could wait to screen for removable aliens
until after conviction and sentencing of criminal defendants.
Coordination with those who supervise convicted offenders-
correction officials, probation agencies and parole offices-is
simpler than coordination with court personnel, but presents
its own problems. Because offenders remain under the
169. See Telephone Interview with Russell Bergeron, Office of Public Affairs, INS
Uan. 31,1997) [hereinafter Jan. 31, 1997 Bergeron Interview].
170. See St. John-Mellado Interview I, supra note 65.
171. See SOURCEBOOK1995, supra note 162, at510.
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supervision of the same agency for several months or longer,
there is less need to screen cases quickly. But once offenders are
sentenced, they are usually dispersed in facilities and
communities across the state. Although INS investigators want
prisoners grouped together to facilitate interviews and -record
collection, state officials prefer to group them according to
other criteria that have little to do with immigration.
Nevertheless, the INS has long recognized the value of
conducting screenings in state prisons and now screens the
prison populations at fifteen federal and sixty-one state prisons
in the five states with the largest populations of incarcerated
criminal aliens,172 Although prison screenings would seem
relatively easy to coordinate, the INS failed to screen more than
a third of the foreign-born prisoners even in the four most
heavily affected states as recently as June, 1997. From the IHP
program's inception in New York in 1986, it has been
hampered by a lack of INS investigators and by the fact that
state prison systems do not always accord high priority to INS
administrative preferences.. Criminal aliens are spread
throughout state correctional systems, often requiring INS
investigators to travel to dozens of facilities across the state.
Only through painstaking negotiations with prison officials in
each state and the Federal Bureau of Prisons has the INS been
able to encourage the seven states to adopt procedures that
maximize INS efficiency by consolidating prisoner entry and
exit points, sharing criminal records with the INS on a regular
basis, and making space for INS staff at the intake and
discharge facilities,173 By July, 1997, several states did, in fact,
reduce the number of intake sites,174 but still others did not
make reductions to the extent the INS wanted.175 Mindful of the
effort required to establish the IHP program, INS officials are
172. See Criminal Aliens: INS's Efforts to IdentifY and Remove Imprisoned Aliens Need to be
Improved: Testimony ofNorman J. Rabkin Before the Immigration and Claims Subcommittee of
the House Committee on the Judiciary (July 15, 1997)
<http://www.gao.gov/reports/htm> [hereinafter Rabkin Testimony); Criminal Aliens:
Ins' Efforts to Remove Imprisoned Aliens Continue to Need Improvement, GAO Letter Report to
the Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the House Committee on the
Judiciary sec. 2.1 (Oct. 16, 1998) <http://www.gao.gov/reports.htm> [hereinafter GAO
Repor~. .
173. See GAO Report. supra note 172, at § 1.
174. For example, Texas reduced the number of its intake facilities from twenty-five
to one. See Rabkin Testimony, supra note 172, at 9.
175.Seeid.
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loathe to commit new managerial resources to tackle the
similar problems inherent in screening the probation and
parole populations.
e. The Identification Process Overall
At each stage of the criminal justice process, the success of
criminal-alien identification efforts depends on the INS gaining
the cooperation of officials with divergent goals and incentives.
Although opportunities for cooperation exist at each stage,
legal and organizational factors prevent smooth coordination.
Local officials lack access to essential immigration information
and, in any case,· lack authority to make immigration
determinations on their own. At the same time, geographic and
organizational dispersion prevents the INS from covering the
justice system's myriad choke points with its own agents.
Coordinating such a system is not impossible, but success is
bound to be slow.
These difficulties have left the INS to adopt practices that fail
to identify most removable criminal aliens. Rather than using
local law enforcement to identify criminal aliens early in the
criminal enforcement process, the INS is forced to wait until the
aliens are sentenced to jail or prison. This reactive approach
allows the INS to focus its resources on the most serious
criminals, but INS screening continues to miss most removable
criminal aliens arrested by law enforcement agencies. Just how
many are missed is difficult to know, but some educated
guesses can be made. First, about forty-five percent of arrestees
are released or sentenced at arraignment to some non-
incarcerative sanctionP6 The INS also misses any aliens whose
cases are dismissed during the pre-trial phase, probably
another seventeen percent of arrestees overall.177 Defendants
176. Most of these are misdemeanants, who constitute about seventy percent of
arrestees overall. See Telephone Interview with Michelle Sviridoff, Center for Court
Innovation Oan. 15, 1997) [hereinafter SViridoff Interview]. Because detailed data on
misdemeanor case processing across the country is not available, Sviridoff's estimates
are based on case processing patterns in the New York City Criminal Court. Patterns in
other jurisdictions may vary somewhat, but a more scientific estimate would not alter
the thrust of this analysis-specifically, that the INS screens few arrestees.
177. A sample of adjudication outcomes for the seventy-five largest counties in the
United States shows that thirty-two percent of felony arrests do not result in conviction.
See SoURCEBOOK 1995, supra note 162, at 514. This is just under ten percent of cases
overall. About a third of misdemeanor cases not disposed of at arraignment result in
dismissal. See Sviridoff Interview, supra note 176. Because only thirty percent of
misdemeanor cases survive arraignment, this is about seven percent of cases overall.
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sentenced only to probation or some other non-incarcerative
sentence- approximately thirteen percent overall178 - are not
screened by the INS unless they are first held at one of the few
jails with an INS screening program. Defendants sentenced to
jail-another seventeen percent overall179- are screened in only
a few jurisdictions. The remaining nine percent of arrestees are
sentenced to prison, where most are indeed screened by the
INS.180 All told, then, the current INS policy of screening only
in federal and state prisons and a few local jails probably
means that almost ninety percent of removable criminal-alien
arrestees - several hundred thousand, according to estimates in
Section II above-enter and leave law enforcement custody
without any determination regarding their removability.l8l
2. The Prosecution andAdjudication Process
Identifying removable criminal aliens is, of course, only the
first step in the removal process. The INS still must prove that
the alien is indeed removable. INS attorneys, defense attorneys,
immigration judges at EOIR, and the aliens themselves all must
participate in the process, which is plagued by delay and poor
coordination.
178. Thirty percent of felony convictions end in probation sentences. See SOURCEBOOK
1995, supra note 162, at 499. This represents about twenty percent of all felony cases, or
about six percent of all cases: About a third of misdemeanor cases surviving
arraignment, roughly seven percent overall, result in probation or some other non-
incarcerative sentence. See Sviridoff Interview, supra note 176.
179. Twenty six percent of felony convictions result in jail sentences. See SOURCEBOOK
1995, supra note 162, at 499. This is about seventeen percent of all felony cases, or about
five percent of cases overall. Roughly seventeen percent of misdemeanants, about
twelve percent of cases overall, are sentenced to jail. See Sviridoff Interview, supra note
176.
180. It is worth noting, however, that the INS screens only those prisoners whom
local officials report as being foreign-born, a method likely to miss at least some
removable aliens because the state's count of foreign-born inmates is based on the
prisoners' self-reports and because alien prisoners are likely to try to conceal their
immigration status. See supra note 37.
181. A calculation based on the following assumptions suggests a figure of over half a
million. In 1994, over 14,000,000 arrests were made in the United States. See
SOURCEBOOK 1995, supra note 162, at 394. If seven percent of these arrestees were
foreign-born, and if sixty percent of those were removable criminal aliens, then roughly
600,000 were criminal aliens. If, conservatively, eighty-five percent were not screened,
then 510,000 removable criminal aliens were arrested and not screened. Of course, there
are several reasons to be wary of such a calculation. First, many of these incidents
involve the same people, as a single individual might be arrested and released more
than once in the same year. Second, with so many low-level arrests included, the actual
proportion of foreign-born arrestees who are removable criminal aliens is probably
lower than sixty percent.
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The hearing process begins when an INS attorney issues to
the alien a Notice to Appear.182 (prior to the enactment of
IOORA § 304(a), the document was known as the Order to
Show Cause (OSC)). The INS sends a copy to EOIR, which
schedules an- initial hearing date. INS personnel also decide
whether to detain the alien or, if not, what bond or condition
should be set for his release. The EOIR then sends a notice to
the alien explaining the time and place of the initial hearing. At
the hearing, the immigration judge explains the process to the
alien and informs him of his rights, including his right to apply
for relief of various types, including asylum. The judge also
informs the alien .of his right to be represented by counsel at his
own expense and may .supply a list of local counsel. The
immigration judge may make his own determination regarding
bond at the initial hearing, or the alien may request a hearing
on the issue later. One or more adjournments are granted in the
vast majority of cases.l83
The alien may apply for various forms of relief from removal,
including asylum. If removal has been conceded or established
and the immigration judge has denied all forms of relief, a final
order of removal is entered against the alien. The alien then has
thirty days to appeal the decision to the BIA. If that fails, the
alien has thirty days to petition for review in the United States
Court of Appeals.l84 While each appeal is pending, the alien
may request a stay of removal.185
lbis process appears simple, but actually it has generated
enormous delays.186 Until recent reforms were instituted, these
182. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1).
183. A' 1989 study found that over eighty percent of deportation cases were
adjourned at least once. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION CONTROL:
DEPORTING AND EXCLUDING ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES 43 (1989) [hereinafter
DEPORTING AND EXCLUDING].
184. See 8 U.S.c. § 1252(b)(1). This assumes that Congress has not deprived the courts
of all review jurisdiction, a question that is currently under intense litigation in a
number of circuits. Prior to the enactment of IMMACf90, an alien had six months to
appeal. See IMMACf90 § 545(d) (codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1252).
185. See 8 U.S.c. § 1252(b)(3)(B). Prior to IMMACf90, the stay of deportation was
granted automatically for aggravated felons. See IMMACf90 § 513(a), repealed by
lOORA § 306(b).
186. A 1989 GAO study found that fifty-nine percent of deportation cases took more
than a year to resolve. When appealed to the BIA, eighty-one percent of the cases took
more than two years to resolve, and twenty-one percent took more than five years. See
DEPORTING AND ExCLUDING, supra note 183, at 39. As a result, more than 220,000
deportation and exclusion cases were pending in September, 1987, and, although 85,000
aliens were placed in deportation proceedings each year in the late 1980s, only 22,000
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delays stemmed primarily from two sources: (1) a lack of
coordination between the INS and EOIR; and (2) the ability of
aliens to delay the hearing process by requesting relief or
appealing adverse decisions.
The lack of coordination between EOIR and INS, though not
extreme, has been sufficient to create substantial delays in the
removal process; Most significantly, the two agencies have
failed to coordinate the issuance of the Notice to Appear with
the scheduling of the first appearance. In most cases, an INS
agent issues the Notice and sends a copy of it to EOIR, and
EOIR then sets the first appearance date and sends the notice to
the alien.187 Only in late 1993 did the INS and EOIR launch a
pilot effort to coordinate electronically the scheduling of the
initial hearing and the issuance of the OSC.188 By early 1997,
electronic schedule coordination was taking place in only four
cities, and it was not uncommon for the EOIR to receive an
OSC for calendaring more than a year after it had been issued
by the INS.189
More serious problems arose from the failure of the INS and
EOIR to maintain reliable address information for aliens
involved in the deportation process.190 In the Immigration Act
of 1990 (IMMACT90), Congress addressed the problem by
were removed annually. See id. at 10, 16.
The procedural reforms of IMMACf90, discussed infra at text accompanying notes
359-62, allowed the EOIR to reduce these backlogs substantially. By 1996, only 125,000
cases were pending in deportation proceedings. See Telephone Interview with Lynn
Petersburg, Program Planning & Analysis, Executive Office of Immigration Review
(Mar. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Petersburg Interview]. Nevertheless, the hearing process
continues to provide opportunities for delay and was certainly an important source of
the poor performance of the removal system during much of the period studied here.
187. Immigration officials in the New York office explained in 1986 that the first
hearing in a deportation case often was not scheduled until six weeks after filing of the
OSC. Furthermore, cases were rarely decided at the first hearing, and second hearings
were usually scheduled four months later. See INvEsTIGATIVE, supra note 21, at 20.
188. See 1994 Hearings on Criminal Aliens, supra note 40, at 231 (response of Chris Sale,
Deputy Commissioner, INS, to questions from Rep. Sangmeister).
189. See Petersburg Interview, supra note 186. For discussion of other IN5-EDIR
coordination problems, see Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: <A White Paper.
11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667 (1997).
190. In September, 1987, for example, the INS did not know the whereabouts of
twenty-five percent of the aliens in deportation or exclusion proceedings. See
DEPORTING AND ExCLUDING, supra note 183, at 23. Because immigration judges doubted
the effectiveness of notices issued to aliens, they were reluctant to order aliens removed
in absentia when they failed to appear at hearings. This resulted in the administrative
closure of thirty-five percent of cases in New York and eighteen percent in Los Angeles.
ld. at 30. As the failure-to-appear rate rose, aliens realized-that no substantial negative <
consequences attached to missing appearances:ld. at 31. < < '
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revamping the notice requirements and increasing the penalties
for aliens who failed to appear at deportation hearings.l91
Applications for relief and appeals of EOIR decisions also
contribute to much delay.l92 The IMMACT90 reforms improved
the hearing process in one key respect: administrative closings
(essentially dismissals of inactive cases) declined sharply while
in-absentia removal orders increased.l93 At the same time, the
hearing process shortened, with most cases taking about six
months to reach disposition before the IJ.194 Appeals, which
remained rare, added an average of six months to the
process.195 As in the past, applications for relief extended the
hearing process (usually from one month to six), but the
aggregate delays caused by such applications were now much
smaller than in the past.196
Like the identification of criminal aliens by local law
enforcement agencies, the removal adjudication process also
suffers from problems of inter-agency coordination. The
separation of INS and EOIR into separate entities and the
adversarial nature of the hearing process magnify managerial
errors (such as the inadequate alien notification system) and
lead to greater delay and mistrust. Against such a backdrop,
191. See infra note 359 and accompanying text.
192. The 1989 GAO study found that cases in which the alien requested some form of
relief took five times longer than cases in which no relief was sought. See DEPORTING
AND EXCLUDING, supra note 183, at 44. Furthermore, the study found that an appeal to
the BIA generally added more than a year to the duration of a deportation case. See id.
at 45. An appeal to the federal courts added another year. See id. at 46. Of these two
causes for delay, applications for relief, especially asylum, were far more significant
than the opportunity to appeal. In 1989, roughly half of the aliens sought relief of some
type, see id. at 44, but only a handful (fewer than five percent) appealed to the BIA. See
id. at 40, 41. Although appeals delayed the process, only about twenty-five percent
(thirty out of 115) were ultimately successful. See DEPORTING AND ExCLUDING, supra
note 183, at 42.
In early February, 1999, an already large backlog of appeals to the BIA was growing
worse, as the BIA sought to reduce to 180 days the time from filing of the notice of
appeal to BIA decision in cases of detained aliens. For other cases, the BIA's goal is
nineteen months. See Remarks of Paul Schmidt, Chairman of the BIA, to New York
chapter of American Immigration Lawyers Association, Feb. I, 1999.
193. In FY 89, administrative closings outnumbered in-absentia deportation orders
four-to-one. By FY 95, despite a larger caseload, administrative closings had fallen by
seventy-five percent and in absentia deportation orders outnumbered administrative
closings six-to-one. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSIlCE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
REvIEW, COMPLETION TREND ANALYSIS-DEPORTATION (Sept. 4, 1995) (on file with
authors).
194. See Petersburg Interview, supra note 186.
195. See id.
196. See id.
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even the simple task of scheduling an alien's initial appearance
becomes an opportunity for inter-agency friction. Although the
legal maneuverings of the aliens themselves have contributed
to the sluggish pace of deportation adjudications, they are not
its chief cause. Furthermore, legislative changes over the last
decade have curtailed the potential for such delays, and the
1996 legislation will have an even more drastic· effect.
Nevertheless, problems of administrative coordination are
likely to remain.197
3. Detention
As criminal aliens wend their way through the removal
process, the INS must keep track of them. It has three choices:
(1) release aliens on bond or on their own recognizance; (2)
detain them; or (3) track them while they remain in custody in
a local jail or state or federal prison. Each option poses
managerial challenges.
a. Community Release
Until recently, the INS had so little detention space that it
had to release most criminal aliens during the hearing
process.198 Unfortunately, many failed to appear for hearings,
and even more absconded when actually ordered removed.199
Aliens ordered removed are far less likely to surrender. One
1996 report found that ninety-four percent of removable
detained aliens were actually removed, whereas only eleven
percent of released removable aliens were.200
Furthermore, the primary method the INS uses to insure the
appearance of aliens in detention hearings - the posting of
money bonds-is clearly a failure.201 Problems with the system
197. For discussions of, and possible solutions to, these problems, see generally
Schuck, supra note 189; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRIMINAL AUENS: INS's
EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY AND REMOVE IMPRISONED AUENS NEED TO BE IMPROVED (1997)
[hereinafter EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY].
198. See infra section m.B.3.
199. The 1989 GAO study estimated that twenty-seven percent of cases are closed due
to the alien's non-appearance. See DEPORTING AND ExCLUDING, supra note 183, at 22. In
New York, during FY 93, for example, eighty-seven percent of aliens receiving final
orders of deportation failed to appear for removal. See Criminal Aliens in the United
States, supra note 37, at 21. Between 1989 and 1993, over 18,000 criminal aliens were
ordered deported but avoided actual removal. See id. at 22.
200. See Schuck, supra note 189, at 673 n.5.
201. Over fifty percent of those failing to appear did so despite having posted bond.
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stem from four sources. First, bond levels are too low to induce
compliance. The statutory minimum was long set at $500; the
1996 law raised it to $1,500. For a ten percent fee, most aliens
can obtain a commercial bond.202 Second, bonds set by the INS
are routinely reduced by immigration judges. One study found
that, although the INS set bonds at an average of $3,000, IJs
reduced them by an average of sixty-eight percent.203 This "by-
play," in which bond levels set by INS officers are routinely
reduced by IJs, only leads each party to over-compensate,
reducing the rationality of the bail system and encouraging
costly and time-consuming appeals. Third, even when bonds
are breached, the INS rarely seeks to enforce them, and the
bondsmen, in turn, rarely bother to pursue the alien.204 Finally,
the problems of information management and coordination at
the identification stage (discussed earlier) insure that most
alien absconders will not- trigger special attention from law
enforcement should they ever be arrested again. Together,
these problems led Congress in 1996 to abandon community
release in favor of mandated detention for most criminal
aliens.205
b. Lack ofDetention Space
A harsh but effective alternative to release, of course, would
be to detain aliens pending their removal. The INS, however,
has always been short of detention space, and detaining aliens
unnecessarily is both harsh and expensive. In 1993, the INS had
a total of 3,500 beds in INS-operated and separately contracted
detention facilities.206 The GAO estimated that in 1990, over
See DEPORTING AND ExCLUDING, supra note 183, at 26.
202. See Schuck, supra note 189, at 683.
203. See Janet Gilboy, Set/ing Bail in Deportation Cases: The Role ofImmigration Judges,
24 U. SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 370 (1987).
204. See Schuck, supra note 189, at 684.
205. See, e.g., IIRIRA § 303 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226). This policy, however, has not
gone unchallenged. On December 14, 1998, a federal district court in Denver ruled that
the Constitution requires individualized bond hearings. See Martinez v. Greene, 28 F,
Supp. 2d 1275 (D. Colo. 1998). The INS has been exploring alternatives to mandatory
detention. One alternative, the Vera Institute of Justice's Appearance Assistance Project
(AAP), claims that supervised release of 122 AAP participants, consisting
predominantly of LPR's, .resulted in 92-100 percent appearance rates at immigration
court hearings. Telephone,interview with Ajay Kahashu, Policy Analyst, AAP of the
VeraInstitute ofJustice;.Feb. 10, 1999.
206. See Criminal Aliens in the United States, supra note 37, at 21.
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480,000 aliens were potentially subject to detention.207 With the
average length of detention at twenty-three days/os the INS
would have needed roughly 30,000 beds to detain them.209
Furthermore, the agency must reserve many detention beds for
long-term detainees and to insure the presence of. a detention
deterrent for other groups of removable aliens,. such as those
attempting to enter the country illegally. These pressures only
worsen the shortfall of detention space available for criminal
aliens.
The detention situation remains dire despite the addition of
many beds and a top priority in the allocation of new
resources.210 When IIRIRA was passed at the end of 1996,
requiring the INS to detain virtually all criminal aliens leaving
state prisons, the INS promptly certified that detention space
was inadequate in order to invoke .the law's' transition
provisions allowing the INS to release some criminal aliens
who are LPRs.211
As of January 22, 1999, the 'detained. population had
ballooned to 16,116,212 including more than 12,000 aggravated
felons.213 The agency claimed an urgent need for 3,700
additional beds214 to detain criminal aliens due to the
expiration of the "Transition Period Custody Rules" (TPCR) on
October 9, 1998.215 The TPCR permitted the INS to refrain from
207. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION· CONTROL: IMMIGRATION
POUCIES AFFECf INS DETENTION EFFORTS 3 (1992) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION POUCIES].
The number must be far greater today with increased illegal migration and the
detention mandated by the 1996 laws.
208. See id.
209. Of course, placing so many aliens in detention would have severely strained
other parts of the removal system, leading to an inevitable increase in average
detention periods.
210. See Morton Interview, supra note 31. The crowded conditions of detention are
also dangerous. See. e.g., Mirta Ojito, Immigrant's Death in Detention Prompts New
Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1999, at B3.
211. See 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1418-19 (1996).
212. As of January, 1999, ninety-three percent of the beds the INS uses for the
detention of immigrants are occupied. See Ojito, supra note 210.
213. See supra note 26.
214. See Telephone Interview with Barbara Francis, Office of Public Affairs, INS (Feb.
10,1999). .
215. See Donald Kerwin & Charles Wheeler, The Detention Mandates of the 1996
Immigration Act: An Exercise in Overkill, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1433, 1435 (Oct. 19,
1998). According to the INS, the problem is not bed capacity, but funding. For FY 99,
Congress has funded only 14,570 beds. See Feb. 11, 1999,'Bergeron Interview, supra note
25; see a/so Testimony of Doris Meissner, Commissioner, INS, Before the Subcomm: on
Immigration of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (1998) (visited on Feb. 10, ,1999)
<http://www.aiIa.org/infonet> ~ereinafterINS Testimony on PetentipI}]. '. ',',
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fully implementing the new mandatory detention provisions
and to release criminal aliens who were not a danger to the
community. Shortly after the TPCR expired, the INS issued
new guidelines revising its detention priorities.216 Despite the
new mandate, however, the INS was preparing in February,
1999, to release criminal aliens due to intolerable
overcrowding.217 It estimates that 3,000 to 18,000 additional
detention beds are needed to comply with the IIRIRA,218
Another difficult detention problem is presented by so-called
"lifers," criminal aliens who are removable to countries such as
Vietnam and Cuba that refuse to accept them. As of late 1998,
almost 3,500 lifers were in INS custody.219
c. Law Enforcement Custody
A third way to track aliens awaiting removal is to complete
the removal process while the aliens are still incarcerated in
federal, state and local facilities. The INS has increasingly
pursued this sensible strategy since 1986.220 Under the IHP, INS
investigators screen prisoners in state and federal prisons (and
now in some jails), beginning proceedings against any who are
removable.221 Hearings take place at or near the detention
facility. If the process is completed prior to the alien's release,
the alien can be removed directly from prison upon the
completion of his sentence.222 The program has expanded to
most states and the federal system, though IHP resources are
concentrated in the seven states with the largest numbers of
incarcerated criminal aliens-California, Arizona, Texas,
Florida, New York, New Jersey, and Illinois.223
Although the IHP has increased the number of removals, it is
216. See INS Detention Use Policy, reprinted in 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1524 Appendix
I (Nov. 2, 1998).
217. See, e.g., Valerie Alvord, Money Woes Will Force INS to Free Criminals, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Feb. 7,1999, at A23.
218. See Kerwin & Wheeler, supra note 215, at 1436.
219. As of January 18, 1999, the number of non-Cuban "lifers" was 1,992. See
<http://www.mercurycenter.com/premium/localfdocs/lifers07.htm> These long-
term detainees contribute to an increasing average stay. The average stay for criminal
aliens is now forty-five to sixty days. See Feb. 11, 1999, Bergeron InterView, supra note
25.
220. See Pear, supra note 103, at B3.
221. See generally GAO Report, supra note 172.
222.See id.
223. See St. John-Mellado Interview I, supra note 65; see also Hearings on Removal.
supra note 49, at 4 (testimony of T. Alexander Aleinikoff, General Counsel, INS).
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also a case study in the grindingly difficult process of
coordination among the INS, EorR, and state and local law
enforcement agencies. Despite agreement on the merits of the
program, these officials have struggled over administrative
details. To make the program work, the INS must make
separate arrangements with each state, with EOIR, and with its
own investigators and attorneys. Space must be obtained and
records exchanged in a timely manner. Automated information
systems must be purchased and installed. For the first four
years of the IHP, these obstacles, along with the lack of
dedicated resources, were disabling,224 Improvements came
only after Congress dedicated new resources in FY 94 and the
INS, EOIR, and each of the seven states completed detailed
negotiations to arrange for limited intake and release points
and to assign adequate space for the hearings in penal
institutions.225 The IHP has recently been integrated with an
institutional removal program (IRP), which uses not only EOIR
hearings but other, faster removal techniques, mainly
administrative removal and reinstatement of prior removal
orders for re-entering aliens.226 As recently as October, 1998, the
GAO reported that the program had still not been fully
implemented even in the seven high-priority states, and the
INS still failed to screen roughly one-third of the target
population of foreign-born prisoners even in the BOP and the
four largest states.227
4. Preventing Re-Entry
To prevent the re-entry of previously removed criminal
aliens, the INS must guard the border and apprehend those
removed aliens who nevertheless manage to enter. Effective
224. Despite focusing only on aliens with at least one year remaining on their sentences,
the INS in 1990 was able to complete only 3.6 percent of IHP cases prior to release. By
February of 1991, the figure was six percent. See IMMIGRATION POUCIES, supra note 207,
at 39. A study of the Los Angeles County jail program found that, although an
immigration judge traveled to the jail once a week, he often had as few as six cases a
day in a jail system estimated to house over 2,000 removable aliens at a time. See
Criminal Aliens in the United States, supra note 37, at 19.
225. See St. John-Mellado Interview I, supra note 65; see also Hearings on Removal,
supra note 49, at 11~17.With the increased funding, there has been a rise in the number
of criminal aliens in federal and state BOP facilities for which the INS has completed
IHP and which it has ultimately removed. But in FY 96, completions remained at the
thirty-two-percent level. See EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY, supra note 197, at 8.
226. See discussion infra at text accompanying note 473.
227. See GAO Report, supra note 172, § 1.
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border surveillance requires enormous resources and adequate
coordination within the INS. Effective interior surveillance
requires the INS to coordinate its own apprehension and
prosecution efforts with those of other law enforcement
agencies. The INS has trouble on both counts.
Its efforts to stop illegal re-entry at the border have suffered
both from a lack of resources and from the INS's own
management failures. Preventing illegal entry is the primary
responsibility of the Border Patrol. Although the Border Patrol
has traditionally received the lion's share of the INS budget,
these resources have not prevented aliens from entering the
country. United States borders are thousands of miles long; few
people would expect the Border Patrol to seal them.
Furthermore, United States citizens and foreign visitors expect
an atmosphere of free travel at airports and across the borders,
limiting the Border Patrol's ability to control traffic.
.But as difficult as the Border Patrol's task is, it is not
impossible. Congress has vastly increased its size and resources
in recent years, 228 and the southern, border, which is largely
impassable, need not be monitored along its entire length. In
1999, the Border Patrol had nearly 9,000 agents, more than
double the level in 1993, and well above the level that the
President had requested.229
To insure that a removed alien does not return to the
country, INS border inspectors and Border Patrol agents also
must know which aliens to look for. Unfortunately, the INS has
often failed to use even the rudimentary systems it possesses to
pass news of a removal from the deportation staff to officers on
the border.230 Recently, however, the INS has improved its
228. The actual amount spent on border patrol in FY 96 was $536 million. The actual
budget figure for FY 98 was $877 million. See Telephone Interview with Steven Mertins,
OMB (Apr. 1, 1998) [hereinafter Mertins Interview II]. The Border Control currently has
9,000 agents in 1998, a 127 percent increase from the level in 1993. See BUDGET OF TIlE
U.S. GOVERNMENT, FY 2000 <http://www.access.gpo.gov> [hereinafter Budget]. The
President's proposed budget figure for FY 99 was $998 million.
229. See DEPT. OFJUSTICE, INS, FAcrSHEET, FEB. 1999.
230. GAO studies in 1986 and 1987 found that information regarding removal of
criminal aliens was routinely missing from the systems used by inspections staff to
prevent re-entry of those who had been deported. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, CRIMINAL AUENS: MAJORITY DEPORTED FROM TIlE NEW YORK CITY AREA Nor
LISTED IN INS's INFORMATION SYSfEMS 8 (1987) [hereinafter MAJORITY DEPORTED]; INS'
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES, supra note 167, at 34-39. As a result, it has always been easy
for those investigating the issue (reporters or congressional staff members, for example)
to find criIJ1inal aliens who have crossed and re-crossed the border with impunity)
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performance by installing a new fingerprint identification
system (!DENT) at key border locations and at many ports of
entry.231
Because previously removed criminal aliens can readily re-
enter, the INS must rely on local law enforcement agencies to
apprehend aliens in the interior. To enfor~e the INA's re-entry
penalties, U. S. Attorneys in border districts must prosecute
those aliens who are re-arrested.232 For most of the last decade,
the criminal-alien removal system has stumbled on both of
these steps.
As discussed earlier, local law enforcement officers have no
way of knowing the immigration status of an arrestee.233 They
have little access to INS records, and INS personnel are seldom
available to answer their inquiries. In most cases, the INS
makes no attempt to identify arrestees until they have been
sent to jail or prison.234 As a result, most previously removed
aliens arrested by law enforcement will escape detection by the
INS.235 Only recently has the INS developed a means to prevent
this. In a special project with the state of California, fingerprints
of removed aliens are now entered into California's criminal
records system so that local law enforcement agencies
requesting an arrestee's criminal record will know that he was
previously removed and re-entered illegally.236
Even when the INS apprehends a previously removed alien,
despite being removed and frequently arrested. See, e.g., Mark Fineman, Mexico Rages
over U.S. Law on Immigration, L.A. TIMES, April 12, 1997, at 1 (citing research by the
Tijuana Research Institute finding the "overwhelming majority" of illegal migrants had
been caught several times).
231. See Telephone Interview with Tim Biggs, IDENT Project Manager, INS (Mar. 3D,
1999) [hereinafter Biggs Interview]. See also discussion at text accompanying notes 468-
69, infra.
232. See, e.g., U.S. v. Diaz-Diaz, 135 F.2d 572, 577 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding a
conviction for unlawful re-entry of a criminal alien). .
233. See supra section m.B.l.a.
234. See generally supra section m.B.l.e.
235. See generally id.
236. See IMMIGRATION AND NATURAUZATION SEIW., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT: MEETING THE CHALLENGE, A RECORD OF PROGRESS 8-9 (1996)
[hereinafter RECORD OF PROGRESS]. An earlier project with the FBI, which focused on
sharing INS records of aliens who absconded duriilg the removal process, took over
five years to implement. Compare Emerging Criminal Groups: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs. 99th Congo 303
(1986) (claiming that FBI and INS had begun discussions on data sharing project)
[hereinafter Emerging], with Oversight Hearing on the Immigration and Naturalization Service
and Immigration Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Congo 21 (1991) (explaining that FBI-INS data-
sharing project was just getting started) [hereinafter 1991 INS Oversight Hearing].
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it has difficulty demonstrating that re-entry laws have bite. In
1993, a congressional investigation into the criminal-alien
problem found no significant deterrent to re-entry, because
illegal re-entrants were rarely prosecuted.237 Several U. S.
Attorneys located along the border had policies in place that
limited the number of re-entry cases they would prosecute, or
chose to prosecute only those cases in which the alien had
already been convicted of illegal re-entry on several
occasions.238 Even completed prosecutions were usually plea
bargained to light sentences. Only after the Justice Department
began beefing up the prosecutorial staffs of key U. S. Attorney's
offices in San Diego and elsewhere along the border in 1995 did
prosecution for illegal re-entry start to become a real
deterrent.239
5. A Difficult System to Coordinate
The failures of the criminal-alien removal system, then, stem
from three sources-the difficulty of the task, the
ineffectiveness of INS's management, and a scarcity of
resources.
In their famous study of policy implementation, Pressman
and Wildavsky showed how problems of coordination between
government entities can quickly turn the enthusiasm of a
public initiative into the frustration of a bureaucratic fiasco.24o
Despite broad public support for a public works and jobs
program, the authors found, it ground to a halt over countless
minor coordination problems. Agreement endured on the
program's goals, but the means sowed contention and sources
of delay. Although most participants agreed most of the time,
each new step in the process produced minor disagreements
among the numerous parties involved in implementation. As
the need for coordination increased, opportunities for delay
multiplied geometrically.241
Pressman and Wildavsky's analysis explains the failures of
237. See Criminal Aliens in the United States, supra note 37, at 14.
238. See Ronald Ostrow, INS Assailedfor Not Deporting Criminal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 1993, at A13.
239. See RECORD OF PROGRESS, supra note 236, at 9; see also, Schuck, supra note 189, at
698-700.
240. See PRESSMAN & WILDAVSKY, supra note 28.
241. See id. at 87-110.
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the criminal-alien removal system. Like the public works
project they analyzed/ the goal of criminal-alien removal enjoys
almost universal support/ yet the coordination challenges are
enormous. Local police officers/ state court judges/ local
prosecutors/ county jail officials/ state corrections agencies/
federal and state information systems/ and federal prosecutors
must all align the logistical details of their operational systems
with those of the INS. By expanding the IHP program in state
and federal prisons/ establishing the LESe project/ and sharing
removal data with the FBI and state recordkeepers/ the INS has
addressed some of these problems. But with so many parties
participating/ even minor disagreements over means or slight
variations in priorities can interact to create enormous delays.
The evidence also suggests that the INS/s managerial failures
have exacerbated the difficulty of coordinating this
complicated system. Such failures may be endemic to most
government programs. Political scientist James Q. Wilson
points out that government managers respond more to
constraints than to mission.242 Because government managers
cannot allocate surplus revenues as they wish/ and because
their priorities are set by outsiders/ they often adopt a short-
term perspective at the expense of the agencts long-term
mission.243 The INS has suffered this fate. Several of its most
serious implementation problems stem from two projects-
data management and detention space-that require careful
planning and long-term resource commitments. Despite the
obvious importance of automated data systems and adequate
detention space/ the INS has consistently failed until recently to
invest in effective information systems and has always been
desperately short of detention space.244 Had it allocated
sufficient resources to developing an adequate criminal-alien
identification system usable by other law enforcement officers/
the criminal-alien removal system would be considerably more
effective today. Similarly/ adequate detention space would
have made the removal system far more credible to aliens and
the public alike.
For most of the last decade/ however/ lack of managerial
242. See JAMES Q. WIlSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENOES Do AND
WHY THEY Do IT 115 (1989).
243. See id.
244. See infra Section IV.A. and IV.B; supra Section m.B.3.b.
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foresight at the INS has been overshadowed by a chronic lack
of resources in the criminal-alien removal system as a whole.
Despite a more than five-fold increase in the INS budget
between FY 85 and FY 99- the current budget is $3.86 billion,
and the President's FY 2000 budget proposes $4.1 billion245-it
was not unti11994 that significant new resources were targeted
at the criminal-alien problem.246 This has meant a crippling of
nearly every stage of .the system. Poor information technology
makes it difficult to identify criminal aliens even when they
were arrested. A shortage of investigative staff prevents
identification at an early stage and even slows INS efforts to
screen aliens in jails and prisons. The· lack of adequate
detention and deportation staff and a serious shortage of beds
keeps the INS from taking most criminal aliens into custody.
Without sufficient space to detain newly identified criminal
aliens, the efficacy of new programs, such as the LESC, is
compromised.. With a dearth of detention and deportation
officers, the INS fails to execute most of the final removal
orders that it manages to obtain; there is no one to pick up non-
detained aliens before they can flee or to take them to the
airport for removal. Finally, a shortage of manpower and
information resources at the border makes it difficult for the
INS to prevent illegal re-entry. Only recently has this chronic
resource shortage been alleviated somewhat. More mysterious
is the question of why it was allowed to persist for so long.
That is the subject of the next section.
IV. POLmCAL AND POLICY REsPONSES TO THE CRIMINAL-ALIEN
PROBLEM
If coordination problems in the criminal-alien removal
system were so severe, why did Congress not move earlier to
solve them? Congressional attention might have aligned the
efforts of state and federal law enforcement; larger INS
appropriations, particularly for detention and information
management, would have made the removal system more
effective. Better legislative oversight would surely have
smoothed the transition from policy to implementation.
Instead, Congress has pursued blame avoidance more
245. See Feb. 11, 1999, Bergeron Interview, supra note 25.
246. See generally infra Section IV.
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ardently than effective oversight for most of the last decade.
Despite considerable attention and frequent legislation,
Congress left a few states and localities to bear most of the costs
of the systems failure.247 Real progress did not occur until 1994,
after several heavily affected states forced the issue.248 Without
their concerted efforts, congressional oversight would not have
produced even the limited improvements for which the Clinton
Administration has taken credit.
The failures of the criminal-alien removal system are
emphatically not the result of congressional inattention.
Congress debated and passed laws targeting criminal aliens
and INS enforcement in 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1994, and twice
in 1996. Key committees held hearings on the subject nearly
every year from 1986 to 1998. Members commissioned detailed
reports from the GAO as early as 1985.249 Immigration officials
have frequently testified on the subject before congressional
committees.250 The failures of the system were no secret.
Neither were the potential solutions. Early investigations
into the criminal-alien problem informed Congress about the
outlines of the problem and some possible solutions. Although
no comprehensive legislative blueprint was ever produced,
outlines of workable solutions were made clear in testimony
and reports prepared for Congress as early as 1986.251 These
solutions may have required substantial new resources or a
different relationship between federal immigration authorities
and local law enforcement agencies, but they were neither
unknown nor particularly difficult to implement. Unlike some
policy problems, such as domestic violence, inner-city
schooling, or protecting the ozone layer, the criminal-alien
problem could be easily solved.
Until quite recently, however, the federal government failed
to pursue these solutions seriously. Despite clear indications
that the primary weaknesses in the criminal-alien removal
system lay in identification, information management, and
detention, both Congress and the INS focused instead on
restricting aliens' procedural rights. Compared to the costly
247. See supra notes 53-54, 73-75, and accompanying text.
248. See infra Section IV.e.
249. See infra Section IV.A.
250. See infra Sections IV.A.2., IV.B., and IV.e.l.
251. See, e.g., Emerging, supra note 236, at 261.
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reforms necessary to improve the system, procedural fixes
seemed easy and cheap. Creating an effective identification
system, building a new information system, and expanding the
detention system required substantial new funding and a re-
thinking of intergovernmental roles. By legislating a procedural
crackdown, Congress could claim to be getting tough on
criminal aliens. This strategy was even more appealing because
criminal aliens had few political defenders and because some
procedural problems really did need fixing. Yet, by focusing
almost exclusively on procedural reform, Congress and the INS
ignored the early evidence that the removal system needed
structural change and considerably more resources.
In 1994, Congress and the INS finally turned to the gritty
implementation problems. Despite budgetary austerity
throughout the federal government, Congress more than
doubled the size of the INS budget in the last six years, from
$1.5 billion in 1993 to $3.86 billion in 1999.252 Much of this
increase has flowed to the removal system.253 At the same time,
the INS has begun to improve coordination with state and local
law enforcement agencies. The result of these reforms is a
substantial increase in removals.254 Such progress, however,
would have been unlikely without the concerted efforts of state
governments long saddled with the costs of the federal
government's failure to remove criminal aliens.
A. 1985-1988: Congress Learns about the Criminal-Alien Problem
During the. mid-1980s, most immigration policymakers
focused on the problem of increased illegal immigration. In its
March, 1981 report, the Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy prpposed a system of sanctions on employers
who hired illegal aliens, a broad amnesty for long-resident
illegal aliens, and a new agricultural worker program,255 while
Congress attacked immigration-related marriage fraud.256
These four measures, ultimately enacted in 1986, stirred
252. See Budget, supra note 228, at 124. The President's budget request for FY 2000
totals $4.27 billion. See id.
253. See infra Section IV.e3.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
255. See NANCY HUMEL MONTIVIELER, THE IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW OF 1986:
ANALYSIS, TEXT, AND LEGISLATIVE HISfORY (1987).
256. See id.
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considerable controversy; their passage required five years of
steady work by legislators and immigration policy experts.257
1. Drawing Attention to the Problem
As the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was
being debated and the magnitude of the illegal alien problem
grew, a few politicians noticed that aliens were committing
many crimes. The first formal inquiry into alien crime came
from Senator Alfonse D'Amato, who asked the GAO in July of
1985 to investigate how the INS was dealing with criminal
aliens in the New York City area.258 The GAO reported that,
although many aliens were arrested on felony charges,259 few
were removed from the country,260 and the INS often failed to
prevent the re-entry of those it did manage to remove.261
The 1986 report traced these failures to a lack of INS
investigative resources, insufficient detention space, and
inadequate information systems.262 During one period of fifteen
months, as many as ten percent of arrested felons in New York
City were aliens.263 Without sufficient investigative staff to
interview these alien arrestees,264 the INS district office
screened only about one in nine of them before local law
enforcement agencies released them.265 Those criminal aliens
who did wind up in deportation proceedings languished there
for months,266 and, with only 400 detention beds available to
257. See id. at3-18.
258. See INVESflGATIVE, supra note 21, atl.
259. See id. at 2.
260. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRIMINAL AUENS: INS's DETENTION AND
DEPORTATION ACTIVITIES IN TIiE NEW YORK CITY AREA 31 (1986) [hereinafter NYC
DETENTION].
261. See MAJORITY DEPORTED, supra note 230.
262. See generally NYC DETENTION, supra note 260.
263. See INVESflGATIVE, supra note 21, at 2.
264. The INS's New York district office had only 119 investigators, including
supervisors (twenty percent fewer than in 1983), and these staff spent only about
sixteen percent of their time on criminal-alien matters. See id. at 22, 16.
265. See id. at 12-13. Instead, the district office directed most of its resources to
screening the prison population even though, as the GAO pointed out, eighty-seven
percent of those arrested on felonies never entered prison. See id. at 2. Meanwhile, most
aliens who evaded INS screening continued to commit crimes, with seventy-seven
percent of one sample rearrested at least once, and eleven percent rearrested at least
five times between the initial request for INS assistance and the completion of the GAO
study. See id. at 3.
266. In one group of cases, eighty-four percent had waited more than three months,
and thirty-one percent had waited more than a year. See id. at 2.
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the district office,267 many were released. Although aliens who
remained in detention were generally removed within ninety
days of apprehension,268 only 17.5 percent of aliens released
over the three years prior to the study were actually
removed.269 Of those released, twenty-four percent absconded,
and thirty-five percent were arrested for new crimes.27o Adding
to the picture of disarray, the GAO found that many removed
criminal aliens returned to commit more crimes. In one sample
of arrestees investigated by the INS, twenty-one percent had
been previously removed.271 Unsurprisingly, the GAO found
that a high percentage of the criminal aliens removed from the
New York City area were not even listed in the information
systems used to screen aliens' entry into the country.272
These accounts led to sustained media attention to the issue
throughout 1986, much of which portrayed the INS as
overwhelmed and unprepared to deal with a rapidly rising
caseload of criminal aliens. In January, Senator D'Amato
criticized the INS for not devoting enough time to the
problem,273 In March, he stepped up his attack, claiming that
criminal aliens were "savaging our society" and pointing to
reports that over 12,000 aliens had been arrested on felony
charges in New York City over a fifteen-month period, though
the INS district office there had removed only 304 criminal
aliens in 1985,274 By mid-July, New York City officials were
admitting that they had given up trying to get the INS to
remove criminal aliens due to widespread recognition that its
resources were inadequate.275 The drumbeat continued
throughout the year, with articles contrasting the growing
criminal-alien problem with the stark lack of INS investigation
and detention resources,276 Public frustration was not limited to
267. See id. at 20.
268. See NYC DETENTION, supra note 260, at 29.
269. See id. at 30. Relief was granted to the alien only in a small fraction (2.5 percent)
of the cases not resulting in deportation. See id. at 30.
270. See id. at 29.
271. See INVEsTIGATIVE, supra note 21, at 14.
272. See MAJORTIY DEPORTED, supra note 230, at 8.
273. See UPI, Jan. 14, 1986, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
274. See UPI, Mar. 23, 1986, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
275. See Kerr, supra note 22.
276. See. e.g., Robert Pear, Immigration Aides Seek Money to Stop Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 7, 1986, at A15 (citing twenty-six-percent drop in INS investigative staff since
1976); Lenny Savino, Not Enough Jail Cells for all the l/legal Aliens, N.Y. DMES, Dec. 21,
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New York; county supervisors in San Diego even considered
suing the federal government for reimbursement of criminal-
justice system costs absorbed by illegal aliens.277
At the same time, efforts by INS administrators and local
officials pointed toward solutions. In New York, the INS
unveiled the prototype for the IHP, which would allow
deportation hearings for incarcerated criminal aliens to take
place while the alien remained in prison.278 At the same time,
the INS made arrangements to remove any criminal alien for
whom the Manhattan District Attorney would waive
prosecution.279 Walter Ezell, then Director of the Western
Region, announced a new initiative to ,screen state prisons and
local jails for removable criminal aliens. At the same time, he
called attention to the fact that INS manpower had dropped
from 111 to 41 investigators in Los Angeles over the last few
years, and that, as a result of similar manpower reductions
across the region, the INS had given up on prison and jail
screening in California and other western states.280 Ezell
suggested, however, that an investment in new investigators,
placed at state and local facilities, would reap benefits for the
criminal-alien removal system.281
2. The First Attempts at a Solution
On Capitol Hill, Senator D'Amato pressed his concerns
further by adding to a supplemental INS appropriations bill a
requirement that the INS provide a report by September
detailing its strategy for investigating, apprehending, and
removing criminal aliens.282 The INS response, known as the
Alien Criminal Apprehension Program (ACAP), prefigured
INS and congressional attention to the criminal-alien problem
over the next decade. Though lacking in detail, the report
outlined a coherent strategy for attacking the criminal-alien
problem.283 The INS recognized the need to build on the efforts
of local law enforcement agencies in apprehending, identifying
1986, Long Island Section, at 14.
277. See Weintraub, supra note 4, at B3.
278. See Pear, supra note 103, at B3.
279. See id.
280. See Ramos, supra note 22, at Bl.
281. See id.
282. See S. REP. No. 99-301, at 23 (1986).
283. See Emerging, supra note 236, at 261.
. .
)
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and detaining criminal aliens. INS districts were instructed to
cooperate with the local agencies in establishing efficient
procedures for INS investigators to respond to local requests at
each point in the criminal-justice process. INS agents would
respond at an early stage rather than waiting to screen only
those aliens who were incarcerated. The INS even recognized
the need to develop compatible information systems with the
FBI and local law enforcement agencies.284
The report also revealed that the INS could not effectively
implement the strategy it had devised. First, the volume of
criminal-alien work was enormous. Even without a
coordinated system for responding to local agencies, the INS
had received nearly 150,000 criminal-alien referrals during FY
85.285 Yet it had only 690 investigative agents on duty nation-
wide (twenty-six percent fewer than in 1976), and almost
eighty percent of their time was spent on issues other than
criminal aliens.2S6 The poor quality of its central information
systems was equally clear. The field offices could only estimate
the number of law enforcement referrals,2S7 and the INS had no
idea how many detainers it had placed on aliens in state or
local custody.288 A centralized alien database accessible to law
enforcement officers confronting criminal aliens was clearly
needed.2S9
Inexplicably, however, the INS report asserted that the
necessary reforms could be implemented without new
resources and without a significant change in the roles of state
and local government in immigration enforcement.290 In
response to a direct question on the topic, then-INS
Commissioner Alan Nelson mentioned only that some
additional hearing officers might be helpful.291 Whether due to
unfounded optimism, fiscal pressure from within the executive
branch, or institutional tunnel vision, INS's timidity in honestly
assessing its capabilities at this early junction is striking.
Congress acted quickly on the GAO findings and the
284. See id. at 300-03.
285. See id. at 267-68.
286. See id. at 282, 298.
287. See id. at 276.
288. See id. at 281.
289. See id. at 6.
290. See id. at 299.
291. See id. at 252.
HeinOnline -- 22 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 429 1998-1999
No.2] Removing Criminal Aliens 429
strategic direction suggested by the INS, enacting several
provisions in 1986 designed to improve cooperation on the
criminal-alien problem between federal and state government.
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 directed the Service to set up
formal pilot programs to cooperate with local law enforcement
agencies in four cities.292 In response to complaints from those
agencies (especially the Florida Sheriff's Association),293
Congress required the INS to respond to all law enforcement
requests regarding the immigration status of aliens arrested on
drug charges and to determine promptly whether the Service
would detain them.294 The new law required the INS to "begin
any deportation proceeding [against a criminal alien] as
expeditiously as possible after the date of conviction."295
Finally, the Attorney General was authorized to reimburse
states for the costs of incarcerating illegal aliens.296
Representative Buddy MacKay of Florida, the latter provision's
sponsor, explained that states bore the consequences of federal
inaction regarding criminal aliens and that the new legislation
would mean "the consequences of the INS failure [would now]
be felt by the federal [government]."297
In November, 1987, a GAO study examining criminal-alien
enforcement in Miami, Houston, Los Angeles, Denver, and
Chicago revealed that other cities also experienced the
problems discovered in New York City.298 In all the
jurisdictions studied, a large number of arrestees were foreign-
born.299 Furthermore, the low quality of INS data systems
impaired criminal-alien enforcement efforts in all five offices.30o
The GAO's analysis of investigation tactics was even more
revealing. Faced with large numbers of aliens in the local
criminal-justice systems, the Houston, Miami, and Los Angeles
292. See ADA of1986 § 1751.
293. See Robert D. Lystad, States News Service, Oct. 10, 1986, available in LEXIS,
News Library, SNS File.
294. See 8 U.S.c. § 1357(d) (1994).
295. See !RCA § 701 (codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1252(i) (1994».
296. See !RCA § 501(a) (codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1365 (1994».
297. See Lystad, supra note 293.
298. See generally INS' ENFORCEMENT AcnvmFS, supra note 167.
299. See id. at 3. In Houston and Los Angeles, about twenty percent were foreign-
born, while thirty-eight percent in Miami were. The GAO estimated that about half of
these were aliens. See id. at 17.
300. As in New York, the GAO found that the INS often failed to keep its re-entry
screening systems up to date in these cities, and that, as a result, "the INS' ability to
prevent previously deported aliens from entering ... was severely limited." ld. at 3-4.
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districts followed procedures similar to those of the New York
office, generally limiting their efforts to screening incarcerated
aliens in jails or prisons, while simply accepting that most
criminal aliens escaped their attention.30l In Denver and
Chicago, however, fewer aliens were present in the criminal
justice system, and INS officers attempted to identify aliens
soon after arrest.302 A lack of detention and deportation funds,
however, required the Denver and Chicago offices to redeploy
their resources toward those aliens already convicted, forcing
these offices to curtail these early identification efforts.303
Hearings organized in 1987 and 1988 by Senator Lawton
Chiles of Florida further revealed the implementation problems
facing the removal system.304 Janet Reno, then a Dade County
prosecutor, reported that the INS consistently failed to support
local law enforcement. In line with the ACAP report, Reno
highlighted the importance of identifying aliens early in the
criminal-justice process and flagged the need for adequate INS
detention facilities.305 John Shaw and John Simon, senior INS
officials, acknowledged the Service's failures but blamed
coordination difficulties throughout the removal process. Shaw
pointed out that merging INS data with the FBI's National
Crime Information Center (NCIC) system to distribute
immigration warrants to local law enforcement agencies would
be complicated306 and cited difficulties in coordinating
schedules with EOIR.307 Simon explained that developing the
IHP required detailed logistical coordination with federal and
301. See id. at 3..
302. See id. at 21-22. In both Denver and Chicago, local INS officials had developed
efficient methods of screening offenders, either at booking facilities or as part of the
pre-arraignment process. INS officials in those locations noted that local criminal justice
agencies were satisfied with the assistance they received from the INS and were
continuing to cooperate.
303. See id. at 22. Officials from the Denver and Chicago offices complained to GAO
investigators that this realignment of effort would result in greater frustration among
local law enforcement officers and a less effective removal system overall.
304. See Federal Responsibility, supra note 4 (statement of Sen. Lawton Chiles).
305. See Federal Responsibility, supra note 4, at 40-60 (statement of Janet Reno). One
Florida sheriff detailed how early identification of criminal aliens would improve law
enforcement and asked for more INS support. See Implementation ofImmigration Reform:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Congo 21-23, 31 (1988) [hereinafter Implementation Hearing).
306. See Federal Responsibility, supra note 4, at 27.
307. See id at 24; see also Haitian Narcotics Activities: Hearing Before the Caucus on
International Narcotics Control, 100'" Congo 42-43 (1988) [hereinafter Haitian Narcotics).
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state prison officials.30B By September of 1988, even the four-city
pilot project was foundering, as computer incompatibilities and
resource shortages slowed implementation to a craw1.309 In
response, Senator Chiles called for further INS
appropriations3lO and introduced legislation requiring INS
detention of certain criminal aliens and a tighter linkage
between INS and criminal law enforcement information
systems.3ll
Despite the attention to the criminal-alien problem, concrete
efforts to attack the problem were overwhelmed by the
implementation demands of !RCA. Rather than simply asking
the INS to patrol the borders and to apprehend those
immigrants who entered illegally, IRCA attempted to shut
down the illegal immigration magnet by sanctioning employers
who hired undocumented workers, while also requiring the
INS to implement an amnesty for millions of illegal aliens who
had been in the country for years.312 These two new programs
absorbed much of the Service's attention from 1986 to 1988.
Nearly all of the new resources allocated to investigations went
to !RCA implementation,313 and the burden of implementing
IRCA was a frequent explanation for the failures of the
criminal-alien removal system.314 The INS became so focused
on implementing IRCA that it sought to divert investigative
resources from the criminal-alien program to its employer
sanctions program.3lS Although Congress halted that move,316
the INS did manage to divert funds allocated for the
improvement of information systems- a key component of the
criminal-alien strategy- to IRCA-related programs.317
308. See Federal Responsibility, supra note 4, at 25-26. Shaw reiterated the point a year
later. See Haitian Narcotics, supra note 307, at 42-43.
309. See INS Increases Efforts Against Criminal Aliens, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 955, 956
(1988).
310. See Federal Responsibility, supra note 4, at 28.
311. See Implementation Hearing, supra note 305, at 27-28.
312. See 8 U.S.c. §§ 1255a, 1324b.
313. See Federal Responsibility, supra note 4, at 20.
314. See, e.g., Haitian Narcotics, supra note 307, at 43.
315. See Senate Approves FY 88 INS Appropriations Bill, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1170,
1170 (1987).
316.Seeid.
317. See 1991 INS Oversight Hearing, supra note 236, at 39.
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3. Early Lessons
An overview of the first few years of serious attention to the
criminal-alien problem reveals several important lessons. First,
as early as 1986, the causes and nature of the problem were
well understood, most of the implementation challenges were
evident, and solutions had begun to emerge. The ACAP
proposal sought to piggyback on the identification and
apprehension efforts of local law enforcement agencies, called
for coordination with local agencies at key "choke points" in
the criminal-justice process, and flagged the need for improved
information system linkage. Though lacking detailed cost
estimates, the ACAP report established a promising policy
framework.318
Neither branch of the government, however, was prepared
to fund its plans. Although some members of Congress seemed
eager to increase the agency's resources, INS requests were
timid.319 Even when committee members urged Commissioner
Nelson to specify other resource needs, he declined.32o At no
point during this period did the INS request additional
investigators beyond those added under IRCA, and requests
for funds to improve its information systems were also
limited.321 Although Congress granted all INS requests for new
criminal-alien money, most new resources were dedicated
disproportionately to the Border Patrol and to IRCA
implementation.322 Despite having authorized the Attorney
General to reimburse the states for incarcerating criminal
aliens, Congress appropriated no money for the program,
eliminating the federal fiscal incentive that Congress had
authorized.
The early history of the criminal-alien problem also reveals a
mismatch of incentives between the federal and state
governments. Although the states bore most of the costs of
318. See Emerging. supra note 236, at 261.
319. Its FY 88 request was only half the amount authorized by IRCA, and the Service
requested only $9.2 million in new money for FY 89, mostly for rehabilitation of
existing facilities. See INS and the Budgetary Impact ofImplementing the Immigration and
Control Act of1986: Hearing before the House Comm. on the Budget. 100th Congo 2-3 (1987)
(statement of Rep. Frost); See Implementation Hearing. supra note 305, at 112.
320. See id. at 59.
321. See CROSSWALK, supra note 165, at 21-25.
322. The INS budget grew from $594 million in FY 86 to $822 million in FY 89. See Id.
at 21, 25.
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dealing with criminal aliens, primary responsibility for a
solution still lay with the federal government. As a result,
pressure for solutions came largely from local interests rather
than national ones. Politicians from states with large numbers
of immigrants-New York's Alfonse D'Amato and Florida's
Lawton Chiles - first focused attention on the issue and
proposed solutions. INS oversight and appropriations hearings
did not even mention the criminal-alien problem until late
1986.323 This misalignment of incentives, left unresolved when
Congress failed to fund Representative MacKay's criminal-
alien reimbursement program, is perhaps the most important
reason why the federal government failed to make headway
against criminal aliens over the next six years.
B. 1988-1993: From Infrastructure to Procedure
Instead of improving the criminal-alien removal system
substantially during the next five years, Congress and the INS
stressed reform of the removal process. Although these efforts
marginally improved the system, they did almost nothing to
solve the core problems of poor coordination, inadequate
information management, and lack of detention space.
1. Daunted by the Details ofImplementation, Congress Moves to
Procedure
The immigration provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988 foreshadowed five years of legislative and administrative
concern with the criminal-alien problem. Frustrated by the
INS's "well documented" inability to arrest, detain and remove
criminal aliens, Senator D'Amato and others turned their
attention away from the tedious, gritty details of policy
implementation and focused instead on curtailing the
procedural rights of aliens.324 The 1988 law, much of which
stemmed from legislation proposed by Senator Chiles,325
323. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Service: Budget and Oversight Issues for
Fiscal Year 1987: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy
ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Congo 1-2 (1986) (statement of Sen. Simpson).
According to a GAO evaluator active in the early studies, INS officials acted as if "there
was no criminal-alien problem" until Senators D'Amato and Chiles demanded action.
Telephone Interview with Jay Jennings, Evaluator, GAO (Feb. 14, 1997).
324. Senate Drug Bill Would Restrict Aliens' Rights, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1039,1040
(1988).
325. See Implementation Hearing. supra note 305, at 27-28.
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created a new class of criminal alien: the "aggravated felon."326
The law sharply curtailed relief for aggravated felons,327 forced
them to file expedited appeals,328 and subjected them to more
stringent re-entry conditions and penalties.329 Had a conference
with the House not revised it, the law also would have created
an expedited "administrative deportation procedure" allOWing
for removal without a hearing before an immigration judge.330
The, few managerial directives in the law brought little
concrete improvement to the criminal-alien removal system.
First, the law gave formal approval to the IHP program already
established by the INS, requiring the Service to conduct special
removal hearings for all aggravated felons while they were still
in state custody.331 Second, Congress directed the INS to take
all aggravated felons into custody (without bail) upon
completion of their criminal sentences if their removal hearings
had not been completed.332 Finally, the new law required the
INS to establish a program to respond (on a 24-hour basis) to
local law enforcement requests regarding the immigration
status of alien arrestees suspected of being aggravated felons.333
Tellingly, however, Congress appropriated no new funds to
expand the INS detention facilities necessitated by these
mandates nor to establish the law enforcement response
program. The only new funds appropriated for criminal
aliens-$26 million intended to fund new investigators and an
automated criminal-alien tracking system- were later diverted
to other Justice Department programs by incoming Attorney
326. See supra Section ill.A.l.
327. Under § 7347 of the ADA of 1988, aggravated felons were to be "conclusively
presumed to be deportable," making them ineligible for several forms of relief,
including withholding of deportation under INA § 243(h)(2) and suspension of
deportation under INA § 244(a). See ADA of 1988 § 7347(c), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1105(a),
1252(a)(1994». They also were no longer eligible for voluntary departure. See id. at §
7343(b),8 U.S.c. § 1105(a) (1994).
328. Aggravated felons were required to file any appeals with the federal courts
within sixty days, rather than the previous limit of six months, after their deportation
orders became final. See ADA of1988 § 7347(b),8 U.S.c. § 1254 (1994).
329. Aggravated felons were not alIowed to return to the country for ten years from
the time of their deportation. See ADA of 1988 § 7349, 8 U.S.c. § 1182(a)(I7) (1994).
Penalties for re-entry were also stiffened. See id. at § 7345, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1994).
,330. Final Anti-Drug Bill Less Anti-Alien, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1092, 1092 (1988).
But the provision was enacted in 1994. See VCCLEA § 130004, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1105a, 1252a
(1994).
331. See ADA of1988 § 7347, 8 U.S.c. § 1252a (a) (1994).
.332 See ADA of1988 § 7343, 8 U.S.c. § 1252(a)(2)(A) (1994).
333. See ADA of1988 § 7350, 8 U.s.c. § 1103 (1994).
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General Richard Thornburgh.334 At the same time, the Chiles
proposal targeting the concrete implementation problems of
the removal system- to facilitate identification of criminal
aliens at arrest by linking the INS and FBI computer
systems335-was dropped due to FBI complaints about system
compatibility and INS misgivings about how the data would be
used.336 Whether by design or accident, then, the 1988
legislation and the dearth of resources necessary to support it
shifted the focus of immigration policymakers toward
procedural reform.
As some scholars have noted, the role of procedure in
immigration policy had already been changing dramatically.337
Prior to 1981, courts had not rigorously reviewed immigration
policy, viewing it as an area of United States sovereignty to
which ordinary constitutional principles did not apply. As
Professor Schuck pointed out, "policies that in other contexts
would have been flatly unconstitutional easily passed judicial
muster."338 In the 1980's, however, this. began to change.
"Drawing upon constitutional and administrative law norms
long established in other policy areas, the courts invalidated
key INS policies and practices ... and enlarged the procedural
rights of aliens resisting expulsion."339 Although Congress
might have accepted these procedural rulings with respect to
immigrants in general, it resisted applying them to criminal
aliens.
Furthermore, the removal process was notoriously
ineffective. The GAO's New York studies revealed that delays
could occur at each stage in the hearing process and that many
cases had languished for years. In response to congressional
inquiries, INS staff were quick to blame aliens' appeals and
applications for relief. Asked how criminal aliens could be
334. See Refugees Win. INS Loses in New Supplemental Appropriations Law. 66
lNTERPRETER RELEASES 739, 740 (1989).
335. See Implementation Hearing. supra note 305, at 27-28.
336. See Griffin Interview, supra note 159; Biggs Interview, supra note 231-
337. See. e.g.• Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation ofImmigration Law. 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1984), reprinted in Schuck, supra note 2, at ch. 2; Peter H. Schuck, The Emerging
Political Consensus on ImmigratIon Law, 5 GEO. lMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1991); Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law after a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Con'stitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. J. 545 (1990). .
338. Peter H. Schuck, The Politics of Rapid Legal Change: Immigration Policy· in the
1980's, 6 STUD. AMER. POL DEV. 37, 85 (1992), reprintedin Schuck; supra note 2, at chAo
339. Id. (footnotes omitted). . -',' ;
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removed quickly, Commissioner Nelson suggested restricting
the hearing process: "By statutorily extending due process to
illegal aliens beyond constitutional requirements, we have
invited abuse of our legal system .... It is not unusual for an
INS special agent to execute an order of deportation on a
criminal alien who has been in proceedings for six to eight
years."340 His answer was often repeated by other INS staff
pressed to explain the failures of the removal system.341 The
image of aliens abusing the process gained further support
from a 1989 GAO report finding that the hearing process
sometimes lasted five years or more and that, in the end, few
aliens were removed.342 Senator Alan Simpson, a key
immigration policymaker, insisted that the government was
facing 1/a situation in deportation where the deportees had
more due process than did an American citizen."343
Meanwhile, both the INS and key legislators were aware that
the core problems of the removal system remained unsolved.
At a November, 1989 hearing, Congress and the INS reviewed
the system's failings in painful detail. Despite an increasing
volume of referrals from local law enforcement, the number of
INS investigators available to deal with criminal aliens
approximated the same low level of 1986,344 leaving the INS
unable even to identify most criminal aliens.345 Although
acknowledging the need for an information system that would
allow local law enforcement officers to flag foreign-born
offenders for INS screening, INS officials reiterated that no
funds had been appropriated for the task and that coordination
with other branches of government continued to be slow and
difficult. The FBI still had not placed INS warrants on its
computer system, and the IHP program had failed to identify
removable criminal aliens.346 The GAO recommended
immediate reform of the chaotic and ineffective INSjEOIR
340. Emerging. supra note 236, at 261.
341. See, e.g., Haitian Narcotics, supra note 307, at 42.
342. See DEPORTING AND ExCLUDING, supra note 183, at 2. The report found that
aliens' requests for relief increased case-processing times five-fold. See id. at 43. Appeals
to the BIA added more than a year to the duration of a deportation case. See id. at 45.
An appeal to the federal courts added another year. See id. at 46. Despite these delays,
only about fifteen percent of aliens managed to obtain any real relief. See id. at 42.
343.136 Congo Rec. 517,106, 517,109 (1990).
344. See /989 Judiciary Comm. Hearing on Criminal Aliens, supra note 158, at 20-22.
345, See id. at 37.
346. See id. at 40, 43, 47, 50.
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appearance control system.347 Noting the high rate of
absconding, committee members also pushed to expand INS
detention space.348 Surveying these failures, GAO investigators
nevertheless found INS efforts reasonable under the
circumstances; any improvements would require significantly
more resources.349
Having detailed the removal implementation snags, both
Congress and the INS seemed to lose heart. Representative
Bruce Morrison, who would sponsor the next major piece of
immigration legislation, llv1MACT90, acknowledged that
current INS efforts seemed only to "scratc[h] the surface" of the
problem.35o Representative Lamar Smith, the ranking
Republican on the committee, proclaimed, "if you can't deport
the criminal aliens who are in jail now, the only place really to
stop them is at the border coming into the country."351 With
little hope of success, Morrison implored INS officials to come
up with solutions "[s]o that we will know at the end of the day
that we won't, in fact, be losing ground on deportation ..."352
Though acknowledging that more could be done, the INS used
the hearing only to request formal arrest authority for
immigration agents and greater reductions in aliens'
procedural rights.353
From the beginning of his tenure in 1989, INS Commissioner
Gene McNary focused on streamlining the removal process
rather than on other aspects of the system.354 In an early
statement of priorities, McNary complained that "the way the
INS handles cases is absurd. A lawyer can keep a case in the
347. See DEPORTING AND EXCLUDING, supra note 183, at 5. At the time of the report,
the INS could not locate 56,000 of the 220,000 aliens in the deportation hearing process.
See id. at 16. Over a quarter of aliens in the sample had failed to appear at hearings as
required. Most of these cases resulted only in administrative closures, rather than
deportation orders, because immigration judges could not be sure that the INS had
effectively notified the alien of the hearing. See id. at 4.
348. See 1989 Judiciary Comm. Hearings on Criminal Aliens, supra note 158, at 74.
349. See id. at 55.
350. 1d. at 75.
351.1d. at 79.
352. See id. at 49.
353. See id. at 25, 27.
354. See Telephone Interview with Gene McNary, former INS Comm'r (Dec. 13,
1996); see also McNary Working to Gain Control Over INS, 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1403,
1404 (1989) (describing McNary's decision to scrap INS detention study) (hereinafter
McNary Gaining Control].
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system for years."355 Accordingly, the INS in 1990 urged the
adoption of the expedited administrative removal procedure
stricken in conference from the 1988 legislation.356 The Bush
Administration also proposed an expedited exclusion
procedure to be used against aliens who entered without
inspection and suggested limiting many forms of relief from
removal for an expanded class of aggravated felons.357
This focus on issues of procedure shaped the criminal-alien
provisions of IMMACT90. Like IRCA, IMMACT90 was a
substantial revision of United States immigration policy. It
increased overall levels of immigration and streamlined the
immigrant visa and naturalization processes.358 FollOWing the
GAO's recommendations, the law called for a reliable
appearance notification system backed by penalties for
nonappearance.359 Convinced that aliens' procedural rights had
gotten out of hand, Congress eliminated JRAD relief,360
expanded the aggravated felony definition,361 and further
penalized any alien who committed one.362 IMMACT90
included only one significant non-procedural reform.
Responding to INS complaints about a lack of cooperation from
state and local law enforcement agencies and disapproving of
the sanctuary laws adopted by San Francisco and other
localities, Congress required state and local governments (on
pain of losing federal crime funds) to furnish the INS with
certified conviction records within thirty days of conviction for
355. McNary Gaining Control, supra note 354, at 1403,1404.
356. See Administration Proposes Tough New Criminal Alien Bill, 67 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 577 (1990).
357. See id. at 577-78.
358. See Schuck, supra note 2, at ch. 4 for the political and legislative history of
IMMACf90.
359. See IMMACf90 § 545(a), repealed by IIRIRA § 308(b)(6).
360. See IMMACf90 § 505(a)(1) (now codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227) (allowing an alien to
avoid deportation on criminal grounds by convincing a judge (usually in state court) to
recommend that the alien's conviction not trigger deportation). For a review of the
JRAD provision and an argument for reinstating it, see Lisa R. Fine, Preventing
Miscarriage ojJustice: Reinstating the Use oj'Judicial Recommendations Against Deportation••
12 GEO. L. J. 491 (1998).
361. The new definition included a variety of drug charges, money laundering, and
any violent crime for which an alien served five years or more in prison. See
IMMACf90 § 501(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(a)(43), as amended by IIRIRA § 321(a».
362. Aggravated felons were barred from seeking asylum. See IMMACf90 § 515(a)(1)
(codified at 8 U.s.c. § 1158 (d». The time limit for appeals to federal court was also
shortened from sixty to thirty days. See IMMACf90 § 502(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1152a(a)(1». '
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all foreign-born offenders,363 and required states to provide the
INS with lists of incarcerated foreign-born offenders.364 Neither
provision assisted the states in obtaining this information or
gave the INS new money to process it. As in 1988, then,
legislators preferred procedural reform to adequately funding
the removal system.365
2. The INS is Slow to Request New Money
The Administration's FY 90 budget proposal amounted to an
overall reduction in INS resources, requesting only $9.2 million
in new money for a limited expansion of INS detention
facilities.366 Pressed by legislators, Commissioner Nelson
acknowledged that resource reductions would primarily mean
reduced enforcement.367 Congress responded by giving the INS
the $9 million it had requested as well as $12 million for new
EOIR judges.368 Despite congressional support for larger
increases,369 the FY 91 budget proposed by the new
Commissioner, Gene McNary, requested only a $42 million
increase over FY 90.370 Most new funds were to go to the Border
Patrol; the detention and deportation division budget would
actually decline by $4 million.371 Congress appropriated the
amount requested.372
By the spring of 1991, the INS began to focus its requests
more directly on the criminal-alien problem. For FY 92,
McNary requested an overall increase of $121 million. Citing
the 1989 GAO report on the deportation process, McNary
363. See IMMACf90 § 507 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 3753(a)(1l».
364. See id. Prior to IMMACT90, such data had never been collected on a systematic
basis.
365. See H.R. REP. No. 101-681, at 145-48 (1990) (expressing conference committee's
awareness of INS's lack of investigative resources and difficulty in coordination with
states). .
366. See Immigration and Naturalization Service Budget and the Naturalization Process:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and International Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Congo 10 (1989).
367. See id. at 48.
368. See Congress on Verge of Approving INS. State Dept. Funding, 66 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1229 (1989).
369. See McNary Reviews Issues and Challenges Facing INS, 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES
745,747 (1990).
370. See House Appropriations Subcommittee Holds Hearing on INS Budget, 67
INTERPRETER RELEASES 385 (1990).
371. See id.
372. See Congress Approves Fundingfor INS. State Dept., 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1215
(1990) [hereinafter Congress Approves Funding].
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earmarked $36 million of the increase for detention.373 Congress
agreed to only a $54 million increase in FY 92, but the detention
program received a substantial share of those funds.374 No
funds were allocated for more investigators, however, until the
INS did so by reprogramming FY 92 funds.375 Only in its FY 93
request-asking for more money for detention, investigators,
BOIR judges and information system development-did the
INS begin to budget for an integrated strategy to reform the
criminal-alien system.376
The surprising modesty of INS budget requests may have
reflected the agency's poor relationship with the Department of
Justice. Before inclusion in the Administration's official budget
requests, INS priorities are reviewed by both DOJ and the
Office of Management of Budget (OMB). Although INS
management enjoyed support from OMB throughout most of
this period, it was often at odds with DOJ.377 Throughout the
early years of the Bush Administration, DOJ managers
displayed little faith in INS management, sometimes sparking
open confrontation.378 The Department diverted new INS
appropriations to its own uses379 and even moved INS
investigators away from their regular work to participate in
more high~profile law enforcement task forces.38o In this
environment, INS had difficulty moving its budget requests
past DOJ.381 INS requests for automation funds or additional
investigators fared particularly poorly.382 DOJ's hostility was so
serious that McNary declared in 1993 that the INS would not
be effective as long as it was part of the Justice Department.383
373. See INS Commissioner Discusses INS Budget and Management; Justice Dept. to Create
Oversight Positions, 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 341, 342 (1991).
374. See Congress Clears FY92 Funding for INS, State Dept., 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1477 (1991).
375. See Immigration and Naturalization Service's General Operations and Fiscal 1993
Budget: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Law, Immigration and Refugees ofthe
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Congo 2 (1992) [hereinafter INS General Operations
andFY93 Budget].
376. See House Panel Hears INS Budget Request for FY 1993, 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES
293 (1992).
377. See Telephone Interview with Gene McNary, former INS Commissioner Uune
10,1997) [hereinafter June 10, 1997 McNary Interview].
378. For more a detailed discussion of these problems, see section N.B.3, infra,
379. See supra text accompanying note 317.
380. See INS General Operations andFY93 Budget, supra note 375, at 23-26.
381. See June 10, 1997 McNary Interview, supra note 377.
382. See id.
383. See Congressional Panel Probes INS Management, Other Immigration Issues, 70
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Whatever the cause of the Administration's modest funding
requests, key elements of the criminal-alien removal system
continued to languish. The investigations program, for
example, received no new resources after the IRCA-driven
enhancement of 1988. In fact, in 1989, 1990, and 1991, the
number of investigators actually declined.384 By April of 1992,
only about one-third of the 1,100 investigators were available to
work on criminal-alien matters.385 When the INS finally added
more investigators later that year, Representative William
McCollum of Florida, a keen observer of criminal-alien policy,
remarked that the increase was long overdue.386 Information
systems also went untended. In June of 1991, McNary admitted
that most new funds for information management had been
siphoned off for other purposes, and little new system
development had occurred.387 As a result, the INS did not begin
automating its criminal-alien tracking system (ENFORCE) until
1991.388 Despite the 1986 ACAP strategy of improved
coordination with local law enforcement, the INS by 1992 still
could only guess at the size of the criminal-alien problem.389
Even the relatively simple matter of disseminating INS
warrants for alien absconders through the FBI system was not
arranged until December of 1991, and even then only on a pilot
basis.39o Despite the clear requirement of the 1986 and 1988
legislation, the lack of automation resources continued to
prevent development of the LESC as late as 1992.391
3. INS Management Problems Contribute to Delay
Management upheaval at the INS exacerbated neglect of the
criminal-alien removal system. Even before Gene McNary took
over as Commissioner, friction between DOJ and INS erupted
when DO] published a scathing audit of several INS
lNTERPRETERRELEASES449,451 (1993) [hereinafter Congressional Panel Probes INS}.
384. See INS General Operations and FY 93 Budget, supra note 375, at 21-22.
385. See lMMIGRATION AND NATURAUZATION SERV., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION
Acr OF 1990, REPoRT ON CRIMINAL ALIENS 3 (1992) [hereinafter REPORT ON CRIMINAL
AUENS].
386. See INS General Operations and FY93 Budget, supra note 375, at 52.
387. See 1991 INS Oversight Hearing, supra note 236, at 39.
388. See REPoRT ON CRIMINAL AUENS, supra note 385, at 12; see also Congress Approves
Funding, supra note 372, at1215, 1216.
389. See REPORT ON CRIMINAL AUENS, supra note 385, at 5.
390. See id. at 10.
391. See id. at 11 (discussing development of LESC).
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programs.392 Seeking to address these and other problems,
McNary launched a broad reorganization,393 but his efforts
failed to silence the critics. Between September and November,
1990, the GAO released two reports highly critical of INS
management systems, programming and leadership,394 finding
that several programs essential to criminal-alien enforcement
were in serious disarray.395
Commissioner McNary and the new INS General Counsel,
William P. Cook, were at loggerheads. In a set of memos sent
secretly to the Justice Department, Cook partly confirmed the
GAO findings and suggested that McNary and the INS could
not avoid the "tendency toward self-destruction" that had
characterized the agency's history.396 In response, Attorney
General Thornburgh appointed a DOJ task force to oversee the
reorganization.397 The upheaval ended only when the Attorney
General approved McNary's reorganization plan in April of
1991.398 Finally, in May of 1991, the House Appropriations
Committee issued its own report, casting doubt on McNary's
reorganization.399
Meanwhile, the criminal-alien problem was continuing to
392. The audit charged that INS's computer systems had "major problems," that its
investigations division suffered from overlapping responsibilities and a lack of
coordination, and that its ability to track investigations was inadequate. Justice
Department Audit Criticizes INS, 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 245 (1989). The INS responded
with uncharacteristic venom two weeks later, calling the audit "myopic," "incorrect"
and "an outrageous misrepresentation of facts." INS Rebuts Justice Dept. Audit, 66
INTERPRETER RELEASES 325 (1989).
393. See McNary Proposes Massive INS Reorganization, 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 605
(1990).
394. See INS INFORMATION MANAGEMENT, supra note 159, at 1; U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OmCE, IMMIGRATION MANAGEMENT: STRONG LEADERSHIP AND
MANAGEMENT REFORMS NEEDED TO ADDRESS SERIOUS PROBLEMS 3 (1991); see also GAO.
INS General Counsel Both Blast INS as Poorly Run, 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1325 (1990)
[hereinafter INS Poorly Run].
395. The GAO pointed to overlapping enforcement duties and noted that the INS had
not kept up with increased detention demands. See INS Poorly Run. supra note 394, at
1326. Despite the shortage of investigations resources, the GAO found that fifty-seven
percent of investigators' time was spent on activities that could be accomplished by
lower-grade personnel. See Final GAO Management Report Critical ofINS, 68 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 218 (1991).
396. INS Poorly Run, supr.a nO,te 394, at 1325, 1327 (quoting memorandum from INS
General Counsel William P. Cook to Deputy Attorney General William P. Barr).
397. See iel. at 1328.
398. See 1991 INS Oversight Hearing, supra note 236, at 11.
~99. See Congressional Report Finds Skepticism fOr Reorganization Efforts at INS, 68
INTERPRETER RELEASES 585 (1991).
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grow, outstripping the agency's modest improvements.400 By
the time Doris Meissner became INS Commissioner in late
1993, a new congressional investigation had found "serious
and in some cases long-running problems with the INS
criminal alien program . . . . at the initial identification stage,
the final deportation stage, and most points in-between."401
Despite the steady growth in the INS's budget, almost no new
positions had been added for investigators or detention and
deportation officers.402 Like the GAO seven years earlier, the
congressional staff found that the INS still did not even know
the number of detainers currently lodged against criminal
aliens in state or local custody.403 Only six percent of the
criminal aliens identified through the IHP program completed
the hearing process prior to being released,404 and with only
3,500 detention spaces, the INS still could not detain most
criminal aliens in the early 1990s.405 Contrary to Representative
Morrison's hopes, the INS was losing ground against criminal
aliens.
C. 1994-1998: State Pressure Triggers Action.
By the beginning of 1994, however, Congress's detachment
and the INS's prostration were coming to an end. The INS
began to request substantial new resources to build a new
removal infrastructure. Congress began to support the agency,
meeting or exceeding the Administration's large requests each
400. See id. at 587-99. In its April 1992 progress report to Congress on the criminal-
alien problem, the INS could do little more than observe the "noted disparity between
the size of the diverse criminal-alien population and the INS's resources available to
address the problem." REPoRT ON CRIMINAL AUENS, supra note 385, at 5. In June of
1992, a GAO report on INS detention policies noted in a similarly hopeless tone that
even the INS's plan to increase its detention capacity by nearly thirty percent would
"not significantly alleviate the shortage of detention space" and that detaining all the
aliens who needed to be detained would be impractical and "cost prohibitive." U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION CONTROL: IMMIGRATION POLICIES AFFECT INS
DETENTION EFFORTS 3 (1992).
401. Criminal Aliens in the United States, supra note 37, at 17.
402. See CROSSWALK, supra note 165, at 16, 23.
403. See Criminal Aliens in the United States, supra note 37, at 27.
404. See id. at 20. Some criminal aliens have even brought suit to force the INS to
deport them more quickly. See Recent Decisions, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 828 (1993); cf
John Kim, Requiring the INS to Do Its Job: Expeditious Deportation Proceedings and INA
§ 242(i), 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1225 (1993) (noting that a number of aliens are
detained past the ends of their sentences). .
405. See Criminal Aliens in the United States, supra note 37, at 21; Feb. 11, 1999, Bergeron
Interview, supra note 25.
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year. The most important cause of the political shift was the
political muscle exerted by the California and Florida state
governments.406
1. Rising Local Frustration
From the beginning, public frustration with the criminal-
alien problem had been articulated primarily by politicians and
officials from those states with the largest alien populations,
especially New York and Florida. Though their efforts helped
Congress and the INS focus on the need to coordinate with
local law enforcement, they did not persuade Congress to make
concrete investments. Local governments in California that
shouldered a disproportionate share of the criminal-alien
problem were also deeply dissatisfied with the puny federal
response, and they began to complain publicly.407
But it was not until Pete Wilson began his tenure as
California's governor that these calls for reimbursement began
to attract national attention. Taking office in the midst of a
recession, Wilson faced a seriously strained state budget.408
Despite having advocated increased immigration as a
senator,409 Governor Wilson turned to Washington to obtain
406. In the view of some congressional staff members, the new focus on criminal-
alien enforcement was an early manifestation of the conservative shift of the electorate
soon to be expressed in the 1994 elections. See Telephone Interviews with Carmel Fisk
and Carl Kaufman, legislative assistants to Rep. William McCollum (Nov. 20, 1996). It is
not clear, however, that those sentiments should automatically have fixed themselves
on criminal aliens nor that they would have been translated into governmental action
even before they were expressed at the ballot box.
407. In October of 1989, for example, Los Angeles County undertook a study of the
population of criminal aliens in its justice system. See generally COUNTYWIDE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE COORDINATION COMM., Los ANGELES COUNTY, CRIMINAL AUENS IN THE LOS
ANGELES COUNTY JAIL POPULATION ii (1990). Finding that eleven percent of those
released from L.A. County jail facilities were deportable aliens and that over half had
been convicted of narcotics or other serious offenses, the report called for federal
reimbursement for the substantial local costs of arresting, prosecuting and incarcerating
criminal aliens. See id. at iv-v. The California state legislature held hearings decrying
the impact of criminal aliens on overworked state courts. See Emesto Portillo, Jr., l//egal
Migrants Add to Court Burden: System Already Is Overloaded, Assembly Panel Told, SAN
DIEGO UNlON-TRlB., June 2, 1990, at Bl. Legislators introduced bills requiring local
police to notify the INS of any aliens arrested on drug charges and encouraging local
courts to use INS personnel to screen defendants at arraignment, as one San Diego
court had done. See House Approves Tough Criminal Alien Bill, 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1155, 1156 (1990). Another legislator went so far as to suggest that California sue the
federal government to force reimbursement. See Smith, Clutching at Straws, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Nov. 18, 1990, at C2.
408. See George Skelton & Daniel M. Weintraub, Wilson Proposes Increasing State Sales
Tax 11/4 cents, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1991, at AI.
409. See Schuck, supra note 2, at 108.
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federal relief for immigration-related expenses, including
incarceration of criminal aliens.410 By early 1992, the issue had
become a Time cover story.
Politicians from other highly affected states soon renewed
their efforts to seek relief for their own constituencies. In early
1992, Senator D'Amato and then-Brooklyn Congressman (now
Senator) Charles Schumer sponsored legislation to reimburse
the states for costs associated with incarcerating criminal aliens
and urged the federal government to take criminal aliens out of
state custody and onto former military bases until they could
be removed.411 Increasing the pressure on the INS, New York
sued the Justice Department in April of 1992, claiming that the
INS failed to take custody of aliens released from state prisons
as required under IMMACT90.412 The court gave New York no
relief, but the lawsuit raised the profile of the criminal-alien
issue. In an effort to hone their own political cases against the
federal government, Los Angeles,413 San Diego,414 and
Orange415 Counties in California launched detailed studies of
the impact of illegal aliens on local services. As the Clinton
Administration took office, the governors of the five states
most heavily affected by immigration (California, Florida,
Texas, New York, and Illinois) wrote to the new president,
seeking relief from the increasing burdens of immigration on
local justice, health care, and education services.416
Responding to complaints from these localities,
410. See Wi/son Wants U.S. to Help State Support Immigrants, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm.,
~ov.21,1991,atl\9.
411. See INS Reports to Congress on Criminal Alien Strategy, 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES
479,482 (1992).
412. See Cuomo v. Barr, 812 F.Supp. 324 ~.D.~.Y. 1993); see also Albany Sues U.S. on
Aliens Held in Prison, N.Y. nMES, l\pr. 28,1992, at Bl. In 1986, New York State passed
legislation allowing non-violent criminals to be released early on the condition that the
INS would deport them. See Change in N.Y. Law Permits Early Deportation, 63
INTERPRETER RELEASES 741 (1986). Corrections officials, however, had been unable to
use the law because the INS neither detained nor deported these aliens, and the State
wound up taking them back into custody. See l\nnucci Interview, supra note 66.
413. See generally INTERNAL SERVo DEP'T, Los l\NGELF5 COUN1Y, 1MPACf OF
UNDOCUMENTED PERSONS AND OTHER lMMIGRANTS ON COS'IS, REVENUES, AND SERVICES
IN Los l\NGELES COUNTY (1992).
414. See Lynn Neary, Immigrant Services Burden California Economy, ~ATIONAL PuBuc
RADIO,l\ug. 26, 1992 (transcript on file with the editors of this Journal).
415. See Eric Uchtblau & Kevin Johnson, O.c. to Study Cost ofServices to Immigrants,
L.A. nMES, Oct. 16,1992, at l\1.
416. See Senate Approves Anti-Crime Legislation With Important Immigration Provisions, 70
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1538,1543 (1993) (citing 139 CONGo REC. S15,757 (daily ed. Nov.
16,1993» [hereinafter Senate Approves Anti-Crime Legislation].
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Representative Gary Condit of California launched an
extended investigation into the impact of illegal aliens on local
services in March of 1993.417 Chief among the problems
Condit's committee uncovered was the inadequacy of the
criminal-alien removal system.418 It was equally clear, however,
that the INS could not make substantial progress without
additional funds. Testifying at the committee's first hearing,
Assistant Commissioner Shaw repeated his 1988 conclusions
that a lack of resources, along with !RCA's mandates, had
prevented the INS from making any substantial progress in
implementing its 1986 criminal-alien apprehension plan.419
California's corrections agency supported the INS plea for
resources and added that, in the meantime, states ought to be
reimbursed for the costs imposed by a failed federal system.420
Variations on these two themes, along with a more detailed
review of the now-familiar problems of state and federal
coordination, filled eight hearings and several hundred pages
of testimony.
By the end of 1993, state frustrations had reached the boiling
point. Governor Wilson wrote President Clinton an open letter,
asking him to /Iend the insanity" of failed immigration policies.
Florida's Governor, Lawton Chiles, announced plans to sue the
federal government over its failure to prevent the entry of
illegal aliens into the state.421 Condit's committee concluded its
work in the summer of 1994 by advocating greater resources
for the INS to support criminal-alien removal and federal
reimbursement of state incarceration and criminal-justice costs
associated with illegal aliens.422 The committee asked the INS to
promulgate a detailed strategy and to request the new
resources necessary to identify all criminal aliens in state
417. See H.R. REP. No. 103-645, at 6 (1994) (describing process that led to report); see
also Congressional Panel Probes INS, supra note 383, at 449 (describing first of these
hearings).
418. See H.R. REP. No. 103-645, at 4 (1994) (reviewing some results of dysfunctional
removal system).
419. See The Impact ofFederal Immigration Policy and INS Activities on Communities:
Hearings bejbre the Subcomm. on Injbrmation, Justice, Transportation, and Agriculture ofthe
House Comm. on Gov't Operations, l03d Congo 7 (1993 and 1994).
420. See id. at 42-47.
. 421. See William Booth, Florida Plans to Sue US. Over Illegal Immigrants, WASH. POST,
Dec. 30, 1993, at AI.
422. See H.R. REP. No. 103-645, at 5 (1994).
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custody and increase the removal rate.423
2. Real Progress Begins
As state and local frustration increased, the Clinton
Administration focused more closely on criminal-alien
removal. In its first budget request covering the INS, the
Clinton Administration had requested an increase of only $40
million, most of which was not targeted at criminal aliens.424
The Administration, however, soon fashioned a more
aggressive enforcement program to target criminal aliens and
alien smugglers.425 Despite serious budgetary constraints on
other programs, it requested $172.5 million in new INS
funds.426
Congress was more prepared' fuan ever to support the
Administration. It further expanded the aggravated felony
definition, creating a streamlined administrative deportation
procedure, eliminating INA § 212(c) relief for certain aliens,
and allowing judges in federal criminal cases to order
deportation.427 More importantly, Congress approved the
Administration's full appropriation request for the INS,
providing new resources for the criminal-alien program.428 This
action was all the more striking because it represented the first
violation of the House's own allocation rule under the 1990
budget agreement.429 Lawmakers also began another set of
hearings to address the details of the criminal-alien removal
system,430 suggesting that Congress was finally prepared to
423. See id.
424. See House Panel Hears INS Budget Request for FY94, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASFS 612
(1993).
425. One immigration policy analyst working at OMB at the time recalls that in the
early days of the Clinton Administration, "no one expected immigration to be a hot
issue." Telephone Interview with Un tiu, Assistant Comm'r for Policy, INS Guly 15,
1997) [hereinafter Liu Interview]. By the summer of 1993, however, after repeated
pressure from the states (along with the high-prome grounding of the Golden Venture
and the discovery that the World Trade Center bombing had been engineered by
aliens), immigration initiatives had risen to the top of the Administration's agenda. See
id.
426. See Clinton Formally Announces Sweeping Immigration Initiative, 70 INTERPRETER
RELEASFS 1001 (1993).
427. See id. at 1540.
428. See Congress Clears Appropriations Bill Boosting Immigration Enforcement,. 70
INTERPRETER RELEASFS 1433 (1993) [hereinafter Congress Clears Appropriations Bill]. .
429. See House, Senate Approve 1994 Appropriationsfar INS, State Dept., 70 INTERPRETER
RELEASFSI033, 1034 (1993). .
430. See, e.g., Criminal Aliens in the United States, supra note 37; at"21 (1993); see also
HeinOnline -- 22 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 448 1998-1999
448 Harvard Journal ofLaw & Public Policy [Vol. 22
tackle the system's chronic implementation problems. The INS
immediately seized the opportunity, requesting a FY 95
increase of $368 million, or twenty-two percent over the
recently increased FY 94 level.431 Much of the new money
would be targeted at criminal-alien enforcement, and another
substantial sum would support new removal system
automation efforts.432
At the state level, however, anger continued to rise. In April
of 1994, Florida filed the lawsuit it had threatened, charging
that the federal government had forced the state to bear
disproportionate expenses for the education and health care of
illegal aliens by failing to enforce the immigration laws.433
California, Texas, Arizona, and New Jersey soon filed similar
lawsuits. Each state made similar arguments, and most cited
the costs of incarcerating criminal aliens as one of their chief
burdens. Although the lawsuits were dismissed, the Senate
Appropriations Committee held hearings in June of 1994 to
address the governors' concerns.434 The hearings produced no
specific agreements on federal reimbursement.435
Meanwhile, the Administration sought to appease the states.
A week after the filing of the Florida lawsuit, the Clinton
Administration announced that it would seek $350 million to
reimburse states for the cost of incarcerating illegal aliens - the
first attempt by any Congress or administration to fund § 501
of IRCA, the long-ignored attempt to make the federal
government pay the full costs of INS failure.436 Although the
Administration denied it was responding to the state
lawsuits,437 the pressures exerted by state politicians
1994 Hearings on Criminal Aliens, supra note 40.
431. See Reno, Meissner Announce Comprehensive Immigration Initiative, 71 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 209 (1994).
432. See INS Testifies on its Budget andResourcesfor Next Year, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES
585,586 (1994).
433. See Chiles v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
434. See generally Increasing Costs of Illegal Immigration: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Appropriations, 103d Congo (1994).
435. One senator praised the governors' efforts as "the only way to force the federal
government to solve the immigration problem." Governors Blast Federal Government on
Failure to Curb lllegalImmigration, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 894,896 (1994) (statement
of Sen. Harry Reid).
436. The program is now known as the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program
(SCAAP). See House Approves Omnibus Anti-Crime Legislation with Immigration Impact, 71
INTERPRETER RELEASES 628, 630 (1994) [hereinafter House Approves Anti-Crime
Legislation).
437. See id.
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(particularly Pete Wilson) were critical.438 Given the high
profile that the criminal-alien issue had attained by 1994, the
reimbursement program easily garnered funding in t1:le final
FY 95 budget, albeit at a level of only $130 million.439
Congressional attention also produced progress. Congress
continued to restrict criminal aliens' procedural defenses and
granted several new routes for removal, including a
streamlined "administrative deportation" procedure allowing
the INS to skip an immigration hearing altogether for those
aggravated felons who were not LPRs and for whom no relief
was available.44o Expressing an unprecedented faith in the INS
and its new Commissioner, Doris Meissner, Congress exceeded
the Administration's request and granted the Service a twenty-
nine percent increase in its FY 95 budget.441 Significantly, the
new budget included substantial funds to improve the INS
removal infrastructure, especially its lagging information
systems, which received an unprecedented infusion of $155
million442-over seven percent of the new INS budget of $2.1
billion. After Congress passed the new budget, Meissner
acknowledged that the huge increase was "about as much as
any agency can effectively ingest," and promised substantial
progress as a result.443
Near the end of 1994, with an attentive Congress watching, a
stable management team in place, and improved relations with
the Justice Department, the INS embarked on a period of rapid
and steady growth. Having already focused much of its
attention on enforcement, INS priorities were largely
undisturbed by the Republican victory in the 1994 elections,
and the relationship between the Service and Congress
438. See Liu Interview, supra note 425.
439. See Congress Clears Appropriations Bill, supra note 428, at1141, 1144.
440. See VCCLEA § 130004. Congress also added a "judicial deportation" procedure
in which U.S. district court judges would have the authority to order a criminal alien
deported as part of the sentence in a criminal trial if the criminal conviction would
render the alien deportable. See INCfA § 222. The list of crimes considered aggravated
felonies was expanded. See id. Penalties for unlawful re-entry by aggravated felons
increased from a maximum of ten years to twenty. See VCCLEA § 130001 (amending 8
U.S.c. § 1326(b)(2)).
441. See Congress Clears Appropriations Bill, supra note 428, at1141.
442. See id. at 1142. The infusion of new automation money in 1994 supported the
issuance of the largest information system contract in INS history. See INS Hopes New
Contracts Will Improve AutomatedSystems, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 8,18 (1995).
443. Commissioner Meissner Recaps First Year, Discusses Recent Developments, 71
INTERPRETER RELEASES1546 (1994).
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remained strong. In the FY 96 budget, the Clinton
Administration again requested a substantial expansion of the
INS budget (twenty-four percent over FY 95),444 and Congress
agreed to a twenty-two percent hike, a seventy-two percent
increase over FY 93 levels.445 Coming in a year in which budget
negotiations resulted in two government shut-downs, this
increase was particularly remarkable. Rapid expansion has
continued ever since.446
Accumulated frustration over criminal-alien removals also
pushed Congress in 1996 to enact two laws-AEDPA and
IIRIRA-creating the most stringent criminal-alien provisions
ever adopted. The acts again expanded the definition of
aggravated felony447 and lowered the sentencing threshold
required for certain crimes to trigger removability.448 The new
laws subjected most criminal aliens to summary removal
proceedings and foreclosed all forms of relief (other than
asylum) from removal for almost all criminal aliens except
LPRs who had been in the country for ten years.449 Congress
also required the INS to take most incarcerated criminal aliens
into custody upon completion of their sentences, although
insufficient detention space forced the Service to postpone the
effective date of the mandatory detention provisions.45o Finally,
AEDPA took the unprecedented step of allowing state and
local law enforcement officers to arrest and detain aliens who
had been previously convicted of a felony and removed.451
3. Recent Progress
With these new resources, the INS moved forward on a
range of initiatives designed to tackle the removal system's
serious coordination problems. By early 1995, the INS had
444. See Clinton Administration Announces FY 1996 Immigration Proposed Budget, 72
INTERPRETER RELEASES 229 (1995).
445. See Stalled Appropriations Bill Contains Significant Increases in INS Funding, 73
INTERPRElER RELEASES 187 (1996).
446. See Feb. 11, 1999, Bergeron Interview, supra note 25.
447. See AEDPA § 440(e); see also llRIRA § 321.
448. See AEDPA § 435(a).
449. See AEDPA § 440(d); IIRIRA § 304. For a discussion of the changes made by
IIRIRA see Lenni B. Benson, The "New World" ofJudicial Review ofRemoval Orders, 12
GEo.IMM. 1.J.233 (1998).
450. See AEDPA § 440(c); see also IIRIRA § 303.
451. The local law enforcement agency is required to obtain confirmation from INS
regarding the alien's immigration status. See AEDPA § 440.
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implemented some form of the IHP program in forty states.452
By FY 96, as a result of these efforts, the INS was able to
interview and make preliminary alienage determinations for a
majority of foreign-born state prisoners in the seven states
holding roughly eighty percent of the country's incarcerated
criminal aliens.453 In those states and in the federal prison
system, the INS begins removal proceedings against almost all
removable aliens identified through the IHP prior to their
release from prison,454 and proceedings for roughly a third are
completed by the time of release.455 The number of hearings
conducted through the IHP has risen substantially in recent
years.456 INS staff now screen prisoners in some local jails with
high populations of aliens.457 These efforts could be
supplemented on a state-by-state basis by programs allowing
the removal of certain non-violent prisoners at the comple,tion
of their sentences, which the states have decided to reduce in
order to expedite removal.458 The first such program was
established in 1994 in Florida, and another was established the
next year in New York,459 In 1996, Congress authorized such
programs nationwide, but no other state has established one.
This suggests that this approach has little appeal to most states.
Border states like California and Texas fear that aliens removed
in this fashion will simply re-enter illegally. In addition, most
aggravated felons, now a very broad category, are statutorily
ineligible for such programs.460
The INS has also recently addressed some of the information
452. See Hearings on Removal, supra note 49, at 18.
453. See Telephone Interview with Lydia St. John-Mellado, Special Assistant to the
Assoc. Comm'r for Enforcement, INS Oune 30, 1997) [hereinafter St. John-Mellado




456. See idi Interview with David A. Martin, former INS General Counsel Oune 29,
1998).
457. Screening began at the Los Angeles County jail on a regular basis on June 1, 1995
and on Riker's Island in New York City later that year. In 1996 and early 1997, the INS
opened jail screening projects in Orange County, California, Dade and Broward
Counties in Florida, and in Dallas, Texas. See Telephone Interview with Russell
Bergeron, Office of Pub. Mfairs, INS (Mar. 19, 1997).
458. See 8 U.S.c. § 12311(a)(4)(B).
459. See Florida to Try Early Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1994, at A25; Ian Fisher,
Pataki Announces Aliens' Expulsion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1995, at AI.
460. See Telephone Interview with Ronald Dodson, Director of Evaluation and
Support, Office of Programs, INS (Mar. 30, 1999).
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system problems that have hampered coordination with local
law enforcement and among branches of the INS. Funding in
1994 finally allowed the Service to implement Congress's 1988
directive that the INS establish a 24-hour service to respond to
local law enforcement officers seeking information on the
immigration status of arrested aliens. The Law Enforcement
_Support Center (LESC) opened on a pilot basis in 1989. Since
then it has gone on to become a permanent unit with its own
budget appropriated by Congress. The LESC provides
information on criminal aliens to local, state, and federal law
enforcement agencies (LEAs) twenty-four hours a day. It
currently answers requests from fourteen states with a goal to
reach all fifty by the end of 1999.' Congress recently
appropriated funding to double the staffing and provide a new
building for the expanded center.461
Any LEAs may access the LESC by sending a query via
NLETS, a pre-existing law enforcement information network.
LESC staff then search INS and criminal databases for
information on the alien. LESC staff finds records for more than
sixty percent of the queries, and search times average about
five to seven minutes. If the alien is not in the database, a local
INS office is notified so that he or she can be interviewed.
When the alien is found to be an aggravated felon or to have
been previously deported, the INS staff in the local area may
detain the alien pending removal or prosecution for re-entry. In
Maricopa County, Arizona, where the project has functioned
the longest, INS interviewed over 4,500 criminal aliens in 1998,
a ten-fold increase since 1996.462
In 1998, the LESC acquired new responsibilities in
accordance with the "Brady Bill." The LESC assists the FBI by
running secondary checks on non-citizens to determine
eligibility to purchase firearms. In addition, the LESC reviews
about 1500 FBI rap sheets on criminal aliens weekly. The
location of the alien is determined and, if the alien is in
custody, LESC agents ensure that an INS detainer is placed.
Often, agents find aggravated felons under prior orders of
removal who have convictions for murder, rape, and other
serious crimes. Agents notify local INS offices so that criminal
461. See Information Received from Callie A. Gagnon, Public Affairs Specialist,
Eastern Regional Office of Congressional and Public Affairs, INS (Mar. 5, 1999).
462. See id.
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aliens are not released into the community. When discrepancies
in identification occur, the LESC uses an image retrieval system
that enables,it to download pictures, prints, and signatures of
certain cri.rriinal aliens from INS databases. These are then
faxed to the requesting LEA for positive identification.463
Since 1991, the INS has used the FBI's NCIC system to
disseminate information on Warrants of Deportation for
criminal aliens who fail to appear for removal.464 From a
database of only a few thousand INS cases, the system has
generated over 450 arrests of absconders.465 Early in 1996, the
INS expanded the program to include criminal aliens
previously removed.466 In September, 1994, the INS began a
cooperative arrangement with California in which fingerprints
of criminal aliens subject to removal orders are entered into the
state's criminal history database. If the alien is arrested again,
the arresting agency can see that the alien was previously
ordered removed and can notify the INS, which has promised
to take these aliens into federal custody for removal or criminal
prosecution.467
The better-funded INS has also improved its own
notoriously fragmented and ineffective information systems. It
has enhanced the system used to track enforcement cases
(ENFORCE) and has created an automated fingerprint system
(IDENT) to track aliens caught crossing borders illegally.468 The
INS has made the IDENT program the backbone of all of its
automated enforcement systems. When linked to the FBI's
newly updated criminal database and to fingerprint experts at
a Washington, D.C. biometric center, the IDENT system can
generate positive identification of all criminal aliens at arrest
without requiring investigative interviews.469
463.Seeid.
464.Seeid.
465. See REMOVAL OF ILLEGAL AliENS, supra note 78, at 4-5.
466. See id.
467. By October, 1996, the program had led to the federal detention and prosecution
of more than 1,600 criminal aliens in California. See RECORD OF PROGRESS, supra note
236, at9.
468. !DENT uses a two-fingerprint identification system and is more than 98 percent
accurate even without auxiliary inputs by fingerprint experts. See Biggs Interview,
supra note 231.
469. See id. As of March, 1999, !DENT had been installed at almost half of the relevant
INS workstations in most or all Border Patrol offices, detention facilities, asylum offices,
and district enforcement offices, but in only forty percent of the ports of entry. See id.
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The increase in resources for enforcement operations (as
distinct from central management and staff services) since FY
93 has also been dramatic. The INS has increased its
investigative staff and detention and deportation staff,470
Detention space had grown from 3,500 beds at the end of FY 93
to 16,100 beds by January, 1999.471 As was discussed in Part
II.C., these extra resources have had a measurable effect on the
system's performance. Coordination with federal prosecutors
has also improved, resulting in many more prosecutions for
illegal re-entry.472
After long delays, the INS has also begun to use the new
authority granted by the 1994 and 1996 legislation. In FY 98, the
INS removed 5,686 criminal aliens under the administrative
removal provisions, which obviate the need to go through the
normal EOIR immigration court process, and under the
authority to reinstate prior removal orders. This shift from the
IHP to a more expedited institutional removal program (IRP)
should become more pronounced in the future.473
V. CONCLUSION
More than ten years after developing its Alien Criminal
Apprehension Program in 1986, the INS has made some
progress on criminal-alien removals. The INS now uses the
LESC to help local law enforcement personnel identify alien
arrestees. Under the IHP and IRP programs, a majority of
removable criminal aliens in state and federal prisons now
begin removal proceedings prior to their release. Many aliens
who were previously removed or who fled during proceedings
can now be identified through FBI information networks. The
INS has expanded its detention space and accelerated the
removal process for most aliens. It has begun to deploy a
biometric identification system compatible with other law
enforcement networks along the border. Better coordination
with prosecutors is beginning to strengthen the deterrent
against re-entry. But the agency's recent progress begs the
question of why Congress waited until 1994 to pay the bill that
made progress possible. After all, lawmakers began
470. See CROSSWALI<, supra note 165, at 2-4, 25.
471. See Feb. 11, 1999, Bergeron Interview, supra note 25.
4721 See. e.g.• text accompanying note 239, supra.
473. See Feb. 11, 1999, Bergeron Interview, supra note 25.
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investigating the criminal-alien removal problem in 1985, and
the resulting stream of GAO reports, internal DOJ critiques,
INS plans, and committee testimony revealed the key
implementation pitfalls early and often. Besides showing
Congress which problems needed fixing, these investigations
revealed the agency's urgent need for greater resources and
suggested specific avenues for reform. Yet Congress responded
by passing procedural fixes instead of assuring fiscal and
administrative support for effective removal.
The new management at INS and DOJ deserves much credit
for the turnaround.474 Commissioner Meissner also enjoys a far
better relationship with DOJ and the rest of the executive
branch than most of her predecessors. Both Attorney General
Janet Reno and President Bill Clinton are especially sensitive to
the criminal-alien problem. As Dade County Prosecutor, Reno
knew first-hand the coordination difficulties of the removal
system and how much effort would be required to solve them.
President Clinton, having lost his first bid for re-election as
Governor of Arkansas partly because of public anger over the
detention of Mariel immigrants at a military base in Arkansas,
understood the political damage that immigration crises could
cause.475 With such sympathetic superiors, Meissner has been
able to address some of the agency's management problems
and push for large appropriations increases to support removal
infrastructure.
But if simply improving the agency's management team
were enough to attract new resources, the agency would have
made more progress in th~ latter part of Commissioner
McNary's leadership, after McNary reformed his own
management structure. Yet McNary garnered only modest
increases in funding, in stark contrast to the post-1993 pattern.
The politics of federalism, it turns out, mattered more than
improved management in stimulating new funding and
474. A former INS General Counsel called Doris Meissner "the best qualified new
INS Commissioner in the history of the agency." Grover Joseph Rees ill, Advicefor the
New INS Commissioner, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1533 (1993). One senator declared,
"there is no better person to lead the INS at this critical time, bar none." Senate Judiciary
Committee Holds Meissner Confirmation Hearing, 70 INTERPRETERRELEASES1289 (1993).
475. Commissioner Meissner herself has attributed the agenCy's improvements partly
to these coincidences. See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Briefing with Doris
Meissner, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, FED. NEWS SERV., Sept. 10,
1996. ' ,-,
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A. The Pitfalls ofFederalism
The criminal-alien problem sheds new light on the
difficulties of policy implementation in our federal system.
First, where policy implementation requires routine
administrative cooperation, the separation between state and
federal authority encourages difficulties and delay. At nearly
every stage of the removal system, the INS must rely on
agencies that share its goal of criminal-alien removal but do not
share its programming priorities or its fiscal or political
incentives. Even minor variations in emphasis can produce
deadlock. The glacial implementation of so promising an
approach as the IHP and IRP programs demonstrates how
difficult it is for separate government entities to coordinate
their efforts.
Second, separating legal authority from fiscal responsibility
is a recipe for policy failure and local frustration. Although the
federal government has sole authority to remove criminal
aliens, state and local governments bear the costs of arresting,
prosecuting, detaining, and punishing them. This mismatch
would be small if local governments could pass criminal aliens
on to the federal government once they were convicted, but
local governments can seldom rely on INS assistance. Instead, a
handful of states and localities are left with the wreckage of
ineffective federal policies.
Congress is aware of these failures, but it ordinarily has little
incentive to remedy them. Solving the problem costs the
federal government money; leaving it to fester does not.476 The
political dynamics of the criminal-alien problem make federal
inaction especially likely. Political pressure to maintain an
adequate military, for example, comes from constituencies
across the country; in contrast, improving criminal-alien
removal matters only to the handful of jurisdictions where
those aliens disproportionately reside. Although constituents
from highly affected states will force their representatives to
confront the issue, they may not hold legislators responsible if
476. Indeed, a festering problem that Congress may blame on INS incompetence
provides members with opportunities to play the attractive roles of investigator and
reformer. See generally DAVID MAYHEW, THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION [GET SUBTITLE FOR
THIS] (1974).
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the federal government fails to respond. A senator who can
produce legislation that looks tough on criminal aliens can win
support back home even if the INS lacks the tools to implement
the new law. As Congress passed round after round of tough
new criminal-alien laws without appropriating sufficient funds
to enforce them, federal politicians such as Lawton Chiles and
Alfonse D'Amato could save tax dollars for other endeavors
while credibly claiming to have confronted the criminal-alien
problem. Legislative action was cheaper than managerial
investment.
At the state level, of course, the political calculus was
different. As governors, Pete Wilson and Lawton Chiles found
that purely cosmetic legislation did little to help their cash-
strapped states. As the failure of federal criminal-alien policy
became increasingly clear to state politicians, they began
pressing for changes through their own channels. By 1993, state
politicians from high-impact states were speaking- and
litigating-in unison on the criminal-alien problem. Only
under the pressure of this concerted effort from the states did
the federal government begin to allocate substantial resources
to the criminal-alien problem. Thus, the Clinton Administration
was the first to make good on IRCA's promise, unfulfilled since
1986, to reimburse the states for the incarceration costs of
criminal aliens. Once the federal government began to bear the
fiscal responsibility for the criminal-alien problem, Congress
and the INS also began to invest seriously in managerial
improvements.
State and local governments have not been the only victims
of Congress's preference for procedural fixes over
administrative reform: aliens have suffered as well. When these
measures failed to improve the removal system and local
frustration mounted, Congress provided more of the same,
with equally meager results. After a decade of procedural
restrictions culminating in llRIRA, Congress produced a body
of law that is harsher than necessary.477 The INS must now seek
to remove nearly every alien ever convicted of a crime,
regardless of family relationships in the United States; even the
prospect of persecution in the country of origin may be
477. For the potential effects of various provisions of this new law, see Lenni B.
Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration
Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411 (1997).
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unavailing.478 Had legislators acted earlier to improve the
removal system, frustration over criminal aliens might not have
pushed the law to this extreme.
At its heart, then, the failure to address the criminal-alien
problem reflects a mismatch in government incentives: even
today, the JNS's administrative resources are not equal to its
mandated responsibilities. Although the INS is solely
responsible for enforcing the nation's immigration laws, it
cannot coordinate the radically fragmented removal system.
Although local law enforcement agencies spend money
arresting, identifying, detaining and supervising criminal
aliens, they lack authority to enforce immigration policy unless
the INS explicitly delegates it to them. Political incentives are
also at odds with legal authority. State governments have
strong fiscal incentives to remove criminal aliens as quickly as
possible, but they lack any authority to do so. Yet even the
federal politicians who must respond to frustrated constituents
have little incentive to push for expensive reforms. Such a
system provides all parties, whether at the political or
administrative level, with too much opportunity to claim that
the failure of the criminal-alien removal system is someone
else's fault.479
B. A Federalist Solution
This history of the criminal-alien problem also highlights an
important, but often overlooked, feature of federalism: local
interests can pressure national politicians to face issues they
would rather ignore. If not for the political independence of a
handful of state governments, Congress and the INS might
never have reformed the criminal-alien removal system. In a
unitary system, representatives of immigrant-receiving regions
might have been able to get by with promoting inexpensive but
478. The media have only recently begun to focus attention on the casualties of this
policy. In one case, a 26-year-old Vietnamese former refugee-turned computer
programmer faced certain deportation for a high-school fistfight. In another, a 54-year.
old Spanish woman was likely to see her 34-year legal residence come to an end over
the theft of a case of perfume. See Years Later. Immigrants Pursued by Their Pasts: Even
Minor Offenses Now Mean Deportation, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1997, at Bl.
479. For a description of the dynamics of this well-known excuse for policy failure in
other areas, see EUGENE BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER
A BILLBECOMES ALAW 159-63 (1977).
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ineffective procedural reforms. In a federal system, however,
cost-bearing localities have their own champions - state and
local politicians.480 Furthermore, as evidenced by President
Clinton's constant trips to California in pursuit of re-election,
the state-based Electoral College gives high-impact, high-
population states special leverage in presidential politics. This
factor also helps to explain why President Clinton and the
high-impact state governors succeeded in restoring many legal
immigrants' eligibility for welfare benefits in 1997 and 1998.481
These most recent displays of political muscle are hardly the
first times state governments have exercised independent
political influence over immigration policy. In fact, state and
local governments have often promoted immigration even at
the risk of impeding criminal-alien removal. In some cases,
they have provided social services and welfare benefits well
beyond what was legally required- or even legally
permitted.482 In the mid-1980s, for example, many cities with
large immigrant populations, such as New York City, Chicago,
San Francisco, and Los Angeles passed ordinances declaring
themselves to be sanctuaries, forbidding local officials,
including police, to cooperate with the INS.483 These non-
cooperation statutes hampered early coordination efforts in the
removal system.484 As late as 1989, key federal policymakers
still doubted that states would work to improve the criminal-
alien removal system.485 The fact that both Wilson and Chiles
480. Peter Skerry has made a similar point. See Peter Skerry, Many Borders to Cross: Is
Immigration the Exclusive Responsibility of the Federal Government?, 25 PuBUUS 71, 85
(1995).
481. See Celia W. Dugger, New Alliances and Attitudes on Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. I, 1997,
atA23.
482. See Peter H. Schuck, The Re-Evaluation ofAmerican Citizenship, 12 GEO. IMM. L.J., I,
29 (1997), reprinted in Schuck, supra note 2, at ch. 8; see also Skerry, supra note '480, at 79-
80.
483. See, e.g., Los Angeles and Seattle City Councils Adopt Sanctuary Resolutions, 63
INTERPRETER RELEASES 118 (1985); see also Mike Royko, Way to Fight Gangs is Alien to
Chicago, CHI. TRIB. June 7, 1988, at C3.
484. One INS official familiar with the history of deportation efforts in California
found the difference between Wilson and his predecessor (fellow Republican George
Deukmejian) to be striking. Under Deukmejian, California officials were openly
reluctant to cooperate with the INS. Within a few months after Wilson took office,
however, the state government changed its stance dramatically, launching an audit of
the state prison population in search of aliens and pushing INS officials to increase
enforcement. See Telephone Interview with Bill Boggs, IHP Coordinator for the INS W.
Reg'l Office in Laguna-Niguel, Cal. Gune 9, 1995). .
485. See, e.g., Criminal Aliens: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and
International Law ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Congo 43 (1989) (displaying
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became outspoken and effective critics of the federal
government only after they moved from federal to state
government and faced different incentives there underlines
how federalism can amplify and legitimate local views.
The independence of state governments does more than
explain how the failure of the criminal-alien removal system
came to be powerfully expressed. It also points the way to
reform. If state and local governments have both the
programming resources and the fiscal and political incentives
to remove criminal aliens, why should they not also be given
the legal authority to do so? If the federal government cannot
effectively coordinate this system on its own, why not improve
the states' incentives to cooperate? The analysis in this Article
suggests that the criminal-alien problem cannot be solved
unless states and localities are allowed and encouraged to play
a greater role in immigration enforcement.486 Although it is
beyond the scope of this Article to explore in detail how this
strategy might be implemented, a few possible approaches
seem promising:
In order to align state resources with federal criminal-alien
removal priorities, the INS could pay states for completed
criminal-alien case files suitable for INS use in removal
proceedings. Currently, INS investigators spend an average of
several hours per case interviewing prisoners, pulling together
state criminal records, and assembling case files in preparation
for removal proceedings. At the same time, states can now seek
reimbursement under SCAAP for the costs of incarcerating
removable criminal aliens. SCAAP reimbursement levels
depend upon the number of state prisoners shown (through a
comparison of state lists with INS databases) to be either illegal
aliens or LPRs currently in removal proceedings.487 To better
coordinate these systems, Congress could condition SCAAP
reimbursement on the state or local government's delivery of a
completed case file. To encourage rapid identification, the
federal government could reimburse the state only for those
incarceration expenses that the state incurred after it delivered
Rep. Morrison's belief that states would not cooperate with INS unless required to do
so).
486. See Spiro, supra note 29.
487. Statistical inferences are made to account for the fact that many illegal aliens are
unknown to the INS. See Morris Interview, supra note 64.
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the completed file to the INS. Such an arrangement would be
more effective than the current mechanism embodied in
IMMACT90 Section 507, which requires information not
narrowly tailored to suit INS's removal needs and which uses
the non-credible threat of a drastic cut in crime-fighting funds
as its only incentive.
The INS could, under appropriate safeguards to prevent
abuse, deputize state and local law enforcement officers to
perform some INS investigatory and detention functions.488
With some training and expanded INS information support
functions along the lines of the LESC, local law enforcement
agencies might be able to determine alienage. Aliens identified
as removable could then be held or released as the INS directs.
Such a system would still not assure that the INS would pick
up, detain, and remove the aliens, but at least all criminal aliens
would be identified at the time of arrest. Identifying
information would then be available to other law enforcement
agencies that might encounter the aliens, and the INS could
begin the removal process earlier in most cases. ,
Congress could also deputize local prosecutors to· press
immigration charges and reimburse them for doing so.
Participating prosecutors' offices would have to develop
expertise in immigration law, but any locality where criminal
aliens abound would have an incentive to do so. Moreover, the
1996 immigration reforms have, for better and for worse,
greatly simplified the law governing the removal of criminal
aliens, especially if they are not LPRs. Immigration hearings
themselves could still take place in immigration court, though
the large increase in caseload would necessitate more
immigration judges. Such a system would allow local criminal-
justice agencies to decide which criminal aliens to detain and
would enable prosecutors to combine immigration and
criminal law concerns in their prosecution of the case, making
those prosecutions more effective.
Congress could permit states to certify some of their criminal
courts as immigration courts, with the EOIR overseeing the
necessary training and certifications. Even more than the
previous suggestion, this would allow prosecutors to combine
488. The INS now possesses such authority under INA § 287(g), which was added by
IIRIRA.
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immigration and criminal law sanctions in their plea
negotiations with criminal aliens.
Under any system in which local officials decided whom to
hold for possible removal, the INS could also delegate
detention responsibilities to the local level, not simply contract
for local facilities as it does now. Depending on how strong an
incentive for' local participation the federal government
desired, the INS could grant reimbursement for local detention.
The INS could also delegate to local authorities the
responsibility for deciding which criminal aliens to hold on
immigration charges. Under the current system, if the local
authorities decide, based solely on local criminal-justice policy,
that a criminal alien should not be detained, they must either
release the alien or turn him over to the INS. In many cases, the
INS is not prepared to pick up and detain the alien, who may
then may be released even if he is clearly removable. To
address this problem, the INS could allow local authorities to
detain criminal aliens even in cases where detention is justified
only on immigration law grounds. To encourage local
authorities to participate, the federal government could
reimburse them (either partially or fully) whenever they chose
to use their own space to detain a criminal alien solely on
immigration-related grounds. Such a system, which would
require controls, would be far more flexible than the INS's
current policy of centrally contracting for local jail space; locals
could use their jail space as they saw fit.
Admittedly, devolving some immigration enforcement
authority to the states would be a radical step, although
Germany and Canada have long done so. In 1986, Congress
declined to adopt an INS proposal that local law enforcement
agents be authorized to arrest any alien subject to an
outstanding final order of deportation.489 More recently, the
Interstate Criminal Alien Working Group, a group of state
officials working with the INS to improve the criminal-alien
removal system, proposed that state and local officials in jails,
prisons, and probation offices be deputized to perform the
identification function on behalf of the INS.490 In the AEDPA
legislation of 1996, Congress took a small step toward
489. See INS Drafts Bill with Drastic Enforcement Provisions, 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES
452 (1986).
490. See ADDRESSING '!HE CRIMINAL AUEN PROBLEM, supra note 39, at 25.
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devolution, allowing state and local law enforcement officials
to detain previously removed illegal aliens convicted of a
felony.491
These and other devolutionary options merit further
study, of course, for such incrementalism ill-serves the public
where the incentives of government are so poorly aligned.
Having proven its intractability over the last ten years, the
criminal-alien problem is in need of more far-reaching review.
As Charles Lindblom pointed out, incrementalists may
"overlook excellent policies for no other reason than that they
are not suggested by the chain of successive policy steps
leading up to the present."492
A similar blindness may be affecting those charged with
improving the criminal-alien removal system. Despite what has
proven to be a serious misalignment of incentives,
policymakers have proceeded as if the federal government,
with sole responsibility for the identification, detention, and
deportation of criminal aliens, can discharge that responsibility
effectively. Even now, with the INS beginning to make slow
progress in removing criminal aliens, this assumption seems
doubtful. Unless policymakers review the criminal-alien
removal system afresh, they will do little more than continue
"muddling through."
491. See AEDPA § 440.
492. For the classic exposition of incrementalism, see Charles E. Undblom, The Science
of "Muddling Through," in THE POUTICS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 130 (Alan A.
Altschuler & Norman C. Thomas eds., 1977).
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